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ABSTRACT 
The research literature on children's understanding of randomness has developed 
considerably in recent decades, notably due to the key contributions of researchers such as 
Piaget and Inhelder (1975) and Tversky and Kahneman (1983). Yet the research has paid 
rather scant attention to the tools that people have available for expressing ideas about 
randomness, fairness and more generally, probability. In contrast, work within the 
paradigm of 'constructionism' makes the explicit claim that by using tools that are 
specially designed for expressing concepts of randomness and chance, people may be 
better able to express ideas that can seldom be predicted by cognitive analysis based on, 
say, misconceptions or thinking stages that fail to take sufficient account of too] mediation. 
This study investigated the nature of young children's expressions of random events. 
Specifically the aims of the study were: 
E iteratively to design and evaluate a tool-based game to afford children between the 
ages of 5 1/2and 8 opportunities to express and develop probabilistic ideas; and 
m to describe and analyse how the tool-based game mediated the children's 
expressions of chance events. 
An open computer game was designed for children to express understandings of 
randomness as formal conjectures, so that they were able to examine the consequences of 
their understandings. The game was designed simultaneously to afford children the 
opportunity to explore and express their intuitions and ideas, and to give the researcher the 
opportunity to study how probabilistic ideas evolved during the activity. 
The study was organised in two main phases. The first, iterative design phase, compared 
two cycles of design and experiments with children as they played with and reconstructed 
the game. The second phase consisted of the learning investigation phase, which describes 
in detail the expressed ideas of children in using the game. This thesis shows how a visible 
and 'continuous' medium, i. e. one in which the sample space is represented by a spatial 
and dynamic metaphor, can enhance young children's expressions of randomness. The 
findings identify children's initial meanings for expressing stochastic phenomena and 
describe how the computer tool-based game helped to shift children's attempts to 
understand randomness from looking for ways to control random behaviour, towards 
looking for ways to control events. This was significant, since the study analyses how 
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children constructed their own ideas for fairness and in particular, how they constructed 
both symmetrical and asymmetrical spatial arrangements for it. In general, it is conjectured 
that the structure of the game, and in particular, the linkage between its components, 
assisted children in developing associated mental structures that developed their 
understandings of chance. Finally, evidence is presented that the children constructed a set 
of 'situated abstractions' for ideas such as 'distribution' and the 'law of large numbers'. 
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1- The Research Rationale 
CHAPTER ONE 
The Research Rationale 
1.1 Overview 
This thesis is concerned with studying the way children can express ideas of randomness 
and probability with special focus on the tools they have available to express themselves. 
This chapter starts by giving the reasons for my decision to choose probability as the 
subject of this study. I use the term 'probability', to denote the branch of mathematics that 
describes randomness, and as a label with which I associate concepts like event, sample 
space and distribution. I outline here the motivations that made me interested in the subject 
and in so doing some aspects of my investigation come to the surface. The concept of 
probability, its history and my focus on subjective and intuitive probability from an 
epistemological view are then described in order to give a more complete idea of the 
subject. Finally, the overview of the thesis is presented. 
1.2 Why probability? 
At least two motivating factors have come into play in guiding my decision to select 
probability within the field of mathematics education as the focus of my research. 
The first factor is that my personal interest contrasts with many people's distaste of the 
subject. I have always been fascinated by the fact that concepts and intuitions about 
probability theory are present in many aspects of our 'non-mathematical' lives. Intuitively, 
people make probabilistic judgements when they choose which is the safest way to cross a 
road, when they decide to park their car in the first available spot or take the risk and move 
on to find a place closer to their destination; when they change their diet to lower the risk 
of heart disease; when they select a school with the highest results in national 
examinations. Intuitive probability is something that is widely applied in everyday life, in 
making decisions and understanding social and natural phenomena. 
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1. The Research Rationale 
Despite all this potential power, probability, from my personal experience as a student and 
as a teacher, is 'the subject everyone loves to hate' (Wilensky, 1995). Moreover, Garfield 
and AhIgren (1988) state that many students develop a distaste of probability through 
having been exposed to its study in a highly abstract and formal way. A particular 
motivation for me to understand how children could better learn about probability is the 
widespread negative view of probability. 
The second motivating factor is the existing work on probability in the field of 
mathematics education, which intrigued me to research the subject more extensively. 
Significant work in this field is Piaget and Inhelder's (1975) experiments on probabilistic 
judgements and the cognitive stages that they proposed based on these experiments. I will 
borrow here Piaget and Inhelder's own words that gradually defined my own stance 
towards the subject: 
' Could there be in a normal man an intuition of probability just as fundamental 
and just as frequently used as, say, the intuition of whole numbers? Almost 
every common action seems, in fact, to require the notion of chance as well as 
a sort of spontaneous estimate of the more or less probable character of feared 
or expected events ... Is such an intuition in-born or does it develop later and, if 
so, how is it acquiredT (p. xiii-xiv). 
I found the above question interesting. Are probabilistic judgements made, developed or 
learned? And if they are developed, how does this happen? 
A preliminary search of the literature seemed to reveal that there is a gap between 
intuitions and the construction of the formal concept of probability. In particular there is a 
gap between early intuitions about probability from everyday life and the formal 
knowledge gained from teaching. 
Although there are many studies on conceptions of probability, most of them focus on 
students' 'misconceptions' (e. g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1983). An example of what 
Tversky and Kahneman (1983) mean by a misconception is the following: they undertook 
an experiment in which they asked people whether there are more words in the English 
language that begin with Y or that have Y as their third letter. Most people, wrongly, said 
that there are more words that begin with Y. Tversky and Kahneman argued that this error 
is attributable to a heuristic of 'availability' because people can much more easily recall 
words that begin with Y than words with Y in the third position. Since words 
beginning 
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with Y are more available to them, they perceive them as more likely. This work describes 
an interesting view of how people make decisions without considering any probabilistic 
thinking, but what might it give to the learning of probability? 
My reading of the literature led to a focus on the concept of probability at an early age, 
children aged 51/2-8, where formal probabilistic knowledge is still undeveloped and 
intuitive knowledge plays a major role. I further decided to focus on the ideas of sample 
space and distribution. In the following sections I will describe some aspects of the history 
and epistemology of probability and I will outline the central importance of sample space, 
distribution and probability of an event. 
1.3 The concept of probability 
The theory of probability, or 'stochastics' as it is more commonly known in continental 
Europe, is the area of mathematics concerned with an attitude of doubt, or degree of belief, 
with respect to the outcome of some future event (Ferguson, 1971). In this section I will 
define what I mean by the terms 'randomness', 'probability', 'random phenomenon', 
4sample space', 'event', 'probability of an event' and 'distiibution'. 
1.3.1 Randomness and probability 
It is natural for humans to use statements of probability to describe uncertainty of the 
external world. People speak in everyday terms of 'chance' and 'randomness'. These 
concepts often serve them well in everyday communication because of the general 
consensus about their meanings. Yet, randomness is one of the most elusive concepts in 
mathematics. Hacking (1975) suggested that the meaning of the word random could 
be 
answered briefly, but it would take 100 pages to prove any answer correct! 
This study adopts the definition of randomness and probability offered 
by Moore (1990): 
'Phenomena having uncertain individual outcomes but a regular pattern of 
outcomes in many repetitions are called random. 'Random' is not a synonym 
for 'haphazard', but a description of a kind of order different from the 
deterministic one that is popularly associated with science and mathematics. 
Probability is the branch of mathematics that describes randomness. ' (p. 98) 
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Moore (1990) implies an external source of the uncertainty, referring to the external world, 
and opposed to an internal source in the form of one's knowledge. Falk, Falk, and Levin 
(1980) argue that probability is composed of two subconcepts: chance and proportion. One 
has to be aware of the uncertain nature of a situation in order to apply the results of 
proportional computations. Obviously the ability to calculate proportions as such does not 
necessarily signify understanding of probability. A realisation of uncertainty either in 
controlling or in predicting the outcome of an event is crucial. 
Kuzmak and Gelman (1986) define the term 'random phenomenon" as follows: 
'By a "random phenomenon, " we mean a physical phenomenon that is 
conventionally viewed as having a number of equally probable outcomes (e. g., 
the roll of a die or the toss of a coin). ' (p. 559) 
They add that there are two basic characteristics of random phenomena: (a) details of the 
mechanism by which outcomes are produced are uncertain, from which it follows that (b) 
the individual outcomes of the phenomenon are unpredictable. 
Heyman and Henriksen (1998) argue that probability can arise from two sources: the 
randomness of events in the world, and ignorance. Based on this view, someone who 
chooses heads or tails in a coin toss has 0.5 probability of being correct because of the 
inherent randomness of coin tossing. On the other hand, a person who loses his/her way 
and chooses to turn left or right has a 0.5 probability of going in the right direction given a 
lack of knowledge of the geography of the area. In other words, uncertainty about the 
future, from this perspective, may arise out of either the randomness of the world or lack of 
knowledge. The distinction between chance and lack of knowledge turns not only on the 
complexity, relative to observers' meanings, of the future that is being predicted, but also 
on their pragmatic concerns. 
Descriptions of the chance of something happening are generally intended to downplay 
ignorance, while accounts of lack of knowledge point attention to the need to learn more. 
A quantitative description of the chance of an event occurring asserts implicitly that we 
have learnt all we can about it. This form of description invites us to stop asking questions 
and to start acting. 
Chance is linked with other terms like 'risk', 'accident', 'opportunity9 or 'possibility'. 
Probability can be thought of as the mathematical approach to the quantification of chance, 
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just as rulers measure distances. The idea of risk reflects a fundamental yearning in 
humans, and perhaps all self-conscious beings, to know what will be; risk is a cultural 
concept employed in modem negotiations of everyday life as when, for example, 
somebody fastens his/her seatbelt before driving a car. The mathematical theory of risk 
provides a methodology for attempting to predict and control the future. It can also be 
defined as the projection of a degree of uncertainty about the future on the external world. 
The Royal Society (according to Heyman, 1998) defined risk as the probability that a 
particular adverse event occurs during a stated period of time, or resulting from a particular 
challenge. 
Next, I will give a more detailed definition of sample space, event, probability of an event 
and distribution and these will be the probabilistic concepts that I focus on for my study. In 
particular, I will use sample space and distribution as 'windows' (Noss and Hoyles, 1996) 
into children's meaning making about randomness, probability of an event and probability 
comparisons. 
1.3.2 Sample space, event, probability of an event, distribution 
Consider an experiment whose outcome is not predictable with certainty. Although the 
outcome of the experiment will not be known in advance, let us suppose that the set of all 
possible outcomes is known. This set of all possible outcomes of an experiment is known 
as the sample space of the experiment and is denoted by S. For example, if the outcome of 
an experiment consists in the determination of the sex of a newborn child, then S= Ig, b), 
where the outcome g means that the child is a girl and b that it is a boy. 
Any subset E of the sample space is known as an event. That is, an event is a set consisting 
of possible outcomes of the experiment. If the outcome of the experiment is contained in E, 
then we say that E has occurred. For example, if E= IgI, then E is the event that the child is 
a girl. Similarly if F= Ib1, then F is the event that the child is a boy. The intersection of two 
events (AnB)is the event that can be described by saying that 'both A and B occur'. The 
union of two events (A U B) is the event that 'either A or B occurs'. We shall distinguish 
between compound (or decomposable) and simple events. For example, consider the age of 
a person. Every particular value x represents a single event, whereas the statement that a 
person is in his fifties describes the compound event that x lies between 50 and 60. In this 
way every compound event can be decomposed into simple events, that is to say, a 
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compound event is an aggregate of certain simple events. Following the general usage in 
mathematics, simple events will be called sample points, or points for short. By definition, 
every indecomposable result of the (idealized) experiment is represented by one, and only 
one, sample point. The aggregate of all sample points will be called the sample space. All 
events connected with a given (idealized) experiment can be described as aggregates of 
sample points. 
In general, as Acredolo, O'Connor, Banks and Horobin (1989) define, the probability of an 
event is expressed as a ratio of the number of potential outcomes that may be considered 
successful over the number of all possible outcomes, successful plus unsuccessful. 
Grimment and Stirzaker (1992) defined it as follows: 
'Suppose that we repeat an experiment a large number N of times, keeping the 
initial conditions as equal as possible, and suppose that A is some event which 
may or may not occur on each repetition. Our experience of most scientific 
experimentation is that the proportion of times that A occurs settles down to 
some value as N becomes larger and larger; that is to say, writing N (A) for the 
number of occurrences of A in the N trials, N (A)/N converges to a constant 
limit as N increases. We can think of the ultimate value of this ratio as being 
the probability P (A) that A occurs on any particular trial... '(p. 4-5). 
One way of defining the probability of an event is in terms of its relative frequency. Such a 
definition usually goes as follows: consider that an experiment, whose sample space is S, 
we define n(E) to be the number of times in the first n repetitions of the experiment that the 
event E occurs. Then P(E), the probability of the event E, is defined by p(E) = I, m 
n (E) 
n-+00 n 
That is, P(E) is defined as the (limiting) proportion of the time that E occurs. We shall 
assume that for each event E in the sample space S there exists a value P(E), referred to as 
the probability of E. We shall then assume that the probabilities satisfy a certain set of 
axioms. Consider an experiment whose sample space is S. For each event E of the sample 
space S we assume that a number P(E) is defined and satisfies the following three axioms. 
Axiom 1: 0:! ý P(E):!! ý 1, the probability that the outcome of the experiment is an outcome in 
E is some number between 0 and 1, 
Axiom 2: P(S)=I, with probability 1, the outcome must be a point in the sample space S, 
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00 Axiom IP UEj)=j]'jP(Ej), for any sequence of mutually exclusive events the 
(i=l 
., i= 
probability of at least one of these events occurring is just the sum of their respective 
probabilities. 
It is often required to find the probability of an event B under the condition that an event A 
occurs. This probability is called the conditional probability of B given A and is denoted 
by P(BIA). In this case A serves as a new (reduced) sample space, and that the probability 
is the fraction of P(A), which corresponds to AnB. Thus P(AIB) = P(AnB )/P(A), when 
A and B are events in a sample space and A has a nonzero probability. 
The distribution of a random variable is concerned with the way in which the probability 
of its taking a certain value, or a value within a certain interval, varies. More commonly, 
the distribution of a discrete random variable is given by its 'probability mass function' 
and that of a continuous random variable by its 'probability density function'. 
I will also illustrate here the strong law of large numbers, as this is probably the best- 
known result in probability theory. It states that the average of a sequence of independent 
random variables having a common distribution will, with probability 1, converge to the 
mean of that distribution. The theorem of the strong law of large numbers says: 
Let Xh X2, ... 
be a sequence of independent and identically distributed random variables, 
each having a finite meanu =E [Xi]. Then, with probability 1, 
XI+X2+-**+Xn 
as n -+ oo. 
n 
(Feller, 1968; Clapham, 1990; Ross, 2002) 
To conclude, probability theory supplies information about the likelihood that data could 
have resulted from chance alone and it can be used to make decisions about uncertain 
outcomes. A basic understanding of sample space is exhibited by the ability to 
identify the 
complete set of outcomes in a one-stage experiment (e. g. by throwing one 
die). Borovcnik 
and Bentz (1991) suggest that symmetry played a key role 
in the history of probability. 
They claim that Laplace's attempt to define probability is characterized 
by an intimate 
intermixture of sample space (the mathematical part) and the idea of symmetry (the 
intuitive part). Although, in modem mathematics, the sample space is completely separated 
from the probability, which is a function, defined on a specific class of subsets of sample 
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space, the concept of sample space cannot fully be understood if it is not related to 
intuitions of symmetry. 
Piaget and Inhelder (1975) suggested that children before eight years of age are 
'prelogical', but after eight years of age are able to identify all possible outcomes in a one- 
stage experiment. However, Jones, Langrall, Thornton and Mogill (1997) reported that 
significant numbers of children in elementary school (before 11 years of age) were not able 
to list the outcomes of a one-stage experiment. From the sample space one can identify 
whether an event is possible, and its possibility, impossibility or certainty (Jones et al, 
1997). (The meanings of these terms are as follows: 'Possible': O<P(E)<I; 'Impossible': 
P(E)=O; 'Certain': P(E)=1). 
Understanding of the probability of an event, for the purposes of this study, is exhibited by 
the ability to identify and justify which of two or three events are most likely or least likely 
to occur (e. g. to understand the behaviour of an unfair die, which has one of six numbers 
twice). Many researchers have investigated young children's understanding of probability 
of an event (e. g. Acredolo et al, 1989; Piaget and Inhelder, 1975). Piaget and Inhelder 
(1975) concluded that young children base their probability predictions on a number of 
criteria, including both subjective and quantitative reasoning. According to their theory, 
young children have difficulty comprehending part-whole relationships. Acredolo, et al 
(1989) note that children commit themselves to one of three strategies in comparing event 
probabilities: 
(a) a numerator strategy in which they only examine the part that corresponds to the event 
(b) an incomplete denominator strategy in which they examine the part that corresponds to 
the complement of the event, and 
(c) an integrating strategy in which they recognise the moderating effect that each part has 
on the other. 
The next section will give a brief history of the concept of probability. The following 
paragraphs will try to give a 'global' idea of the 'genesis' of the concept of probability, 
connected in a way with people's intuitions about chance events. 
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1.4 Some selected aspects of the history of probability 
Although we think of probabilities and risks as natural, taken-for-granted phenomena, 
history shows that our modem machinery for thinking about probability was invented 
relatively recently. A historical perspective provides a valuable corrective to the view that 
probability refers to a natural property of the world, rather than to one's understanding of 
it. Traces of the uses of probability in games of chance can be found in the ancient cultures 
of Indians, Babylonians, and Egyptians. The earliest known object for games of chance 
(around 3500 B. C. ) is the astragalus, made from a bone in the heel of a sheep. Betting 
games with these bones were popular among Roman soldiers. It is possible that rubbing the 
round sides of the astragalus until they were approximately flat would make a primitive 
die. The cubes made from well-fired pottery, which were in use in Babylon 3000 B. C., 
were nearly perfect dice. Considerable experience would have been gained from casting 
dice or drawing beans out of ums for divine judgement at religious ceremonies (for 
example at Delphi in Greece) and it is curious that the conceptual breakthrough based on 
the regularity of the fall of dice did not occur before the birth of Christ. 
The meaning of the term 'probable' has shifted qualitatively between medieval and modem 
times and the development of the modem concept of probability depended on a number of 
related shifts in the ways in which the world was understood (David, 1962; Hacking, 1975; 
Heyman and Henriksen, 1998). Formal theorising about probability emerged quite 
suddenly in the Western world in the second half of the seventeenth century, even though 
evidence of interest in odds and gambling had been found frequently in the Ancient world. 
There is disagreement about why formal theorising did not occur earlier and why it 
suddenly appeared at this time. Whatever the reasons, concern with the nature of 
probability and risk emerged as a defining feature of the modem Western world, bound up 
with the associated developments of science, trade and capitalism (Hacking, 1975). As 
Heyman and Henriksen (1998) state, some historical imagination is needed to visualise a 
worldview that did not take for granted our modem axioms about probability; for example, 
the 'law of averages' was unknown because the mathematical average had not been 
invented. 
The field of probability and statistics is barely a mathematical adolescent when compared 
to geometry or to algebra, and even to the roots of the calculus are traceable back to 
Eudoxes and Archimedes. Hacking (1975) reviews a number of possible reasons why 
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probability has been a late bloomer. He claims that this slow emergence was primarily due 
to the dual meaning that has historically been attached to the word probability and to the 
respective definitions of scientific evidence that accompanied each of these two meanings. 
David (1962) gives to Cardano in 1560 as the first reference to probability. Cardano 
discusses that there is equal probability of obtaining one half of the total number on the 
faces of a die as getting the other half. Thus, a die is honest if the wagers therefore are laid 
in accordance with this equality. 
The seventeenth century saw the first steps taken towards an explicit theory of probability. 
Pascal and Fermat made great progress in conceptualising probability in their famous 
correspondence that was published in 1679. They solved the Division of Stakes (problem 
of points). Pascal and Fermat's achievement in the problem of points was to be the first to 
model the fair division of stakes by a game of chance. The problem deals with the fair 
division of stakes if a series of games has to be stopped before completion. At the 
beginning of the series two players bet equal stakes. The player who wins a certain number 
of single games first wins the whole stake. The series has to be interrupted before one of 
the players has reached the required number of points and the stakes have to be divided. If 
five games are required to win, and the score is 4: 3 in favour of A, what is the fair division 
of stakes? The theory analysed introduced what should happen if the game was continued 
and if the chances of the players were equal for a single round. The stakes should be 
divided proportionally to the probability of winning in this continuation of the games. 
Pascal developed his famous arithmetic triangle as a general method to solve similar 
problems. The ideas of Fermat and Pascal were taken up by Bernoulli and were soon 
refined and developed for a vast variety of scientific purposes. Bernoulli used a maximum 
likelihood argument to prove that the best choice from a series of observations can differ 
from the arithmetic mean by using a particular continuous distribution of error. Bernoulli's 
theorema aureum in 1713 refers to the law of large numbers that relates individual 
probability to the probabilistic 'convergence' of relative frequencies. The stabilising of 
frequencies is a very intuitive means of transferring abstract probability onto the 
frequencies in large series. Francis Bacon, also in seventeenth century, stated the 
systematic and sufficiently precise development of Baconian probability and he gave other 
seminal ideas about non-demonstrative inference. Another well-known statistician of the 
seventeenth century was Abraham de Moivre. De Moivre was the first to find the function, 
which is now called the normal density. 
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In the 18th century Laplace made one of the most important statistical achievements by 
deriving the central limit theorem that states the binomial distribution approaches the 
normal distribution as the number of trials increases to infinity. Laplace came to the central 
limit theorem from his observations that errors of measurement, which can usually be 
regarded as being the sum of a large number of tiny forces, tend to be normally distributed. 
The application of the central limit theorem to show that measurement errors are 
ap roximately normally distributed is regarded as an important contribution to scientific Kp 
method. Gauss used the normal distribution not only as a tool for approximation, but also 
as a distribution in its own right. He explored the relationship between four concepts; the 
mean as the best value to take from a series of measurements; the normal distribution for 
describing variation of errors; the maximum likelihood method to take the best value from 
a series of measurements; and the method of least squares to derive the best value 
replacing a series of measurements. Further details on history of probability are given in 
David (1962), Hacking (1975), Cohen (1979), Shaughnessy (1992), Daly, Hand, Jones, 
Lunn and McConway (1995), Borovcnik and Peard (1996), Ross (2002). 
As it has been already mentioned, the historical perspective shows that the 'genesis' of the 
concept of probability is connected with people's intuitions. The next section describes the 
different categories of concept and it focuses on the 'subjective' and 'intuitive' probability. 
1.5 A focus on 'subjective and intuitive probability' 
The literature on probability (Hawkins and Kapadia, 1984; Konold, 1989; Shaughnessy, 
1992; Wilensky, 1993) discusses several different categories of probability. These 
categories are distinguished as classical, frequentist, formal and subjective. The first three 
categories are the classical ones of teaching and learning probability. The thesis 
is focused 
on subjective and intuitive probability, as it applies to the subjects of this research. 
Classical probability refers to the assignment of probabilities in an experiment with a 
random device where all outcomes are equally likely. 
Classical probability could be called 
the uniform probability distribution (Shaughnessy, 1992). 
Frequentist probability considers probabilities that are limiting ratios of 
frequencies. When 
tossing a coin many times, we record the ratio of numbers of 
heads to number tosses. As 
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the number of tosses increases without bound, this ratio reaches the probability of throwing 
a head. Mathematically, this involves the theory of limits and convergence (Konold, 1989; 
Wilensky, 1993). 
Fonnal probability is the probability that is calculated precisely using the mathematical 
laws of probability. This is sometimes known as 'objective' or 'normative' probability. 
Formal probability requires some acquaintance with fractions while subjective probability 
may rely merely on comparisons of perceived likelihood. 
Subjective and intuitive probability is the 20thcentury term for opinion or degree of belief. 
When tossing a coin, the probability of being the outcome heads is relative to the beliefs of 
the coin tosser. The distinction between subjective and intuitive probabilities poses the 
greatest difficulty and as a result attracts the greatest amount of controversy and ambiguity. 
One view that has been put forward is that probability intuitions constitute notions of what 
is the 'correct' solution to a probabilistic problem, 'correct' being that which would accord 
with formal or theoretical probability. More details about what is intuition will be given in 
Chapter Two (section 2.2.1), as intuitions play an important role in this study. Subjective 
probability judgements on the other hand are said to be concerned with weighing evidence 
when there is no formal approach. Subjective and intuitive probability could therefore 
logically be accessible to less mathematically sophisticated children, at earlier stages of 
their mathematical education, than formal probability (Hawkins and Kapadia, 1984). 
Subjective and intuitive probability is an area that is often neglected in classroom oriented 
research, although it may be a fundamental precursor for the formal probability taught in 
schools (Hawkins and Kapadia, 1984; Wilensky, 1993). Hawkins and Kapadia (1984) 
conclude that a better understanding of growth and communication of probabilistic notions 
will not be achieved unless we include a consideration of the nature and influence of 
subjective and intuitive probabilities in the development of formal probability concepts. 
1.6 Overview of the thesis 
The aims of this study were concerned with designing a tool-based game to 
be used for 
children to express understandings of randomness as formal conjectures, so that they were 
able to examine the consequences of their understandings. 
The game was designed 
simultaneously to afford children the opportunity to explore and express their 
intuitions 
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and ideas, and to give the researcher the opportunity to study how the game mediated the 
children's expressions of chance events. 
The thesis is organised in nine chapters. Chapter One has provided the rationale of the 
study. The next chapter, Chapter Two, reviews the literature concerning the research in 
understanding the learning of the concepts of probability and indicates some didactic 
implications. It describes what intuitions are, and examines the idea of conceptions and 
misconceptions of probability. Furthermore, Chapter Two describes 'constructionist 
approaches', the idea of 'situated abstraction' and computer-based microworlds for 
stochastics. Chapter Three describes the aims of the study. It defines the aims of the 
research and provides an overview of the structure and the design principles of the tool- 
based game. The study is organised in two main phases: the iterative design phase and the 
learning investigation phase. The methodological issues of the two phases that comprised 
the study are presented in Chapter Four. Chapter Five begins the data analysis, focusing on 
the iterations of iterative design phase of the research. It also gives a description of the 
evolution of the game used for the learning investigation phase. Chapters Six to Eight 
present the main data analysis. Specifically, Chapter Six analyses children's thinking about 
sample space and global outcomes; Chapter Seven describes children's construction of the 
idea of fairness; Chapter Eight describes children's quantitative ideas of randomness, such 
as equality, the law of large numbers, possibility and proportional thinking. Finally, 
Chapter Nine provides the conclusions of the study, outlining some didactical implications, 
limitations of the study and suggestions for further research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A Review of the Literature 
2.1 Overview 
The survey of the literature is in three parts. Part One begins by describing intuitions and 
(mis)conceptions in general, and the key literature in the area of probability. Researchers 
(e. g. Piaget, Fischbein etc. ) in the fields of education and psychology have argued that 
students invoke both prior and intuitive information that facilitates, and sometimes hinders, 
their learning. Part Two focuses on the ideas of constructionism, in particular computer- 
based microworlds and situated abstraction. It describes what constructionism is and how it 
can be applied to mathematical learning; and it examines how situated abstractions can be 
made to connect concrete and abstract ideas, particular in the medium of computer-based 
learning environments. Finally, Part Three describes research on the learning of the 
concept of probability, and the didactical implications of this. 
2.2 Part One: Intuitions and (Mis) Conceptions 
2.2.1 What is intuition? 
According to Fischbein (1975) intuition is 
'the means by which intelligence secures for cognition an immediate control 
over action. An intuition is a stabilised program which is derived from 
experience, and which is effective because of its global, immediate, and 
flexible qualities. Deriving from action, it summarises, concentrates, and 
determines the anticipatory cognitive qualities of adaptive action in general, 
and of certain classes of adaptive actions, in particular' (p. 20). 
Fischbein's definition claims that intuitions develop as a kind of 'knowledge from 
experience', which are used to take control over actions. The work of Nunes, Schliemann 
and Carraher (1993) on 'street mathematics) reveals examples of mathematical intuitions 
developed by children. Following this definition, questions arise as to how intuitions that 
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are based on experience can become 4stabilised programmes' when experiences change 
over time. 
Bruner (1974) identifies two distinct approaches that operate in any field of intellectual 
endeavour. One is intuitive, the other analytic. In general, intuition is less rigorous with 
respect to proof, more oriented to the whole problem than to particular parts, less 
verbalized with respect to justification, and based upon a confidence to operate with 
sufficient data. Kant (1980) claims that intuition is simply the faculty through which 
objects are directly grasped in distinction to the faculty of understanding through which we 
achieve conceptual knowledge. In the area of mathematical thinking, Tall (1991) describes 
intuition as the product of the 'concept images' of the individual. The more educated the 
individual is in logical thinking, the more likely the individual's concept imagery will 
resonate with a logical response. The growth of thinking passes from initial intuitions 
based on pre-formal mathematics, to more refined formal intuitions as the learner's 
experience grows. 
Fischbein (1987) points out that many other terms are used in reference to intuition. 
Sometimes people use the term 'insight' to indicate a sudden, global rearrangement of data 
in the mind, which provides a new view of a problem situation, or its solution. The ten-ns 
revelation (especially in religious contexts), inspiration (in artistic matters), common sense, 
naive reasoning, empirical interpretation, natural thinking are sometimes also used to 
denote intuitive thinking. Fischbein states that intuitions serve several functions in the 
relation between actions and intellectual operations. They may be antecedent to the 
operations, or they may occur during the operations, facilitating their continuity and 
fluency. They may also occur after analytical operations, synthesising the results of 
analysis into a global view of unitary significance, and thus assisting in the transfer of 
decision to the level of action. For example, the individual, before being able to carry out 
any explicit computation of probabilities for a given situation, must adapt to an 
environment in which the accidental, the uncertain, and the possible are all part of ongoing 
existence. 
Fischbein (1987) says that intuitions express a necessary mental capacity deeply rooted in 
our adaptive behaviour, as they reappear time and again in intellectual development. For 
example, over history, mathematicians have continued to discover that concepts that have 
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previously been taken for granted as self-evident, have had to be questioned and sometimes 
abandoned. Fischbein suggests eight general characteristics of intuitive cognitions: 
I- self evidence, as intuitive cognition is self-consistent, self-justifiable or self- 
explanatory, 
2. intrinsic certainty: the fact that intuitive cognitions are accepted as certain, 
3. perseverance: intuitions, once established, are very robust and sometimes the 
formal instruction has often very little impact on ones intuitive background, 
4. coerciveness: intuitions impose themselves subjectively on the individual as unique 
representations or interpretations, 
5. theoretical status: an intuition is a theory expressed in a particular representations 
using a model, but not a pure theory, 
6. extrapolativeness: an intuition can be said to occur when an individual reaches a 
conclusion on the basis of less explicit information that is ordinarily required to 
reach that conclusion and always exceeds the data on hand, 
7. globability: an intuition is a structured cognition which offers a unitary, global view 
of a certain situation, 
8. implicitness: intuitive reactions are in fact the surface structure expression of tacit, 
subjacent processes and mechanisms. 
Fischbein (1987) concludes that an intuition is the direct, cognitive prelude to action, 
mental or practical, which organises information in a behaviourally meaningful and 
intrinsically credible structure. Intuitions are self-evident notions that are robust, holistic, 
and conceptual, and to the individual, all of his or her intuitions are obviously correct. The 
robustness of an intuition becomes apparent by considering its applicability in many 
situations and the implausibility of alternatives. Furthermore, an intuition is not 
analytically separable into constituent parts but exists meaningfully as a whole. Building 
and applying an intuition requires conceptual thinking beyond immediate perceptual 
stimuli. 
diSessa (1988) gives a definition of intuitiveness in relation to learning physics. He uses 
the term p-prims (phenomenological primitives) to describe the first abstractions from 
experience and he argues that intuitions consist of a number of fragments rather than one 
or even any small number of integrated structures one might call 'theories'. He states that: 
4 many of these fragments, which I call 'p-prims' (short for 
phenomenological primitives), can be understood as simple abstractions from 
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common experiences that are taken as relatively primitive in the sense that they 
generally need no explanation; they simply happen' (p. 52). 
It seems that diSessa has in mind a similar idea to Fischbein about the nature of intuition 
when he defines p-piims as 'knowledge that comes from experience'. Furthermore, diSessa 
describes them as a first meaning about things, consisting of simple abstractions, not well 
developed generalised pieces of knowledge that originate from specific experiences but 
can be used in similar situations. He emphasises p-prims as knowledge in pieces: 
'People have perceptions about what happens, about what causes what, about 
what is important and what is not concerning knowledge, its development, and 
its deployment. In some cases these ideas also seem to be almost theoretical, 
but the same caveats are warranted here as with intuitive physics. ' (p. 67). 
According to diSessa, conceptual change occurs in three ways, each involving a 
transformation of the 'causal net': a. by the addition of new p-prims, b. by the formation of 
new connections between p-prims and c. by changes to the priorities which fix how likely a 
p-prim is to be triggered by incoming data. 'Unstructured' p-prims live in isolation and 
cannot trigger further p-prims. They remain unstructured if incoming data is not 
inconsistent with those p-prims, or if there is no further incoming data. When p-prims and 
data are consistent with each other, p-prims become highly structured, so that a whole 
cluster is always triggered at the same time. 
diSessa's idea about knowledge in pieces is connected to the theory of organisation of 
knowledge in 'schemata'. Piaget and Szeminska (1952) argue that infants construct 
intuitions when they abstract their behaviours into perceptual-motor schemas that allow 
them to recognise objects and events and to act appropriately. However, these authors do 
not explain how the process of creating early concepts occurs. It is here that cognitive 
psychology comes to fill the gap. Fischbein (1999a) proposes that intuitions change 
together with the entire adaptive system to which they belong. In the cognitive psychology 
literature (see for example Marshall, 1990), the adaptive system is described as a system of 
schemata. 
Bruner (1966) discusses the idea of schemata. 1-fighly specific action schemata that are 
irreversible guide sensori-motor intelligence: each action has its own plan, and the action 
goes off from beginning to end, and only in that order. Thus, human memory consists of 
networks of related pieces of information. Each network is a schema: a collection of well- 
connected facts, skills, strategies, and these schemata develop over long periods of time 
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and by continual exposure to relevant contextual events. Fischbein (1999a) defines 
structural schemata as mental devices which make possible the assimilation and 
interpretation of information and adequate reactions to various stimuli. Structural schemata 
are characterized by their general relevance for adaptive behaviour. Fischbein and 
Schnarch (1996) state that: 
'In each intuition considered, a general intellectual schema is embedded which 
influences the conclusion. The schema acts tacitly and this implies, in our 
opinion, that the schema becomes an integral part of the respective intuition. 
But, at request (when justification is required), the schema may be rendered 
explicit by the subject. ' (p. 359). 
The framework of schemata is proposed as fundamental to the organisation of the human 
mind and this it fundamentally shapes the mechanisms of learning. For example, Fischbein 
(1987) argues that there are sometimes contradictions between intuitive and scientifically 
acquired concepts, but the best procedure to make the student aware of the conflict is to 
help him/her develop control over his/her intuitions through conceptual schemas. 
2.2.2 Intuitions in probability 
For Fischbein (1999a), the renewed interest in intuition in the 20'h century had two main 
sources: one was the continual endeavour of scientists to increase the degree of rigour, of 
conceptual purity, in their respective domains, and the other was their tendency to 
understand and explain the world as a whole by taking into account the genuine relativistic 
nature of physical laws. 
In the area of probability, Kahneman and Tversky (1982) suggest that the term 'intuition' 
is used in three different senses. First, a judgement is called intuitive if it is reached by an 
informal and unstructured mode of reasoning, without the use of analytic methods or 
deliberate calculation. Second, a formal rule or a fact of nature is called intuitive if it is 
compatible with our model of world; thus, it is intuitively obvious that the probability of 
winning a lottery prize decreases with the number of tickets, but it is 'counter-intuitivel 
that there is a better than even chance that a sample of 23 people will include a pair of 
individuals with the same birthday. Third, a rule or procedure is said to be part of our 
repertoire of intuitions when we apply the rule or follow the procedure in our normal 
conduct. The rules of grammar, for example, are part of the intuitions of a native speaker. 
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Fischbein (1982) suggests that when subjects were required to predict the outcomes of a 
repetitive series of stochastic trials, they are able even from an early age, to tune the 
proportions of their predictions to the relative frequencies of the outcomes. It seems 
therefore that even very young children can have intuitions about relative frequencies. 
However, Fischbein (1982) explains: 
6 ... in o er to create new correct probabilistic intuitions the learner must be 
actively involved in a process of performing change experiments, of guessing 
outcomes and evaluating chances, of confronting individual and mass results a 
priori calculated predictions, etc. New correct and powerful probabilistic 
intuitions cannot be produced by merely practising probabilistic formulae' 
(p. 12). 
Game playing is a very important activity for children's development of probabilistic 
ideas. Pratt (1998) points out that young children are very attracted to contexts where the 
laws of probability are central. Kafai, Franke, Ching and Shih (1998) have shown that 
game design provides motivation and engagement in ongoing reflection about the learning 
of mathematics. Most children love games based on dice or playing cards, where 
unpredictable events happen constantly. This gives us reason to believe that intuitions 
about stochastics do develop through experience. According to Fischbein (1975) 
(probabilistic intuitions also involve images - images of dice, coins, boxes, and 
so on, but these images have a merely auxiliary function.... The germ of 
intuitive reasoning about probability lies in natural 'experiments' with 
stochastic results, which involve predictions and random draws or other 
equivalent actions' (p. 16-17). 
Fischbein argues that children, from pre-school up to the age of 7, can distinguish the 
(random', in the sense of the unpredictable, from the deducible, however there are some 
general features of their intelligence at this age which distort their interpretations: 
(a) Subjectivism: the child confuses the random with the arbitrary, interpreting the 
objectively random as the manifestation of the 'will' of the object concerned; 
(b) Passive induction: the child judges new facts on the basis of the immediately preceding 
facts, and not on the basis of a deductive schema, a combinatory schema for example. 
This explains the inability of the pre-school child to correctly interpret random 
phenomena when the number of possible events is large; 
(c) The belief that random events can be controlled by the person who triggers the events 
when, objectively, any such control is absent, 
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(d) The distinction between the random and the necessary is unstable in the absence of an 
operationally deductive system; inessential changes in the experimental conditions can 
easily influence the decisions of the child as to whether events are random or 
determined. 
The probabilistic judgement of pre-school children is precarious. The interplay of 
influences at the cognitive level can easily mislead the child in making decisions, because 
of the absence of any relevant conceptual control. For example, Fischbein has studied the 
influence of perceptual configurations on the estimation of odds in pre-school children, 
demonstrating that children estimate odds and make predictions primarily on the basis of 
what they perceive. 
Fischbein developed his theory out of Piaget and Inhelder's seminal research (1975). The 
latter's work contrasts with Fischbein's argument that probabilistic intuitions can become 
established given appropriate experiences - they claim that probabilistic thinking is a very 
late development in the child's evolution of knowledge. According to Piaget and Inhelder, 
the idea of chance is not acquired before the stage of concrete operations (before about the 
age of 7), because the understanding of chance presupposes an understanding of the 
irreversibility of a mixture of objects - for example the marbles used in one of the 
experiments of Piaget and Inhelder - and this requires the possession of a combinatory 
schema. In fact, the conceptual schema of chance can only exist as a function of the 
relevant operational resources. Fischbein (1975) argues contrary to Piaget and Inhelder, 
pointing out that primary intuition of chance is present in the everyday behaviour of the 
child, even before the age of 7. Chance is equivalent to unpredictability, and not 
necessarily to the smallness of odds; when the number of possibilities, and correspondingly 
the number of possible combinations, is small, the pre-school child reason correctly, and 
sometimes more correctly than an older child at the stage of formal operations. 
Fischbein's (1975,1987) theory of intuition and understanding classifies intuitions into 
primary and secondary types. Primary intuitions are formed before, and independently of, 
systematic instruction; they develop from normal everyday experience, which is of course 
subject to cultural variation. Secondary intuitions, by contrast, are formed after a 
systematic process of instruction; thus they are acquired, not through natural experience, 
but through some educational intervention. Secondary intuitions enable an individual to 
transcend primary cognitive acquisitions that are often inconsistent with the primary 
intuitions relating to the same concepts. They convey the products of social experience 
-34- 
2. A Review of the Literature 
mostly in the form of scientific truths. The mathematician's intuitions, or those of the 
scientist, fall into this category. Fischbein (1987) argues that if our view of the close 
relationship between action and intuition is correct, it follows that secondary intuitions, 
even though attained through social experience, need to be reconstituted through individual 
experience, from which they are distilled. 
What is not clear in Fischbein's account is how secondary intuitions are different from 
conceptions or whether they are the same thing. Is it right to call something an intuition 
which comes after a systematic process of instruction? And if not, why are secondary 
intuitions, still intuitions? 
In the next sub-section I turn to the nature of concepts in order to understand better how 
secondary intuitions may relate to concepts. 
2.2.3 (Ms)Conceptions 
According to Smith, diSessa, and Rochelle (1993) 
'Conceptions (or ideas) identify and relate factors that students use to explain 
intriguing or problematic phenomena. They also represent the knowledge, 
expressed in terms of solution strategies and their rationale, that constitutes the 
core solution to specific problems. '(p. 119). 
Having in mind this definition of conception, then a misconception is one that produces a 
systematic pattern of errors. Misconceptions are what people do wrong in opposition to 
logic; arise from students' prior leaming, either in the classroom or from their interaction 
with the physical and social world. In domains like probability Misconceptions continue to 
appear even after the correct approach has been taught. Tversky and Kahneman (1983) 
demonstrated this in the context of professional and common misconceptions about 
statistics and probability, such as the representativeness heuristic and the law of small 
numbers. According to Fischbein and Schnarch (1996), probabilistic misconceptions are 
rather divergent. Some probabilistic intuitions improve with age, but others become worse. 
This finding can be explained by the tacit influence of certain intellectual schemata on the 
structure of intuitions. 
Tall and Vinner (198 1) developed the idea of concept image and concept definition. They 
define concept image as that which describes the total cognitive structure that is associated 
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with the concept, and concept definition as a form of words used to specify that concept. 
Vinner (1983) clarifies this idea, suggesting that for every concept there exists two 
different 'cells' in the cognitive structure. One cell is for the definition of the concept and 
the other is for the concept image. By concept definition, Vinner means a verbal definition 
that accurately explains the concept in a non-circular way. The concept image is a mental 
picture of a concept, and there are cases where the definition may be unclear, but the 
concept image is clear; for example, the definition for 'house' is less clear than its concept 
image. The word 'forest' can be defined as 'as many trees together' and we are able to 
visualise many trees together as a concept image. As Vinner suggests 
'... (1) in order to handle concepts one needs a concept image and not a concept 
definition, (2) concept definitions (where the concept was introduced by means 
of a definition) will remain inactive or even will be forgotten. In thinking, 
almost always the concept image will be evoked. '(p. 293). 
One cell or even both of them might be void for a particular concept. There might be an 
interaction between the two cells although they can be formed independently. 
Working from Vinner's description of concepts, it can be argued that secondary intuitions 
are more related with a concept image after instruction, than with the Fischbein's definition 
of intuition. Thus, it could be argued that Fischbein's secondary intuitions should be 
regarded as conceptions. In this study, I will use the term 'intuition' to denote a primary 
'piece of knowledge' derived directly from experience, and I will relate secondary 
intuitions to Vinner's idea of concept image. 
2.3 Part Two: Selected theoretical literature 
This part is concerned with four theoretical issues, which form the theoretical framework 
of this study. These are: the theory of constructionism; the idea of situated abstraction as a 
mental construct which links concrete and abstract ideas in mathematics; computer-based 
microworlds in the field of mathematics education; and the role of representation and 
visualisation in learning mathematics. 
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2.3.1 Constructionism 
Constructionism is a term first proposed by Papert (1990), seeking to combine the 
constructivist psychology of Piaget (e. g. 1952) and the ideas of progressive education 
exemplified by Dewey (1902). Constructionism emphasises that an effective way for the 
learner to construct knowledge in the head is to build something 'tangible', a meaningful 
product. According to Papert (1991) 
'constructionism shares constructivism's connotation of learning as 'building 
knowledge structures' irrespective of the circumstances of the leaming. It then 
adds the idea that this happens especially felicitously in a context where the 
learner is consciously engaged in constructing a public entity, whether it's a 
sand castle on the beach or a theory of the universe' (p. 1). 
The term 'constructionism' evokes and puts together two connotations: the psychological 
theory of constructivism and the notion of physical construction (e. g. a child's 
6construction set' toy). Constructivism re ects the assumption that information can be 
simply passed on to a set of learners; it refers to a more complex procedure (see, e. g. 
Philips 1995). It recognises the learner as an active person, but it brings with it a tendency 
towards treating knowledge as entirely socio-political. Papert (1991) argues that, when 
Piaget described himself as a constructivist, he was referring to a view that knowledge 
structures are built by the subject rather than transmitted by a teacher. When he describes 
himself as a constructionist, Papert subscribes to this view, but he adds to it the idea that 
building knowledge structures happens especially well when the subject is engaged in 
building material structures in the world, as children do with construction sets. Children 
don't 'get ideas'; they make them by constructing something external and shareable, as 
Kafai and Resnick (1996) argue. The 'learning by doing' philosophy regards any 
transmission theory of education as fundamentally wrongheaded. Thus, children's learning 
can be promoted by 
4 ... using a cycle of 
internalisation of what is outside, then externalisation of 
what is inside and so on. ' (Papert 1990, p. 3) 
Over the last two decades, constructionism has gone beyond its original definition. 
Constructionist teachers and researchers have fleshed out this definition into a body of 
beliefs and practices, many of which are inspired by Papert's work, such as 'Nfindstorms' 
(Papert, 1980). Whereas most learning theories describe knowledge acquisition in purely 
cognitive terms, constructionism sees an important role for affect. In constructionist 
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learning, forming new relationships with knowledge is as important as forming new 
representations of knowledge. Constructionism also emphasises diversity: it recognises that 
learners can make connections with knowledge in many different ways, and they are more 
likely to become intellectually engaged when they are working on personally meaningful 
activities (Kafai and Resnick, 1996). 
2.3.2 Situated abstraction: concreteness and abstraction 
Papert (1996) argues that the metaphor of learning by constructing one's own knowledge 
has great rhetorical power against the metaphor of knowledge being transmitted though a 
pipeline from teacher to student. On a pragmatic level, constructionism suggests that we 
need to look for 'connections' as opportunities for learning, and on a theoretical level the 
metaphor leads to a range of interesting questions about the connectivity of knowledge. It 
even suggests that the deliberate part of leaning consists of making connections between 
mental entities that already exist. Also, thinking about the interconnectivity of knowledge 
can help to explain why some knowledge is so easily acquired without deliberate teaching. 
Wilensky (1997) defines concretion as the building of personal connections, whereby 
learners express their own sense of experience across different mathematical domains. If 
we want to endow new ideas with suitable meaning, these should be connected with the 
leamer's previous experience. Wilensky states that concreteness is not a property of an 
object, but rather a property of a person's relationship to an object - thus the formal often 
appears to be abstract just because we haven't yet constructed the connections that will 
concretise it. 
The nature of abstraction, as a mental process and as an aspect of mathematical knowledge, 
has been discussed in mathematics education for many decades (see, for example, Noss and 
Hoyles 1996, for an overview of the issues). Looking for definitions of abstraction we find, 
for example, Gray and Tall's (2002), stating that an abstraction is a duality: it is both a 
process of 'drawing from' a situation and also the concept (the abstraction) produced by 
that process. Dreyfus (1991) argues that the process of abstraction is intimately linked to 
generalisation, the general nature of the results that can be obtained and passes also from 
the process of synthesizing. What we are used to think of abstraction is, I believe, best 
understood as what Sierpinska (2002) describes as a dual mental activity whereby some 
aspects of the object of thought are ignored while others are highlighted, or as Noss and 
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Hoyles (1996) describe, some conscious appreciation by learners of the generalised 
relationships implicit in their expressions. 
This study adopts the notion of situated abstraction to describe a simultaneous notion of 
concretion and abstraction. Noss (2001) and Noss, Hoyles and Pozzi (2002) describe 
situated abstractions as a way of describing how a conceptualisation of mathematical 
knowledge can be simultaneously situated and abstract. The process cannot be separated 
from the product; there must be some 'webbing' (see Noss and Hoyles, 1996), connecting 
familiar knowledge to abstract ideas. Noss, Healy and Hoyles (1997) state that 
'Our idea of situated abstraction is designed to underscore the idea that 
abstraction does not come ready-made, either a priori or post hoc. It is a 
process which develops in activity, which - like all activity - is situated'. 
(p. 226) 
They argue that abstracting within a domain of abstraction is situated in the sense that 
learners constructively generate mathematical ideas connected to the setting, articulated in 
terms of the objects and relationships within it - its tools, linguistic conventions and 
structures - generally speaking, the medium of expression of the setting. 
Learners 'web' their own knowledge and understandings by actions in the learning 
environment (such as a microworld), articulating and 'messing with' fragments of that 
knowledge- this activity is abstracting within, not away from, the situation. Situated 
abstractions emerge during such activity as internal meanings, knowledge, concepts, that 
serve as relatively general devices for making sense of situations that arise within a setting. 
A situated abstraction is observable as a more or less tacitly articulated invariant 
relationship, framed within the situation itself. 
Wilensky's (1997) idea of 'connected mathematics' suggests some didactical implications 
for situated abstractions. In connected mathematics, a concept cannot be intelligible if it 
has only one meaning - it is through connections that concepts gain meaning. 
Connected 
mathematics is a form of 'connected knowing'; a personal form of knowing that is intimate 
and contextualised as opposed to an alienated and disconnected formal 
knowing. 
Mathematical concepts derive their meaning and their power though their embeddedness in 
a personally and socially constructed web of connections to other ideas and experiences, 
both mathematical and non-mathematical. In a connected mathematics learning 
environment, the focus is on learner-owned investigative activities combined with 
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reflection. Mathematical concepts are not simply taught as statements of formal 
definitions. Instead, they are multiplying represented in leaming environments that support 
multiple styles and ways of knowing (an example of this multiple representation is given 
by Turkle and Papert, 1991). In general, connected mathematics calls for making many 
more connections between mathematics and the world at large, as well as between different 
mathematical domains, throughout the leaming experience (Wilensky, 1997). Another 
expression of this kind of view of learning is Noss and Hoyles' (1996) idea of 'webbing': 
'The idea of webbing is meant to convey the presence of a structure that 
learners can draw upon and reconstruct for support - in ways that they choose 
as appropriate for their struggle to construct meaning for some mathematics. ' 
(p. 108) 
Webbing involves connecting together pieces the conceptual and physical worlds to 
produce understanding. The crucial idea is that individuals' sense of situation and the tools 
they have to hand provide support for making meaning, and also the means for 
reconstructing these pieces in new ways, or developing new pieces of knowledge. By 
webbing, concrete ideas become increasingly associated with abstract ideas. For an 
individual who has not had the opportunity, or does not yet possess the necessary internal 
meanings, a concept will be disconnected and unfamiliar. Thus, abstraction for Noss and 
Hoyles (1996) becomes a problem of how to add new friends and relations, not to ascend 
to unattainable heights. 
Metaphorically, as Wilensky (1991) proposes, abstract objects are unreachable until 
concrete objects are used, which are reachable, 'graspable'. In these terms, concreteness is 
the property that measures the degree of relatedness to the object, how close we are to it, 
and the quality of our relationship with the object. The more the representation allows us to 
visualise an object, to pick out a particular scene or situation, the more concrete it is. 
Concreteness is associated with an instance of an object. It can be assumed that when we 
construct objects in the world, when we connect them with something already existing, we 
come into an engaged relationship with them and the 'abstract' knowledge needed for their 
construction - it is especially likely then that we will make this knowledge concrete. 
Barnett and Noss (1997) have proposed that the process of making invisible mathematics 
visible might offer a more effective pedagogy for learning about probability. If children 
could gain an insight into making models of risk they would be able to connect their 
personal assessment of risk with statistical information that they are given. It can be said 
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that the situated abstraction is the 'visible' side of mathematical understanding, before the 
idea gets its abstract view, and becomes generalised. Research has shown (for example 
Noss et a], 1997) that interaction with computer-based microworlds, is important for 
developing situated abstractions in a constructionist environment. The following section 
introduces computer-based microworlds in detail. 
2.3.3 Computer-based microworlds: situated stochastics 
Balacheff and Kaput (1996) claim that a unique feature of effective computer-based 
material as compared to other types of learning materials is their intrinsically cognitive 
character. Similarly, diSessa (1995) suggests that by extending linear language into the 
multiply-connected, dynamic, richly textured graphical and interactive forms allowed by 
computers, we may fundamentally extend the material bases for thinking and learning, and 
with them the whole practice of education. diSessa (1986) argues that computers will not 
dominate our children's experience; they will play a part in it, or rather, many small parts. 
The trick, he says, is to turn abstractions into new experiences and not to turn experiences 
into abstractions with a computer. The following paragraphs will define what is a 
computer-based microworld, describe microworlds from Vygotskian perspective, elaborate 
microworlds for stochastics and illustrate microworlds and teaching. 
2.3.3.1 Some definitions of microworlds 
The key feature of a computer-based microworld is that it presents a formal, computable 
representation of mathematical objects and relationships. Balacheff and Kaput (1996) 
define a microworld as 
6a set of primitive objects, elementary operations on these objects, and rules 
expressing the ways the operations can be performed and associated - which is 
the usual structure of a fonnal system in the mathematical sense and a domain 
of phenomenology that relates objects and actions on the underlying objects to 
the phenomena at the 'surface of the screen". (p. 47 1) 
Similarly, Noss and Hoyles (1996) define a computer microworld as a flexible, interactive, 
expressive medium for working with mathematical objects and operations. Sutherland and 
Balacheff (1999) argue that computer-based microworlds provide access to formal 
mathematical knowledge through the nature of the 'intermediate' screen objects with which 
students interact in order to construct and manipulate new objects and relationships. 
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Moreover, mathematical microworlds allow the learner to explore simultaneously the 
structure of the accessible objects, their relations and the representations that makes them 
accessible. It can be said that the microworld 'evolves' as the learner's knowledge grows 
(Hoyles, 1993). 
Papert (1980) offers the following description of the notion of a microworld, using the 
example of Turtle geometry and the 'Logo' programming language: 
... the Turtle defines a self-contained world in which certain questions are 
relevant and others are not ... this idea can be developed by constructing many 
such 'microworlds', each with its own set of assumptions and constrains. 
Children get to know what it is like to explore the properties of a chosen 
microworld undisturbed by extraneous questions. In doing so they learn to 
transfer habits of exploration from their personal lives to the formal domain of 
scientific theory construction' (p. 117) 
Papert's early work has been very influential in the development of computer environments 
labelled 'microworlds'. Logo itself can be seen as a microworld for a particular kind of 
geometry. Learners interact with the microworld and build their own computer-based 
models. These models reflect learners' thinking about the mathematical objects and 
relationships as they work on particular activities. 
The work done with Logo (described in, for example, Hoyles and Noss, 1992) provides an 
answer to Solomon 9s (1986) question for the future 'How do I learn to use computers today 
in a way that will not be obsolete in five yearsT Solomon argues that children can use 
computers to gain concrete experience with dynamic processes acting separately or together 
in parallel. In her view the computer is an intellectual agent, operating in a culture and 
reflecting ideas of that culture. But what really inspires Solomon is the belief that naYve as 
well as sophisticated people should be given access to powerful ideas and that computers 
can offer easier access to such ideas as well as models for how to build with them. A 
computer-based microworld requires the learner to utilize formal structures in the service of 
more informal, intuitively based explorations and problem solving. Thus, microworlds are, 
according to Noss and Hoyles (1996), formal systems to which learners can relate to 
informally. 
Edwards (1998) claims that in seeking a definition for 'microworlds', there are two possible 
approaches: the structural and the functional. The structural approach describes a 
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microworld as: a. a set of computational objects, created to reflect the structure of 
mathematical entities within some sub domain of mathematics, b. a microworld links more 
than one representation of the underlying mathematical objects, c. often the objects and 
operations in a microworld can be combined to form more complex objects or operations, 
and d. a microworld includes a set of activities, which may be pre-programmed into the 
environment or instantiated in worksheets or verbal instructions in which the user is 
challenged to use the entities and operations to reach a goal. Thefunctional view focuses on 
characteristics that emerge when a microworld is placed in front of a learner: the learner is 
expected to manipulate the objects and execute the operations instantiated in the 
microworld, with the purpose of inducing or discovering their properties, and construction 
and understanding of the system as a whole; to interpret feedback from these manipulations 
in order to self-correct or 'debug' his or her understanding of the domain; to use the objects 
and operation in the microworld to create new entities or to solve specific problems or 
challenges, or both. 
2.3.3.2 Microworlds from a Vygotskian perspective 
According to Lajoie, Jacobs and Lavigne (1995), computer-based learning environments 
support the 'learning by doing' philosophy; for example statistical concepts become less 
abstract if individuals interact directly with models rather than manipulate abstract 
symbols, which are detached from their referent. In a computational modelling approach to 
statistics, a modelling language and sets of associated tools are made available to learners, 
allowing the learner to pursue personally meaningful investigations. Arguing along similar 
lines, Harel and Papert (1990) describe 'instructional software' in which 
'The communication between the software producers and their medium is 
dynamic. It requires constant goal-defining and redefining, planning and 
replanning, representing, building and rebuilding, blending, reorganizing, 
evaluating, modifying, and reflecting in similar senses. ' (p. 46). 
This view of designing software seems to be a realisation of Vygotsky's view of learning 
by an 'active child' in an 'active environment': 
'An essential feature of learning is that it creates the zone of proximal 
development; that is learning awakens a variety of internal developmental 
processes that are able to operate only when the child is interacting with his 
environments and in cooperation with his peers. While these processes are 
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intrernalized, they become part of the child independent developmental 
achievement. ' (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 90) 
According to Vygotsky (1981), all higher mental functioning that characterises human 
thought inherently involves mediation. A mediated mental function involves an indirect 
action on the world, which incorporates and transforms the natural, basic mental processes, 
extending their range and mode of functioning. The inclusion of the tool in the activity 
alters the course both of the activity and of all the mental processes that enter into the 
instrumental act. In this way, tools do not only facilitate mental processes, they transform, 
re-organise and shape them. Vygotsky (1978) argues that the child's system of activity is 
determined at each specific stage both by the child's degree of organic development and by 
his or her degree of mastery in the use of tools. 
Noss and Hoyles (1996) add another 'brick' to Vygotsky's theory, connecting it with the 
use of computer-based microworlds. They argue that the computer environment acts as a 
window. That is, although one cannot observe a learner's thinking directly, the researcher 
can study and analyse the learner's actions as they 'come to the surface' whilst working 
with the situations that the computer environment provides. 
diSessa, Hamer and Sherin (1991) adds another characteristic to Noss and Hoyles' (1996) 
openness of microworlds. They refer to the issue of ownership: 
'Ownership of ideas and artefacts is a potential advantage to having students 
design representations. Did these children own and feel that they owned the 
ideas developed? At a finer scale, how was ownership shared in the group? Did 
individuals hang onto their own creations, adopt the group consensus, or adopt 
the ideas perceived to be best, independent of originator and independent of the 
feelings of the rest of the group? '(diSessa et al, 199 1, p. 124). 
Children have in a computer-based environment the opportunity to express their own 
representations and also to re-construct and re-design the computer environment 
without losing its main kernel. This ownership helps to give meaning to the task and 
it enables children to feel that they own the ideas developed during their interaction 
with the task. 
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2.3.3.3 Microworlds for stochastics 
Computational models can contribute to the learning of stochastics because, when learners 
build computational models of everyday phenomena, they can develop robust mental 
models of the underlying probability and statistics. The feedback provided by building and 
then testing the computational model supports the learner in debugging and successively 
refining their mental model (Wilensky, 1997). Learning about stochastics requires 
opportunities to inquire, investigate, analyse, and interpret rather than to compute and 
memorise (Papert 1980,1996). 
Research on constructionism and 'connected mathematics' has shown how technology 
empowers children in the use of stochastics (Wilensky, 1997; 1995; Pratt 1998). 
Wilensky's (1993) project on 'connected probability' is a detailed example of a computer- 
based microworld in the field of probability. The research aimed at a better understanding 
of the source of learners' difficulties in probability and statistics and the building of 
learning environments that would foster the development of intuitive conceptions of basic 
concepts, and positive attitudes towards the discipline. Wilensky's findings were that 
mathematical intuitions are not static, nor are some mathematical concepts inherently 
'abstract' and thus not amenable to intuitive comprehension. Learners build and develop 
their mathematical intuitions over a lifetime and probabilistic ideas can become more 
concrete as learning progresses: the mathematical intuitions are constructed, not innately 
given. Both the lack of good leaming environments for probability, and the cultural and 
epistemological confusion surrounding the subject are barriers to the construction of good 
probabilistic intuitions. Pratt's (1998) study showed that by using a constructionist 
computational system (Boxer), 9- 11 year old children managed to make sense of local 
and global probabilistic meanings, interpreting local ones as those based on experiencing 
the outcome of individual events, and global ones as those that focus on an aggregated 
view of probability. 
2.3.3.4 Microworlds and teaching 
The above examples begin to suggest how the teaching process can be shaped by a 
computer-based constructionist microworld. Papert (1990) discusses 6constructionism vs. 
instructionsim' as follows 
' This does not suggest that instruction is bad or useless. Instruction is not bad 
but overrated as the locus for significant change in education. Better learning 
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will not come from finding better ways for the teacher to instruct but from 
giving the learner better opportunities to construct'. 
As Papert (1991) argues, the classroom environment ought to change its focus from 
instruction to the idea of construction. Consistent with this view are two of the central 
tenets of constructionism: that people learn by doing, and by reflecting on what they do. 
Learning by doing involves building up mental structures so that ideas may get linked into 
a mental network that will allow some ideas to assimilate readily while others will be 
transformed radically by the assimilating structure. If a concept is taught and that is well 
assimilated to teacher's internal structure but the structures of the learners are sufficiently 
different from the teacher's, then what is taught will be radically transformed (Wilensky, 
1993). 
Sutherland and Balacheff (1999) raise the issue of didactical complexity that can occur in 
computational environments for the learning of mathematics. They argue that computer- 
based microworlds can provide access to mathematical worlds but the very nature of 
mathematical knowing and knowledge means that for many pupils there will not be a 
seamless entry into the world of mathematics. This is where the teacher plays a crucial 
role, but the teacher needs to understand what has been passing between student, computer 
and the task. Moreover, Kapadia and Borovcnik (1991) claim that probability concepts and 
their meaning depend not only on the level of theory, but also on their representations. The 
tools used to represent knowledge or to deal with knowledge have a significant impact on 
an individual learner's formation of this knowledge. In particular, visualization and 
graphical methods facilitate representation of models at different levels of abstraction Cý, 
offering the possibility of interaction. 
2.3.4 Representation and visualisation in mathematics 
Constructionist learning environments encourage multiple learning styles and multiple 
representations of knowledge. In this section, some theories of representation and 
visualisation are described. 
Bruner (1966) claims that " 'representation' must be inferred from the behaviour we can 
observe" (p. 7); to infer a person's representation of the world we must 
design tasks that 
permit us to infer how the learner does these things. 
Bruner describes three modes of 
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representation: the enactive, the iconic, and the symbolic. In order to understand the nature 
of internal representation by action, image and symbol and the difficulties of inferring their 
presence-in-operation, we should first understand the objective of a representation - not 
simply the medium by which things are represented, but what they are represented for. 
Representation can be effected in the media of symbols, images, and actions and each form 
of representation can be specialized to aid symbolic manipulation, image, organization, or 
execution of motor acts. The three representational systems are parallel and each is unique, 
but all are capable of partial translation from one to another. Davis (1984) shares the idea 
of Bruner, adding that in order for any mathematical concept to be presented in the mind, it 
must be represented in some way, and the representations reveal the ideas one has of a 
specific concept. 
Denis (1991) distinguishes two aspects of the representational process: mental, cognitive 
entities, and external, physical objects. Denis points out that a representation can refer to 
both a process and the outcome of this process, where the former is an activity generating 
objects or entities, and the latter refers to the entities themselves rather than the activity 
which produced them. The mental-external distinction of Denis is used in Dreyfus's (1993) 
analysis of representations, defining mental representations as those referring to a 
mathematical ob ect or process (which might be different for different people), and j 
external representations as referring to communication about mathematics, such as graphs. 
Booth and Thomas (2000) refer to cognitive integration, where mediation leads to the 
connection of imagery and related verbal data. They claim that to gain the benefits of 
cognitive integration it is necessary, for example, to have developed good spatial skills, in 
order to analyse a picture, abstract from it the essential elements of the problem, mentally 
convert these impressions of reality into theoretical objects, and at each stage relate these 
to the verbally stored conceptual ideas. Booth and Thomas's cognitive integration has 
similarities with Tall and Vinner's (1981) description of concept image and concept 
definition (see section 2.2.3). Dreyfus (1993) suggests that success in mathematics 
depends on rich mental representations, which involve many linked aspects of a given 
concept. He suggests that several mental representations of a concept may be presented 
simultaneously and be called up in different situation and also the learner can switch 
efficiently between them as required by the situation or problem with which he/she is 
faced. 
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Some representations are of visual form (e. g. a pie chart); others are purely symbolic or 
algebraic. The visual representation of a mathematical situation tends to provide a global 
view, while the symbolic representation tends to favour more local analysis (Larkin and 
Simon, 1987). The use of visual types of representation is called visualisation by 
Zimmermann and Cunningham (1991): 
' We take the term visualization to describe the process of producing or using 
geometrical or graphical representations of mathematical concepts, principles 
or problems, whether hand drawn or computer generated' (p. 1) 
and they add 
' In mathematics, visualization is not an end in itself but a means toward an 
end, which is understanding. Notice that, typically, one does not speak about 
visualizing a diagram but visualizing a concept or problem. To visualize a 
diagram means simply to form a mental image of the diagram, but to visualize 
a problem means to understand the problem in terms of a diagram or visual 
image. Mathematical visualization is the process of forming images (mentally, 
or with pencil and paper, or with the aid of technology) and using such images 
effectively for mathematical discovery and understanding'. (p. 3) 
In fact, mathematicians' trust in visual reasoning has long been noted. Hadamard (1945), 
for example, illustrates that in problem solving mathematicians use visual reasoning, 
incorporating geometrical and other images as the basis for their intuitions, and only 
subsequently code them in symbolic terms. He recounts that when thinking mathematicians 
avoid not only the use of words, but also algebraic or other symbols and have a preference 
for vague images. Speaking of himself, he insists that words were totally absent from his 
mind when he really thought about mathematics, and that they remained absent until he 
came to the moment of communicating the results in a written or oral form. 
Presmeg (1986) identifies five categories in visual imagery. Concrete imagery, a holistic 
image that has parts only to the extent that they are parts of an everyday object or picture; 
in Presmeg's study students tended to recognise the whole shape easily, but could not 
always recognise partially made shapes unless they are pictorial. Pattern imagery in which 
there is a conscious recognition of some of the properties of the concrete images and their 
relationships, often in the form of pattems, symbolic and numerical pattems. Memory 
images offormulae, where visualizers typically see a formula in their minds, written on a 
blackboard or in their notebooks. Kinaesthetic imagery, imagery involving muscular 
activity and Dynamic imagery in which shapes are changed into new related shapes. 
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Moreover, in Presmeg's study the students did not stay with only one of those types, but 
used different ones in different situations. 
The range of visualizations generated by individuals is an important factor. Cunningham 
(1991) claims that adding visualization to mathematics education promotes intuition and 
understanding and allows a wider range of coverage of mathematical subjects. Students do 
not only learn mathematics but also learn new ways to think about and do their own 
mathematics. A particularly important way in which the mathematics education community 
has attempted to integrate visual reasoning is through the use of computer-based 
environments. Kaput, Noss and Hoyles (2002) describe how a computational environment 
can act as a 'representational window' and lead to the development of new notations for 
learnable mathematics. They claim that when one is learning or constructing something 
new, one needs to think explicitly about the representational system itself, the 
representational system is simultaneously transparent and opaque. This 'coordinated 
transparency' represents a synthesis of meaning and mechanism, a situation in which 
fluency with and within the medium can temporarily be replaced by a conscious awareness 
of its internal structures. Using 'ToonTalk' (a visual programming language for children), 
they illustrate how the evolution of representational structures and associated artefacts and 
technologies have gradually externalised aspects of knowledge and transformational skill. 
The use of a computer-based microworld offers effective ways to represent stochastic ideas. 
Biehler (1991) summarises some main principles of using computers in the learning of 
probability: a. the computer should be used as a visualization tool; it adds new dimensions 
and the possibility to see pictures and dynamical representations, b. by the inclusion of 
multiple, linked representations; different students may find different representations 
persuasive and memorable, and all students will understand concepts more deeply if they 
comprehend the connections between representations, c. providing opportunities for 
interaction; students can modify data and graphs, set parameters for sampling experiments, 
and construct decision models. The immediate feedback of a visual representation provides 
students with the power to 'discover' statistical concepts. For example, Kaput (1995) 
creates environments that offer different representational 'windows' on the same general 
situation. The user can manipulate one of the particular representations simultaneously 
displayed and he argues that these experiences may help students link more familiar, 
concrete representations to more abstract ones of the same situation. 
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2.4 Part Three: Themes in research on the learning of probability 
Probabilistic reasoning is receiving increased attention nowadays amongst mathematics 
educators and researchers. Psychologists have long been interested in how people reason 
about probabilities when they make decisions and they have amassed a considerable body 
of research in this area over the past few decades. This part is divided into two sections: the 
first illustrates the research in understanding probability; the second identifies some 
didactic implications arising from this research. 
2.4.1 Research in understanding probability 
The definitive texts on the development of probabilistic cognition were written by Piaget 
and Inhelder (1951, translated 1975) and Fischbein (1975). Unlike Piaget's preoccupation 
with 'a priori' probability, Fischbein 9s perspective allows an exploration of intuitive 
foundations and precursors to probabilistic knowledge. He is less interested than Piaget in 
the final schemata of formal probability that affect the outcome of instruction in the 
subject. There is a sense in which Fischbein is looking for the existence of partially formed 
probability concepts whereas Piaget is observing the lack of completed concepts. 
Piaget and Inhelder (1975) devised a number of experiments, which involved 'chance' 
outcomes. They used these for 'probing' the conceptual development of children from pre- 
school ages to adolescence. The use of different experimental tasks with different age 
groups of course carries with it problems concerning the equivalence of the experimental 
situations, with consequent difficulties over establishing an unambiguous developmental 
picture. Piaget and Inhelder (1975) argued that for children before the age of 8 years old, 
there is a failure to understand the irreversibility of random mixing depends on the same 
reasons as the failure to understand the reversibility of operations. As they concluded for 
this age range: 
'Perhaps it will be said that these last drawings show simply the lack of 
flexibility in operative representation and imagination at this age level, and do 
not exclude the understanding of physical mobility which the subject noted 
during the experiment itself. But if we compare these drawings with the totality 
of the reactions at this age, the over-all picture shows precisely that the lack of 
an internal mobility of thought goes along with failure to understand the 
mobility inherent in the physical process of random mixture itself'. (p. 12) 
-50- 
2. A Review of the Literature 
Piaget and Inhelder designed the 'marble tilt box' problem as a window on the concept of 
randomness. They assume that children who 'have the randomness concept' would 
interpret the situations as indeterminate and the transformations of the marble 
arrangements as random; and those who do not have the concept would anticipate 
conservation of the marble arrangement in its ordered state or, at least, a quick return to 
this special state. In the first stage of understanding, they claim that there is an absence of 
appreciation for the distribution of the whole and the subjects' reasoning is determined by 
two competing explanations: repetition or compensation. The subjects of this stage 
understand the mixture of the balls as a kind of regulated process of elements and because 
they lack precisely this understanding of the different combinations determining the 
individual paths of the balls during mixing, the subjects do not come to an understanding 
of any distribution of the whole based on the symmetry of combinations in play. Piaget and 
Inhelder described the second stage, until eleven years, as the stage of beginning the idea 
of combinatorics, where the intuition of chance appears along with the establishment of the 
first concrete operations ('interrelated' and 'reversible'). In the second stage there are 
beginnings of structuring a distribution and generalization from one experiment to the next. 
They claim that it is at the third stage, to twelve years, when formal thought first appears, 
that the process of random mixture is understood because, at that age, the observed facts 
are assimilated in an operative scheme based on the mechanics of permutations. 
In general, Piaget and Inhelder inferred children's stages of development partly by 
observing their behavioural responses, which might, for example, be sketching a predicted 
outcome, and partly by questioning them on their predictions or preferences in sampling 
experiments. The connections between the outcome and the sample can be also 
characterised by 'causality'. As Piaget (1974) states: 
'Since causality proceeds from a specific action to a generalization of 
relationships between the objects and, since the operations themselves are 
derived from actions and from their co ordinations, we can assume that the 
further back one goes, the more the actions of the subject are undifferentiated, 
therefore simultaneously preoperational and causal; as the operations progress, 
there will be at the same time differentiation and collaboration in a manner yet 
to be determined. ' (p. 9) 
According to Hawkins and Kapadia (1984) many experimental variations are possible 
using the framework of Piaget and Inhelder's research. In fact, there are so many variables, 
which may be altered either by accident or design, that apparently conflicting results occur 
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in what essentially seem to be replication studies. Kuzmak and Gelman (1986) assess 
children's early competence in understanding probability and random phenomena, dealing 
with a random phenomenon as a physical one that is conventionally viewed as having a 
number of equally probable outcomes. They report that 4-year-olds differentially respond 
to the question of which colour is going to come out next (having as an option to answer 
(yes' or 'no') when they are shown apparatuses with determined versus undetermined 
outcomes (a plastic tube containing a line of marbles, as opposed to a wire steel cage from 
which one marble will occasionally fall). They point out that children who fail to 
differentiate the phenomena do not tend to behave as if they view all phenomena as 
predictable, with a hidden and arbitrary order. They conclude that Piaget and Inhelder's 
characterization of an early stage of development was not confirmed and that the stage 
described by Fischbein, of having an intuition of uncertainty without a deep understanding 
of physical mechanism, may apply to the 4-year-olds who correctly differentiated the 
predictability of the two phenomena but could not give explanations showing an 
understanding of the random mechanism. However, they suggest that the 4-year-olds and 
perhaps even some 3-year-olds may have understood the nature of the mechanisms but 
may have lacked the linguistic ability to explain their thinking. 
In fact, researchers (for example, Hoemann and Ross, 1971) have disagreed with Piaget's 
approaches, stating that his work is lacking in rigorous experimental controls, which enable 
unambiguous interpretations to be derived. This, and also disagreements over what kinds 
of probability concepts are being explored by Piaget's experiments, have engendered much 
debate and controversy. Green's (1983) investigations with large samples of children aged 
7 to 16, using paper and pencil versions of Piaget's tasks, showed that ability to recognize 
randomness does not improve with age; the children were able to describe what was meant 
by equiprobable but they did not appear to understand the independence of the trials, and 
they tended to produce series in which runs of the same result were too short when 
compared to those that we would expect in a random process. Batanero and Serrano (1999) 
extended Green's research to 17 year-old students and complemented his results by an 
analysis- of students' arguments to support randomness in bidimensional distributions. 
They conclude that students' arguments and responses indicate underlying conceptions that 
parallel some of the meanings attributed to randomness throughout history. These results 
reveal the complexity of the meaning of randomness and they argue that it may be 
preferable to consider the term randomness as a label with which we associate many 
concepts, such as experiment, event, sample space, or probability. 
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Fischbein's theory (1975) provides strong support for the importance of systematic 
education in the development of probabilistic intuitions. He provides an alternative to the 
developmental theory of Piaget and Inhelder and disagrees that the acquisition of 
probability concepts occurs in three narrowly defined stages, as Piaget and Inhelder 
describe. For Fischbein, the process of replacing a primary intuition by a secondary one, 
which occurs after instruction, is not a gradual process but takes place all at once. This is 
very much like the experience that Shaughnessy (1992) describes as the moment of 
discovery or insight in the problem-solving process. Fischbein also emphasizes the need in 
research on probabilistic cognition for more adequate analysis of the chance events under 
consideration and the task characteristics that may affect the participant's problem solving, 
as well as a more accurate identification of the cognitive processing that the participant 
actually uses. 
In Fischbein's theory, intuition plays an essential part in the domain of probability, perhaps 
more conspicuously and strikingly than it does in other domains of mathematics. He argues 
that probability intuitions, for example probability matching whereby the relative 
frequencies of the person's predictions over a series of trials come to approximate the 
probabilities of the respective outcomes, have been observed in children as young as 3-4 
years old and generally appears to be well established by the age of 6. Fischbein (1999b) 
emphasizes the role of intuition in the origins and development of probabilistic thinking: 
'If one investigates the student's difficulties and misconceptions, one does not 
identify only logical deficiencies. One identifies, very often, intuitive 
tendencies, intuitive interpretations, and models tacit or conscious - that 
contradict the formal knowledge with which school tries to endow the student. ' 
(p. 49) 
Research carried out by Kahneman and Tversky (1982) into the persistent errors that 
people make when making judgements under uncertainty, shows a difference between 
looking at intuitions and looking at misconceptions. It also shows that because of the 
contradictions between intuitions and the formal knowledge that school tries to teach, this 
can cause students to develop many different misconceptions. Kahneman and Tversky's 
original thesis was that people who are statistically naYve make estimates for the likelihood 
of events by using certain judgmental heuristics, such as 'representativeness' and 
6availability'. According to the representativeness heuristic, people estimate the likelihood 
of events based on how well an outcome represents some aspect of its parent population; 
people believe that a sample should either reflect the distribution of the parent population, 
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or that a sample should mirror the process by which random events is generated. For 
example, Tversky and Kahneman (1983) analysed reactions to the following statement: 
'Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in 
philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of 
discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear 
demonstrations. '(p. 297) 
People had to rank by likelihood the statements 'Linda is a bank teller', 'Linda is active in 
the feminist movement', and 'Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist 
movement'. A misconception that respondents exhibited was to rank Linda's being a bank 
teller and a feminist as more likely than just being a banker. This ranking violates the rules 
of logic, which require that any single statement is more likely than its conjunction with 
another statement. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1982) concluded that people have many misconceptions of 
probability events. NaYve reasoners are posited to have what might be called a 'makes 
sense7 epistemology, they act as though the test of truth is that a proposition makes 
intuitive sense - it 'sounds right', 'rings true'. They see no need to criticise or revise 
accounts that do make sense because the intuitive feel of fit suffices. Stochastic 
misconceptions have been seen when: 
a. people inappropriately believe there is no variability in the 'real world', 
b. people have unwarranted confidence in small samples, 
c. they are unaware of regression to the mean in their everyday lives, 
d. they mistakenly believe that an appropriate size for a random sample is independent of 
the overall population size, 
e. people believe that any difference in the means between two groups is significant, 
f. people have insufficient respect for small differences in large samples 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1983; Schoenfeld, 1985; Shaughnessy, 1985). 
Tversky and Kahnheman (1983) claim that the law of small numbers reflects a failure to 
appreciate the chance and variability in small sets drawn from a population. In research on 
understanding and attribution of randomness of primary grade children, kindergartners and 
3 rd graders, and undergraduates, Metz (1998) suggests that the law of small numbers was 
the only interpretation to explain the subjects' acknowledgment of determinism. That is, 
the belief that the contents of an unknown sample space can be directly assessed through a 
small number of observations of the constituent elements. She claims that the challenge of 
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assessing the boundaries of the agent's control enters into the instantiation of the strategy, 
in which the participant believes he or she should somehow be able to implement the 
drawing process such that the order of marbles drawn accurately reflects the proportion in 
colours in the unknown sample space. 
The misconceptions research, such as that of Kahneman and Tversky (1973), argues that in 
making predictions and judgements under uncertainty, people do not appear to follow the 
calculus of chance or statistical theory of prediction. Instead, they rely on a limited number 
of heuristics, which sometimes yield reasonable judgements and sometimes lead to 
systematic errors. On the other hand, Smith, diSessa and Rochelle (1993) refute the 
misconceptions approach as lacking explanatory power: this approach only considers a 
narrow range of contexts in which the misconceptions occur. Heuristics research is full of 
questions directed to people for whom those questions are clearly not close to their areas of 
competence or in situations where appropriate tools to explore the questions are 
unavailable. Smith, diSessa and Rochelle (1993) state that it should be possible to create 
new learning environments, which are closer to pre-existing areas of competence of young 
children, in which it may be possible to observe their search for underlying principles. To 
understand children"s physical conceptions they claim that 
'It seems more productive to study the roles that naYve physical conceptions 
continue to play in expert reasoning than to suggest that the main issue in 
acquiring expertise is to remove and replace them. ' (p. 145). 
Similarly, such an approach may provide a richer evidential base for understanding 
probabilities than an emphasis on how people fail when operating outside of their area of 
competence. 
Hawkins and Hawkins (1997) conducted research into lawyers' misconceptions in the area 
of statistics and probability. Lawyers in the United Kingdom receive no training in these 
areas apart from their compulsory school mathematical education. The researchers 
concluded that it is not surprising that lawyers have considerable difficulty with most of 
their probabilistic questions, given the inadequacy of their preparation for the increasingly 
quantitative decision-making facing them in their work. 
The literature that describes misconceptions in statistics and probability is much more 
extensive than the literature on what can practically be done to ameliorate 
them. Wilensky 
(1995,1997) is critical of the influence of Kahneman and Tversky and the consequent 
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belief that humans are incapable of thinking intuitively about probability. He argues that a 
common conclusion drawn by educators and researchers from this research is that people 
just aren't built for doing probability, or that intuitions are faulty and not to be trusted. He 
claims that a better practice for educators wishing to educate students in probability is to 
instil an attitude of mistrust for intuitive responses and a healthy respect for formulae. 
Wilensky's research showed that when people have difficulties, or 'misconceptions' 
according to Kahneman and Tversky, these stem from fundamental confusion about 
notions such as randomness, distribution, and expectation, and these can be avoided by 
using an appropriate learning environment (in Wilensky's case the 'connected probability' 
project. 
Jacobs and Potenza (1991) found that the use of the representativeness heuristic is specific 
to social judgements and is based on the development of social schemata that can be used 
to make judgements in social situations. Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson and Kunda (1983) suggest 
that people are disinclined to reason statistically about certain kinds of events that they 
recognise to be highly variable and uncertain, notably social events, because the sample 
spaces for the events and the chance factors influencing the events are opaque. They add 
that training in statistics should promote statistical reasoning even about mundane events 
of everyday life, because such training can help people to construct distributional models 
for events and help them to recognise 'error', or the chance factors that influence events. 
Konold (1989) suggests that in addition to normative, forinal reasoning and to reasoning 
with heuristics, people also reason in some situations according to an 'outcome approach% 
They are inclined to view probability inappropriately as 'operative', i. e. as attempting to 
predict the outcome of an event. Given an uncertain situation, people using the outcome 
approach do not see their goal as specifying probabilities that reflect the distribution of 
occurrences in a sample but as predicting the results of a single trial. Konold found that 
subjects' responses were not consistent across problems: subjects who appeared to reason 
according to the outcome approach on one problem seemed to reason correctly on another 
and showed evidence of using a heuristic approach on yet a third. He concludes that there 
is a tendency for people to interpret the use of 'probabilities' in certain situations as 
measures of causal dependence, rather than as a measure of chance. Li and Pereira- 
Mendoza (2002) conclude that the outcome approach is one of the main 'Misconceptions' 
of probability in Chinese students, independent of school streams or background in 
-56- 
2. A Review of the Literature 
probability, and also that students' understanding of probability does not improve naturally 
with age, although teaching does play an important role. 
Konold, Pollatsek, Well, Lohmeier and Lipson (1993) concluded that most students have a 
well-developed concept of independence prior to any formal instruction. The sizeable 
percentage of correct responses are spurious and reflect an outcome approach to 
uncertainty that is perhaps more pernicious than misapplication of the representativeness 
heuristic. They state that the picture that is emerging from research on student conceptions 
of probability is that there is no simple story about how students reason about chance and it 
is important for teachers of probability to become familiar with the variety of alternative 
conceptions. 
Fischbein, Nello and Marino (1991) tried to obtain a better understanding of the origins 
and nature of some probabilistic intuitive obstacles of elementary and junior-high-school. 
They found that subjects did not have in mind a clear definition of the terms 'possible', 
'impossible' and 'certain'. The term 'certain', especially, entails a difficulty when it is 
related to a compound event, for instance the probability of obtaining a number smaller 
than 7 when rolling a die. Some subjects confused 'rare' with 'impossible'. They also 
conclude that there is no natural understanding of the fact that, in a sample space, possible 
outcomes should be distinguished and counted separately if the order of their elementary 
components is different. In questions where the subjects were asked to compare the 
probabilities of getting certain numbers obtained by addition when rolling two dice, they 
found that many subjects seem to be able to relate spontaneously the estimations of 
probabilities to the magnitude of sample spaces. Singer and Resnick (1992) suggest that 
proportions expressed as relationships have three basic quantities associated with them, a 
whole and two parts, and that they can be represented by two different schemas: a part- 
whole schema and a part-part schema. For example, in a collection of ten marbles, six of 
which are red and four of which are black, one can represent the relationship of the parts to 
the whole (4/10 black to whole) or the relationship of the two parts to each other (6/4 red to 
black). 
Fischbein et al (1991) claim that 
'The general idea is then that, the outcomes can be controlled by the 
individual. The mathematical, probabilistic structure has not yet been detached 
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from the concrete circumstances and considered in its abstract generality' (p. 
530). 
Truran and Truran (1999) studied the understandings of the concept of independence of 
dice throws by children and adults, showing that while some probabilistic intuitions exist at 
a very early age, they do not transfer well into even moderately complicated situations. The 
suggestion from Konold (1989) that it is a lack of understanding of independence, which is 
the principal problem, becomes more precisely that it is a failure to know how to identify 
random generators. For Truran and Truran (1999), the principal problem seems to be a 
belief that the initial tossing of the die, the moment that the action of tossing takes place, is 
more powerful than the subsequent large number of forces that impinge on the random 
generator. They conclude that since deciding whether two random generators are 
independent is essentially a subjective, process and since we can see that many children and 
adults do not always intuitively acquire this skill, it is something that needs more explicit 
attention in schools. 
Jones et al (1997; 1999) try to give a framework for assessing probabilistic thinking. They 
conclude that there are four levels for each of the following probabilistic concepts: sample 
space, probability of an event, probability comparisons and conditional probability. They 
describe the four levels as follows: 
Level 1- 'subjective', children list an incomplete set of outcomes for a one-stage 
experiment; predict the most/least likely event based on subjective judgements, recognise 
certain and impossible events; compare the probability of an event in two different sample 
spaces, usually based on various subjective or numeric judgements, cannot distinguish 
'fair' probability situations from 'unfair' ones, following a particular outcome will predict 
consistently that it will occur next time, or alternatively that it will not occur again (over 
generalisation). 
Level 2- 'transitional', children list a complete set of outcomes for one-stage experiments 
and sometimes list a complete set of outcomes for a two-stage experiment using limited 
and unsystematic strategies, predict most/least likely event based on quantitative 
judgements but may revert to subjective judgements, make probability comparisons based 
on quantitative judgements-may not quantify correctly and may have limitations where 
non-contiguous events are involved-, begin to distinguish 'fair' probability situations from 
'unfair' ones, begin to recognise that the probability of an event changes in a non- 
replacement situation and can recognize when certain and impossible events will arise in 
non-replacement situations. 
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Level 3- 'informal quantitative', children adopt and partially apply a generative strategy to 
make a complete listing of outcomes for a two-stage case, predict most/least likely events 
based on quantitative judgements including situations involving non-contiguous outcomes', 
use numbers informally to compare probabilities, distinguish 'certain', impossible', and 
6 possible' events, and justify choice quantitatively, make probability comparisons based on 
consistent quantitative judgements, justify with valid quantitative reasoning, but may have 
limitations where non-contiguous events are involved, distinguish 'fair' and 'unfair' 
probability generators based on valid numerical reasoning, can determine changing 
probability measurers in anon-replacement situation and recognise that the probability of 
all events change in a non-replacement situation. 
Level 4- 'numerical', children adopt and apply a generative strategy which enables a 
complete listing of the outcomes for two-and three- stage cases, predict most/least likely 
events for single stage experiments; in this level children also assign a numerical 
probability to an event (it may be real probability or a form of odds), assign a numerical 
probability measure and compare, incorporate non-contiguous and contiguous outcomes in 
detertnining probabilities, assign equal numerical probabilities to equally likely events, 
assign equal numerical probabilities in replacements and non-replacement situations and 
distinguish dependent and independent events. 
Jones et al's framework suggests that the development of young's children's thinking in 
probability will be linear - in order for children to reach a 'level 3' understanding they 
must pass first from level I to level 2 etc. The subjects of Jones et al's research were eight 
randomly selected children; four from each of two third-grade classes, and none of the 
children had been exposed to probability instruction. This framework seems to be the only 
recent one, since Piaget and Inhelder (1975), which tries to define stages for children's 
development in the concepts of probability. 
Concerning understanding of sample space, Ayres and Way (1999; 2000) worked with 
students who observed a video recording of coloured balls being drawn from a box with 
replacement, sample space unknown. They conclude that students were significantly 
influenced in their probability judgements by confirmation or refutation of their own 
(predictions', and that many students inappropriately tried to utilise colour patterns as a 
strategy. 
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Falk et al (1980) suggest that one method to help develop young children's potential for 
understanding of probability is to let them practice playing probability games, which give 
children experience with the operation of the laws of probability. Paparistodemou and 
Philippou (2002) describe how young children start to make probabilistic decisions and 
think about chance and risk from an early age, depending on how they have embarked on 
probabilistic games. Amir and Williams (1994) argue that heuristic intuitions seem to gain 
for relevant experiences and practices, which are culturally determined, like gambling or 
board games. Playing games, using concrete materials and 'real life' tools is a kind of 
concrete, simple representation that can be a force for learning probability (Chiu, 1996; 
Acredolo et al, 1989; Szendrei, 1996). Watson and Moritz (2000) argue, from research on 
statistical literacy, that there is a need to make more explicit the transition from out-of- 
school connotations of sampling, such as in supermarkets or medical contexts, in which 
variation is not usually an issue, to the representative sampling required for statistical 
inference. 
In research on fairness, Pratt and Noss (1998) examined how their subjects, 9- 11 year old 
children, made sense of dice situations, and they showed how existing intuitions about 
fairness, often based on actual outcomes, are co-ordinated with new meanings and derive 
from interacting with a computer-based microworld. They permit a data-oriented view of 
the world, where Kahneman and Tversky's heuristics and Konold's outcome approach can 
flourish. These ways are abstracted directly from experience with dice and other kinds of 
random generators, like cards, during informal game playing. This is also what Papert 
(1996) argues: learning probability by throwing dice and calculating fractions will 
reinforce behaviour based on misconceptions such as Kahneman and Tversky's identify. 
Borovcnik and Peard (1996) indicate the gap between actions (or operations) and 
reflections. For them, an operation means for example 'predicting the outcome of the next 
toss', whereas reflection means 'evaluating the weight of heads'. Thus, the individual 
experiences a conflict right from the beginning. This conflict is governed by, on the one 
hand, being unable to predict the next outcome exactly and with absolute certainty, and on 
the other hand the need to master the 'chaos' in the environment. 
This is where the computer can play a role, as Biehler (1991) points out, for example in 
dealing with the law of large numbers and the frequentist interpretation. Biehler argues that 
students often understand the laws of large numbers only superficially. 
Without computer 
support, it is in fact difficult to work with large numbers; 
long run frequencies remain 
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mysterious and students are led to act as if a 'law of small numbers' holds - they develop 
the 'misconception' that there is a stabilization of absolute frequencies. Aspinwall and Tarr 
(2001) report that, while typical middle school students are seemingly unaware of the 
relationship between experimental probability and sample size, appropriate cognitive 
activity focused on results of simulations of random phenomena can foster conceptual 
development. In general, the relationship between experimental probability of an event and 
the theoretical probability of an event results from the fact that, for a given event, 
experimental probability will more closely approximate theoretical probability as the 
number of trial increases. Stohl and Tarr's (2002) research has shown how a variety of 
software tools can enable students to understand the interplay between empirical and 
theoretical probability. Their study was based on 6thgrade students who worked with open- 
ended software stimulation tools, using a program, Probability Explorer, as the primary 
investigation tool. The students began to recognize the importance of using larger samples 
to make inferences, and to justify their claims with data based evidence. These authors 
claim that one of the most important aspects of formulating and evaluating inferences is 
understanding the unpredictability of random phenomenon in the short-run and 
predictability in the long-run trends in data (i. e., the law of large numbers). Thus, the 
sample size in a simulation is a crucial factor for students to consider when making 
inferences from a sample distribution to the population, and making connections between 
empirical and theoretical probability. The terms short-run and long-run trends here are 
used in a similar sense to Pratt's (1998) local and global meaning. Stohl and Tarr (2002) 
suggest that inference is an appropriate topic for the middle school mathematics curriculum 
and it does not need to be postponed until students have first developed robust proportional 
reasoning. This brings us to the next section of this chapter, which describes the concept of 
probability in curriculum and in teaching procedures. 
2.4.2 Didactic implications concerning the concept of probability 
According to Borovcnik and Peard (1996), there is no doubt that the topic of probability 
is 
an important one in the mathematics curriculum even though the 
inclusion of probability is 
a relatively recent development. A necessary area of 
investigation is the role of the teacher: 
if we consider the necessity of educating students who are used 
to think stochastically, it is 
needed to re-think the role of the teacher 
in the teaching/learning process (Lopes and de 
Moura, 2002). Konold (1991) provides some salient reflections on the role of 
instruction in 
a learning situation fraught with students' prior stochastic' misconceptions': 
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'Long before their formal introduction to probability, students have dealt with 
countless situations involving uncertainty and have learned to use words such 
as probable, random, independent, lucky, chance, fair, unlikely. They have a 
coherent understanding that permits them to utter sentences using these words 
that are comprehensible to others in everyday situations. It is into this web of 
meanings that students attempt to integrate and thus make sense of their 
classroom experience... My assumption is that students have intuitions about 
probability, and that they can't check these in at the classroom door. The 
success of the teacher depends on how these notions are treated in relation to 
those the teacher would like the student to acquire... How students think about 
probability before and during instruction can facilitate communication between 
the student and the teacher' (p. 144). 
Borovcnik and Bentz (1991) suggest that conventional teaching establishes too few links 
between primary intuitions and the mathematical model. They claim that this is critical for 
probability as there are no direct experiences, which will help learners to establish these 
links on their own. If learners are to understand probability and apply it to other situations, 
teaching has to start from the learner's intuitions and develop them gradually. That is, the 
learner needs to see how mathematics can helpfully reconstruct his/her intuitions. Konold 
(1989) suggests that intuitions and misconceptions need to be considered in the design both 
of probability curricula and of instruments meant to assess conceptual understanding 
Jones, Langrall, Thornton and Nisbet (2002) indicate that a considerable amount of 
research has been concerned with young children's probabilistic thinking, yet probability is 
an under-represented mathematical domain in elementary school curricula. The research of 
Kahneman and Tversky (1982) did inspire curricula to alert students to the use of heuristics 
and how these heuristics can lead them astray in judgements of uncertainty. 
One of the issues for curriculum design is the continuing influence of Piagetian models for 
the development of intelligence. For example, Ojeda (1999) claims that probability is not 
considered in Mexico for children of 5 to 8 years of age, because, according to Piaget, 
children are not capable to understand probability at stages previous to the stage of 
concrete operations. However, Ojeda's research suggests the need to introducing didactical 
activities for teaching probability at elementary school level, by giving priority to a natural 
approach that recognises children's intuitive understandings of chance events. 
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Ahlgren and Garfield (1991) suggest what a probabilistic curriculum should involve. One 
should seek to ensure that students will be able apply probabilistic understandings outside 
of the school setting, but an impediment to meaningful curriculum is the tendency by 
students to compartmentalise what they learn in school. Without practice in retrieving 
ideas or employing skills outside of the classroom context, students are unlikely to make 
use of what they learn in school. This tendency is even stronger for ideas that are 
inconsistent with their intuitive ways of viewing the world. Borovcnick and Bentz (1991) 
also suggest that from the didactic perspective it may be advantageous to develop concepts, 
which allow for a more direct development of stable secondary intuitions than for 
probability concepts. 
Steinbring (1991) argues that there are two main methods of teaching probability, based on 
intuitiveness and consistency. The intuitive approach focuses on experiments, ideal games 
of chance and real situations. After this intuitive and experimental phase of teaching there 
is a progression towards statistical methods and concepts. The teaching of probability and 
statistics generally relies heavily on the concepts of chance and randomness, therefore 
statistical educators should be aware of the 'theories' and preconceptions concerning these 
concepts that students possess before receiving any instruction, since while students are 
learning something new, they will construct their own meanings by connecting the new 
information to what they already believe to be true (Falk, 1992; Falk and Konold, 1994; 
Borovcnick and Peard, 1996; Batanero, Serrano and Garfield, 1996). 
In research on the evolution with age of probabilistic intuitively based misconceptions, 
Fischbein and Schnarch (1997) conclude that some misconceptions diminish with age, 
some remain stable and some gain greater influence. Their interpretation of this is that 
probability does not consist of mere technical knowledge and procedures leading to 
solutions. Rather, it requires a way of thinking that is genuinely different from that 
required by most mathematics leamt in school. In learning probability, students need to 
develop new intuitions, and instruction should lead students to actively experience the 
conflicts between their primary intuitive schemata and the particular types of reasoning 
specific to stochastic situations. 
Wilensky's (1995) research aimed to build from the conjecture that both the learner's own 
sense-making and the cognitive researchers' investigations of this sense-making are best 
advanced by having the learner build computational models of probabilistic phenomena, 
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based on prior intuitive understandings. He shows that through such building, learners can 
come to make sense of core concepts in probability, like normal distribution. Similarly, 
Pratt and Noss (1996) describe the development of a computer-based domain within which 
children (aged 9- 11 years) manipulate 'stochastic gadgets', representing everyday objects 
such as a die, a coin, a lottery and a set of playing cards. They claim that this gives 
researchers a 'window' onto the processes by which the domain shapes the children's 
thinking about stochastic events such as fairness, randomness and chance. Pratt and Noss 
put individual learners in situations where they could express their beliefs in symbolic 
('programming') form, where they could articulate the beliefs that they hold, and 
reconstruct them in the light of their experiences. Pratt's (1998; 2000) research on 
computational environments examines two notions: a. that probability is 'simply hard' and 
b. that our knowledge of how to build effective learning environments is too limited. As he 
states, the evidence from his study is that pedagogic methods need to be found by which 
recently acquired global meanings can be recognised to have greater explanatory power 
than competing long-establi shed local meanings. According to Pratt (1998), local meanings 
in probability have characteristics such as: the next outcome is unpredictable, there is 
irregularity, there are no patterns and fairness appears as symmetry in appearance. Global 
meanings have characteristics such as: the proportion of outcomes for each possibility is 
predictable (probability), the proportion will stabilise as an increasing number of results 
(large numbers) and there is control through the manipulation of sample space. 
Greer (2001) argues that particular attention needs to be given to the relationship between 
probability and statistics and how this relationship should be handled instructionally. The 
recording, graphical representation and interpretation of results from experiments with 
stochastic phenomena, in combination with comparisons of graphical data arising from 
probabilistic and deterministic processes (and the fitting of algebraic functions), offer 
opportunities for making such links. Petocz and Reid ý(2002) indicate the importance 
for 
development of learning environments that can engage students' interest, broaden their 
understanding of statistics and enrich their own lives. They suggest that the 
development of 
learning environments must be 'total' and that the learning of stochastics should 
be less 
focused on the curriculum itself, and certainly less focused on the traditional concern of 
material to be 'covered' or 'examined'. Rather, the 
focus should move towards supporting 
students to develop 'holistically'. 
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2.5 Summary of Chapter Two and the emerging focus of this study 
The review of the literature reveals that there is a gap between intuitions and construction 
of the mathematical concepts of probability. Some researchers have suggested that this gap 
can be explained in terms of 'misconceptions', or 'wrong connections' between pieces of 
probabilistic knowledge. However, despite the important contributions that Piaget and 
Inhelder, Tversky and Kahneman and other similar works have made to the research of 
randomness, the research has paid rather scant attention to the tools that people have 
available for expressing ideas about randomness, fairness and more generally, probability. 
Tools that represent knowledge or allow learners to 'manipulate' knowledge have a 
sizeable impact on learners' formation of this knowledge. In contrast to the Piagetian 
research, constructionism has emphasised that an effective way for the learner to construct 
knowledge in the head is to build something 'tangible', a meaningful product. 
Constructionist learning environments encourage multiple learning styles and multiple 
representations of knowledge. In the constructionist paradigm, using tools that are 
specially designed for expressing randomness and chance, learners can express ideas that 
cannot be predicted simply by misconceptions or by stages of thinking. 
This study takes the framework of constructionism as a working hypothesis, that when 
learners construct for themselves they will express ideas in different ways. Thus, this study 
tries to develop a tool-based game with which children can express their probabilistic 
intuitions. In terms of analysing children's work in a constructionist environment, the 
notion of situated abstraction will be the principle to describe the movement from 
'concrete thinking' to abstraction. After the design and evaluation of the tool-based game, 
the study will focus on analysing children's expressions of chance events. The next chapter 
will provide an overview of the aims and the elements of the game. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Aims of the Study and Overview of the Game 
3.1 Overview 
This chapter provides an overview of the framework of the study. I begin this chapter by 
stating the aims of the study and then I discuss the framework within which the study took 
place. Specifically, the structure and the design principles of the tool-based game will be 
discussed and based on that, the aims will be restated. The idea here is for the reader to 
gain an overview of the pieces that comprise this research. 
3.2 Aims 
The general theme that ran throughout this study was to explore the ways in which a 
specially designed computer game afforded children the opportunity to develop and 
express probabilistic ideas. Specifically, the aims of the study were: 
Aim 1: iteratively to design a too]-based game to afford young children (age 51/2 -8) 
opportunities and novel ways to express and develop probabilistic ideas; and 
Aim 2: to describe and analyse how the tool-based game mediated the children's 
expression of chance events. 
By the idea of "game" (the relationship between games and intuitions are explained in 
section 2.2.2) 1 intend something special, which is not necessarily part of what is normally 
meant by the use of the word 'game'. In normal speech a game is something that is merely 
played for enjoyment. But in this study, the game was devised not only for playing, but 
also for understanding. The key was to render visible its structures and the mathematical 
ideas that underpinned it. In this respect, the game was "open" whose rules were visible. 
Henceforth, I will drop the adjective tool-based in front of the word 'game', although it is 
essential that the reader insert it for his/her self. 
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The game format facilitated the detailed tracing of children's initial knowledge and 
intuitions, because the activity within the computational medium required the articulation 
of these pieces of knowledge by the 'children players'. The previous chapter illustrates 
evidence that using a computer game to express and explore probabilistic ideas is feasible 
in contexts that are based on visual manipulations and which offer access to formal ideas in 
a concrete way, by representing abstract mathematical ideas in iconic form on the screen. 
The age of children who participated on the study was between 51/2to 8 years old and they 
were generally characterised by their teachers as normal mathematical ability children of 
both sexes. The choice of this age range was based on three practical and theoretical 
considerations: 
1. The literature review showed that little research on probability has been conducted 
with children at pre-primary and at the early-age of primary school. Most research 
in the field of probability has been undertaken with secondary school pupils (or 
with late elementary school ages). 
2. A second reason for choosing this age range was curriculum-based. The National 
Curriculum for England and Wales, and also that of Cyprus, contains almost no 
work on chance and probability at this level. This lack benefited the research in 
making it assumable that at this age formal probabilistic knowledge is still 
undeveloped and intuitive knowledge plays the major role. 
3. What little research has been undertaken concerning probability at the early-age of 
primary school has tended to focus on the existence of probabilistic stages/levels. 
This research has sought to examine how far probabilistic thinking follows linear 
stages at this age and to pay attention to the tools that children have available for 
expressing probabilistic ideas. It adopted the constructionist paradigm approach 
that when children have available the tools to express themselves they do 
extraordinary things that cannot be predicted by stages of thinking. This research 
seeks into describe and analyse how the game mediated children's expressions of 
chance events and to compare these mediations with probabilistic thinking 
frameworks (for example Piaget and Inhelder, 1975; Jones et al, 1997). 
The study was divided into two phases: each corresponding to one of the two main aims of 
the study. Phase I deals with the iterative design and evaluation of the game. The 
methodology of this work is reported in Chapter 4 and the evolution of the game is 
reported in Chapter 5. Phase 2 investigates the way in which children learned and describes 
in detail the expressed ideas of children by using the game. The methodology of this work 
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is also reported in Chapter 4 and the analysis of the children's expressions of chance events 
by using the medium is described in Chapter 6,7,8. 
I begin by outlining the general structure of the game. 
3.3 The structure of the game 
In Phase I of the study, the aim was to design a game that afforded young children an 
opportunity to express probabilistic ideas. The game was based on icon based 
programming environments. Each of these programming environments was built in a new 
version of Logo, called "Imagine", that was developed concurrently with the study. 
Imagine and its programming environments were developed through a European Union 
Financed Project, Playground Project'. The aim of the Playground Project was to design 
and build iconic rule-based programming system. The project team was building computer 
environments for 4-8 year-olds to play, design and create games. Playground Project's 
rationale was for children to build and modify games by constructing and expressing their 
ideas with rules. The project aimed to harness children's playfulness, allowing them to 
enter into abstract and formal ways of thinking. The relation between Imagine software, its 
programming environments (platforms) and the games used in each Phase is illustrated in 
Diagram 3.1. 
1 http: //www. ioe. ac. uk/playground/frame-fhtm 
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Diagram 3.1 describes the structure of the game. The programming 'base' of designing the 
games was 'Imagine' in which the platforms Rule-Maker and Pathways were constructed. 
The first iteration game was built using Rule-Maker platform. The second iteration, and the 
final game used in Phase 2, was built in Pathways platform. The full arrow of Diagram 3.1 
illustrates that x is programmed in y, for example the Rule Maker was programmed in 
Imagine software. The dotted arrow in the diagram illustrates that x was a pre-version of y, 
so Rule Maker was a pre-version of Pathways. I now describe each of these elements in 
turn. I will elaborate the Imagine software and its two platforms below. 
3.3.1 Imagine 
Imagine is an ob ect-oriented language and it was a recently devised version of Logo, 
developed in the Slovak Republic (see Kalas and Blaho, 2002). Dr. Ivan Kalas was also 
one of the main contributors at evaluation through discussion of the games (see section 
4.2.2). In this study Imagine was invisible to the children and to me, as a designer of the 
game. Thus, I will not discuss its features further here. The reader may safely regard 
Imagine as opaque, much like any other programming language. For further details see 
http: H www. mathsnet. net/logo/imagine/. 
-69- 
Diagram 3.1: The relation between the Imagine software and its two platforms, the relation between the two 
platforms and the relation between the platforms and the games used for each Phase 
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3.3.2 Rule Maker 
Rule Maker was a preliminary version of what subsequently became Pathways (see section 
3.3.3). The reader will not need to know any details, but at this point it is important to 
outline the general idea of this platform. Rule Maker was an iconic programming 
environment. Its pieces fitted together in a way to aim at simple rule expression. The rules 
were constructed in an iconic form by the use of 'robots'. These robots obeyed their rule 
when the game was switch on. Figure 3.1. shows a rule expressed in Rule Maker. 
The condition of the rule 
.4 so. 4 
The action of the rule 
Figure 3.1: A rule expressed in Rule Maker saying 'I always move forward'. The robot in the rule will 
always move forward. Its condition shows the symbol of 'always' in Rule Maker and its action shows the 
direction of its movement. 
Figure 3.1. shows that a rule in Rule Maker was constructed by a hexagon, which showed 
the condition of the rule, and by an arrow, which showed the action. The reader can refer to 
Chapter 5 (section 5.2) for further details, where the game that is used in the first iteration 
by using the Rule-Maker software is described. 
3.3.3 Pathways 
Pathways, like Rule Maker, was also a programming environment developed in Imagine. 
Pathways also allowed children to build and modify rules via a graphical iconic interface. 
A major period of my study was dedicated to designing Rule Maker and Pathways 
environments in Playground Project. Mainly, I was a beta tester in the design of Pathways. 
My role was to try out versions with children, making recommendations, and attending 
planning meetings with members of the team in order to improve the software for 
maximum expressive power for mathematical concepts. 
Since the game that finally evolved for use in the Phase 2 study employed Pathways as a 
platform, I will now describe Pathways in some detail. I will explain the key features of 
Pathways as they appear on the screen when the user is introduced to the software. Figure 
3.2 illustrates the main features of Pathways. 
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Tools Stones New Internet 
box box object Connection 
Figure 3.2: A Pathways screenshot, illustrating the main features of the system 
On the bottom of the screen of Pathways software (seen in Figure 3.2) there are the 
Pathway's features. Reading left to right, the key features of Pathways are: 1. the tools box, 
2. the toy box, 3. the stones box, 4. the backgrounds box, 5. the new object, 6. the on/off 
switch, 7. the internet connection, 8. the exit door. Selection of each icon , by double 
clicking, makes other icons appear on the screen as described below in more detail. The 
first icon opens the tools box (see Figure 3.3). 
Figure 3.3: The tools box 
By using the tools box (as shown in Figure 3.3) the children have the choice to copy 
objects on the screen by using the magic wand, to destroy objects by using the bomb, and 
they can change the shape, the speed and the heading of objects by using the star. They can 
also use the microphone to add new words in their objects and the mouth to listen to what 
each object is doing. 
Near the tools box on the bottom of the Pathways screen is the toy box (see Figure 3.4). 
Figure 3.4: The toy box 
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In the toy box children can find pre-constructed games or save their own. By selecting the 
icon next to toy box opens the stones box (see Figure 3.5). 
Figure 3.5: The stones box 
The stones box provides children with the opportunity to construct rules beside each object 
in the game. These rules are the key-aspects of the Pathways, which will be of great 
importance in what follows in the study. I therefore, give a few examples to provide the 
reader a flavour of how rules are expressed (see Figures 3.6,3.7,3.8). 
Figure 3.6: A rule in Pathways stating 'when I am touching any object I play a sound' 
For example, in Figure 3.6 there is a rule stating 'when I am touching any object I play a 
sound'. The dark stone shows the condition of the rule and the light stone shows the action 
of the rule. When the children in Pathways pick up the mouth from the tools box they can 
hear what the rule is. The children can also add new stones to the rules and they can create 
more than one rule in any object of their game (see Figure 3.7). 
Figure 3.7: One object's rules in Pathways stating 'when I am touching any object I play a sound and I shoot 
a bullet' and 'when the dice lands on one I blow up myself. 
For example, in Figure 3.7 the first rule states 'when I am touching any object I play a 
sound and I shoot a bullet'. It is followed by the rule 'when the dice lands on one I blow up 
myself'. When the children construct the rules in an object the last rule 
is always empty in 
order to provide space for creating a new rule. 
By constructing rules at Pathways the user 
can also connect objects, with the message-passing 
feature (see Figure 3.8). 
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LMmne 1 
Figure 3.8: A passing message rule. The dog's rule states 'when I touch the rabbit I show a red message' and 
the mine's rule states 'when I receive a red message I blow up myself. 
Figure 3.8 shows a rule in which the dog says 'when I touch the rabbit I send a red 
message' and there is a mine that says 'when I receive a red message I blow up myself'. 
This message-passing feature of Pathways gives the opportunity to link the rules of 
different objects. This is important, since it relates an object's action behaviour with 
another object's condition. 
3.4 The design principles of the game 
The game took several forms. The details of these forms and the final version are given in 
Game Evolution, Chapter 5. Here, however, I will outline the principles of the design that 
informed the construction process and how they are related to the tool platfon-ns, Rule 
Maker (Iteration 1) and Pathways (Iteration 2 and final game). Again, I will stress the part 
that concerns Pathways as this was the platform of the final version of the game. 
3.4.1 The major design principles of the game 
There were three major principles that governed the design of the game. These principles 
were: 
The manipulable sample space (and distribution). A 'lottery machine' represented 
an "executable sample space" in the game 
2. The 'lottery machine' was a visible 
manipulable engine for the generation of random events and with it the children 
could directly manipulate the outcome of the game. For example, in iteration I (c. f. 
2 This is the reason that the game, from now on, will be also called as 'a lottery game'. 
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section 5.2) from the children's point of view, the shuffling of the balls caused the 
lighting strike. Similarly, in iteration 2 (c. f. section 5.3) from children's point of 
view again, the touching of the coloured balls caused the movement of the space 
kid. The direct manipulation and linked connections provided by the software 
allowed children to set in motion the mechanism to trigger an event, and be able to 
link the execution of that event with an outcome on the screen. 
2. The spatial representation of sample space. The presentation of the lottery machine 
in the game was geometrical/spatial, whereas in previous work (for example 
Konold, 1989) the sample space was either hidden (i. e. not available for inspection 
or manipulation) or represented only in quantitative form (by using only numerical 
quantities). The lottery machine contained balls of different colours, which made it 
possible for children to carry out as many events as they like without being obliged 
to think about numbers (as they would have to using dice, coins, etc. ). Moreover, in 
the final iteration, the children had also the opportunity to change the probability of 
an event to occur by changing the size of the balls and their arrangement. 
3. The existence of local and global events in the game and a visible link between 
them. The lottery game gave the children the opportunity simultaneously to see on 
screen the local and global representation of an event of their sample space. A local 
event refers to the trial-by-trial variation and the global to the aggregate view of 
each single trial3. In practice, local events might be used by children to make sense 
of short-term behaviour of random phenomena, while global events are associated 
with long-term behaviour of a lottery game. Thus, whilst individual outcome could 
be seen as a single trial in a stochastic experiment, the totality of these outcomes 
gave an aggregated view of the long-term probability of the total events. 
3.4.2 The 'concept' of a lottery game 
As described in the previous section, the lottery game gave the children the opportunity, by 
manipulating the sample space and distribution, to identify intuitively whether an event is 
possible (whether it is impossible, certain or somewhere in between). 
The lottery game consisted of two key pieces: a 'lottery machine' and a link between the 
local and global events. Diagram 3.2 gives the concept of the game. 
3 Many studies (for example Pratt, 2000 Ben-Zvi and Arcavi, 2001; Konold and 
Pollatsek, 2002; Rubin, 
2002) have shown the importance of linking local understandings with the global ones, the aggregate view 
and how this can be a complex process 
for students. 
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Lottery Machine Outcome (s) Result(s) utc-, 
I 
agrarn 3.2: The concept of the lottery game: the connection between the lottery machine, the outcomes and 
the results 
Diagram 3.2 shows how the ingredients of the lottery game are connected. The lottery 
machine generated an outcome and this affected the result of the game. The short arrows 
. 
illustrate how children, by manipulating the lottery machine, were intended to experience 
the outcome of an individual event in the machine (i. e. a collision between two balls) and 
how this was connected to a single result in the game (i. e. effecting a movement of an 
object in the game). The single outcome from the lottery machine provides an idea of a 
local event. The totality of the outcomes of the game gave a more aggregated view of the 
results and the lottery machine's construction. The manipulations made via the lottery 
machine could have a short-term and long-term outcome within the game. For example, 
children could make decisions about their next change in the lottery machine based on 
long-term result of their previous constructions. 
3.4.3 A description of the different parts that comprise a lottery game 
I will now illustrate each part of the lottery game in more detail. An example of a lottery 
machine can be seen in Figure 3.9. 
Figure 3-9: A lottery machine with its scorers showing the local events of the game 
The lottery machine here is represented by the yellow square. In it, a small white ball 
bounced and collided continually with a set of static blue and red balls. Children could 
change and manipulate a number of aspects 
in order to construct their own sample space: 
the number, the size, and the position of the balls in the lottery machine, and they could 
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also create new objects with their own rules. As programmed initially, collisions with the 
blue balls added one point to the blue score and moved the 'space kid' (see Figure 3.10) 
one step down the screen. In this way the lottery machine controlled the movement of the 
space kid (see Figure 3.10). 
Figure 3.10: The space kid and the planets that represent the result of the game 
Broadcasting and receiving messages (see section 3.3.3) achieved control of movement of 
the space kid. The continuous movement in 2-dimensions of the small ball in the lottery 
machine was designed in order that children might visualise the global outcomes of the 
game. 
3.4.4 The choice of Pathways (Rule-Maker) for designing the lottery game 
Pathways, like its predecessor Rule Maker, was designed as a medium where children can 
build and modify games using the formalisation of rules as tools in a constructive process. 
This enabled the construction of a lottery game, which afforded a simple means for 
programming the direct manipulation of objects, with which children could express 
meanings from actions and build new meanings of probabilistic ideas. 
Hence, there were three reasons for the choice of Pathways (Rule-Maker): 1. evident, 
iconic rules that could be understood by children of this age, 2. easily manipulated objects 
and 3. a clear message-passing mechanism providing a mean of linking local and global 
events. Thus, rules could be created specifying how each object of the lottery game works. 
This afforded the children the opportunity to understand how the objects of the game were 
interrelated. It also allowed them to manipulate and link local and global events (c. f. 
section 3.4.1). Diagram 3.3 shows how the mathematical ideas and programming criteria 
are interrelated. 
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Key Mathematical Idea 1: 
Sample Space and 
Distribution 
(probability of an event) 
Criterion 2: 
Manipulations 
Criterion 1 
of choosing 
Pathways: 
Rule Based 
Svstem 
Key Mathematical Idea 2: 
Local and Global Events 
Criterion 3: 
Message Passing 
Diagram 3.3: The interrelations between the mathematical ideas developed in the game and the criteria for 
Pathways choice 
Diagram 3.3 shows the two key mathematical ideas developed that formulated the design 
of the game. The key contribution of Pathways was that it allowed manipulations of the 
sample space and distribution, while its message-passing gave to the game the opportunity 
to link its local and global events. Both criteria were related to the rule-based system on 
which Pathways (and therefore the lottery game) was built. 
3.5 Restating the aims 
The study is focused on children's expressions of randomness. The aims of the study can 
be restated as follows: 
1. an aim to document and discuss the evolution of the lottery game in 'Pathways' 
('Rule-Maker'), and the interaction between its design principles and its realisation 
in the lottery game and, 
2. to answer the question: when young children interact with the lottery game, what 
expressions of their informal intuitions of randomness are observed and how did 
the lottery game mediate the children's expression of chance events? 
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The procedure of reaching the aims was organised in two main phases. The first phase 
refers to the design and evaluation of the lottery game where the iterative design process 
takes place. The second phase refers to the learning investigation phase that concerns the 
second aim of the research, where the main study takes place. The following chapter 
describes in general the qualitative methodology employed for both phases. It subsequently 
provides evidence of how the data has been collected and analysed in each phase of the 
procedure. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Methodology 
4.1 Overview 
Two main sections comprise this present chapter: the methodology of the iterative design 
phase and the methodology of the learning investigation phase. The first section describes 
the iterations within the iterative design phase, the analysis of iterative design phase, the 
qualitative approach for the evaluation through game use and the data of the task-based 
interviews. The second section refers to the methodology of the learning investigation 
phase. This section describes the data collection and data analysis of the final iteration and 
it refers to the tilt box experiment and the children's experience with Pathways. 
4.2 Phase 1: Iterative Design Phase 
As mentioned in Chapter Three, the research was developed in two phases: the iterative 
design phase and the learning investigation phase, corresponding to the two aims of the 
study. This section deals with Phase 1. Iterative design was defined by diSessa (1989) as 
follows: 
6 one must carefully observe and document the activities of children in 
prototypes of the proposed microworlds ... including some sense of the span of 
conceptual states that children might be in. ' (p. 216-217). 
Iterative design proposes that by using the game 4 with learners the researcher tries to 
obtain feedback and insights that will feed into the next iteration of game development and 
use. The method that I followed in designing the lottery game was that children were 
presented with a set of problematic situations, which sought to develop their probabilistic 
knowledge in the context of the game; at the same time this gave feedback and insights 
about the game that fed into the next iteration of game 
development. The iterative process 
facilitated the gradual refinement of the game and a gradual focusing of the primary design 
issues. Bearing in mind that Pathways was developed as the study developed, the 
iterations 
41 remind the reader that the 
'game' is used in a special way here, as described in Chapter Three. 
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also gave feedback to the Pathways software itself, by suggesting new functions for the 
next version of the software that could be used to develop the game. An example of giving 
feedback to the game's software was when a 'stone' (see section 3.3.3) needed to be 
created first in Pathways in order to be used in the following version of the game. The 
researcher had to describe the functions of the new stone and how this would be used in the 
game. Specifically, a 'bouncing stone" was needed to develop from iteration 1 to iteration 2 
and this stone had first to be created in Pathways, and then used in re-designing the game 
for iteration 2. Diagram 4.1 illustrates the process of iterative design. 
Feedback to the game's software 
(Pathways/ Rule Maker) 
Changes to be made in the software in 
order to achieve the changes in the game. 
The design of the computational tool 
(Changes that need to be made to the game) 
The study of how children's expressions of 
chance events develop in the context of the game 
Diagram 4.1: The iterative design of the computer game 
Diagram 4.1 highlights the two main issues that concern the study: the design of the 
computational tool and the children's expression of chance events in the context of the 
game. These two issues are represented in the two big rectangles. The arrows between 
them show the iterative design process that takes place. The interaction between the design 
of the game and the Pathways software is also shown. This illustrates that while the 
Pathway's structural features shaped the ways in which the design and implementation of 
the game evolved, the game's priorities and preliminary testing also fed back to shape the 
evolution of Pathways. 
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When the game, after a number of iterations, broadly satisfied the first aim of the study, 
then the iterative design stopped and the learning investigation phase (Phase 2) started 
where the main data collection was carried out. A difficulty in iterative design was 
generally to decide when the cycles of design came to an end. In my study the process 
came to an end when the game seemed to be suitable enough to be used for the leaming 
investigation phase and ready to reach the second aim of the study. 
In the iterative design phase each iteration consisted of two phases, game development and 
game use. The learning investigation phase could be also considered as a final iteration of 
the study. Thus, its focus represented a decisive shift from game development to game use. 
Game development and game use are described as follows: the first gave feedback on the 
current design of Pathways and it fed into the development phase of an iteration and, where 
relevant, (see iteration 2 in Chapter Five) the development of new games. During an 
iteration the 'game use' phase generated and analysed the choices children made, how 
these choices were influenced by the structure of the game, the ways in which it was used 
and the connection between the use of the game and the expression of children's 
probabilistic thinking. Diagram 4.2 gives a linear representation through time of the 
iterations of the study. 
(Iterative design phase) 
Iteration I 2 3 
(Learning investigation phase) 
Diagram 4.2: Linear representation through time of the iterations of the study 
Diagram 4.2 shows that the study developed through three iterations that switch attention 
from game development to game use. Firstly, the game development was based on initial 
interpretations of the literature (see section 2.3.3.3) and personal experience (my 
experience as an educator interacting with children of this age) and 
became more 
sophisticated after children interacted with iO. 
5 The changes of the game based on children's 
interaction are presented in Chapter 5. 
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4.2.1 Iterations within the iterative design phase 
As indicated in Diagram 4.2 the first two iterations refer mainly to the development of the 
lottery game rather than to its mediation of children's expressions. The iterative design 
phase was conducted through semi-structured interviews. The methodological details are 
discussed later, but the overall schedule is set out in the Table 4.1. 
Iteration 1 2 
Date March 2000 April 2001 
Number of children 2 pairs of children I pair of children 
(3 girls and I boy) (I boy and I girl) 
Age of children 5: 6,6: 0,7: 0 and 7: 6 years old Both 7: 0 years old 
Background of children mid-socio-economic rnid-socio-econoniic 
mid range of mathematical mid range of 
ability mathematical ability 
Duration 2x (1.5 to 2 hours) each pair Ix (1.5 to 2 hours) 
IxI hour all four children 
together for discussion 
Place of interVieW6 Playground Project Lab Computer Lab 
Institute of Education, U. K. All Souls School, U. K. 
Children's experience with 6 months 1 year and 6 months 
the software 
7 
Table 4.1: The schedule for the iterative design phase 
Table 4.1 describes the date, the number of children, duration and place of interview. Thus, 
it shows that Iteration 2 took place about a year later than Iteration 1. One of the reasons 
was that several attempts were made to satisfy the changes that Iteration I dictated. 
Another reason was that in order to make the changes to the game there had to be changes 
in the game's platform (see diagram 3.1). So, after eleven months of iterative design of the 
game Is software it emerged that it was necessary to create a new version of software, 
called instead of 'Rule-Maker', 'Pathways'(see section 3.3), and the iteration 2 
experiments took place in April 2001. 
Another six children were planned to participate in Iteration 2, but some immediate 
changes were indicated after the first interview. Thus, the other 
interviews were deferred to 
6 In the place of interview were only the children and the researcher. 
7 The children were participating in the 
Playground Project. 
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iteration 3, the learning investigation phase. The game use and game development took 
place as the interview was taking shape. 
The interview at the All Souls School took place in the afternoon after children had 
finished their lessons. All the interviews were made with the cooperation of children's 
8 teachers and parents . The children were characterised by their teachers as average 
mathematical ability. The children who participated in these two iterations were part also 
of the Playground Project club and they had previous experience on working with Rule 
Maker software (iteration 1), and Pathways software, as was named after iteration 1. 
4.2.2 The analysis of the iterative design phase (Phase 1) 
The analysis of the iterative design phase was based on six interacting processes: 1. 
epistemological analysis of the mathematical knowledge, 2. virtual experiments: sketches 
of what sorts of games might address the strands of knowledge identified the 
epistemological analysis, 3. design prototypes: sketches and drawings written down of 
what was required for the games, 4. constructing prototypes: the construction of the actual 
games developed in Pathways (Rule Maker) software and based on the design prototypes, 
5. evaluation through discussion: the main contributors were Professor Richard Noss 
(Playground Project co-director), Dr. Dave Pratt (Playground Project partner) and Dr. Ivan 
Kalas (Playground Project partner), 6. evaluation through game use (see Chapter Five): the 
prototypes were tested and debugged through use with children. The interaction between 
these six processes can be seen as a hexagon (see Diagram 4.3). 
8 In working with children some ethical issues were taken into consideration. 
The age of the children (51/2 -8 
years old) made it necessary to get permission 
from their parents directly, or through their teachers, to work 
with them and make recordings. The children were also asked 
if they wanted to participate. The date and time 
of an interview, if it was at school, was chosen 
between the researcher and the teacher of the particular 
children. Also, the children were allowed to terminate 
the interview any time they liked. 
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I., Epistemological 
analysis 
2. Virtual Experiment 
6. Evaluation through 
game use 
5. Evaluation through 
discussion 
3. Design Prototype 
4. Construction 
Prototype 
Diagram 4.3: The six interacting processes of iterative design phase 
The elements of Diagram 4.3 were developed and analysed. Although the sequence of the 
processes of the iterative design phase was linear, the evaluation through game use process 
can be seen as a long-term data analysis and it was also assessing the whole iterative 
design phase. The evaluation through game process gave also rise to a set of new design 
criteria to drive the next stage of iteration. 
The evaluation through game use included the data collection from children task-based 
interviews. The game use evaluation is also the process of analysis that referred to the 
learning investigation phase of the study (Phase 2). The precise methodology employed for 
the evaluation through game use will be discussed in the following section. 
4.2.3 The evaluation through game use 
The complexity of understanding children's expressions and constructions suggested the 
use of a qualitative approach to achieve the aims of this study. This study exploited several 
forms of expressions: a. the button clicks, menu choices and various ways of pointing on 
the screen, the construction that they made in the lottery machine of the game, the use of 
the features of the Pathways software and the discussions between myself and the children, 
which were often used to validated and probe more deeply into the thinking behind their 
actions and discussions. 
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4.2.3.1 Semi-structured task-based interviews phase 1 
During each iteration the children were interviewed on their performance on a set of tasks. 
The tasks were prototyped with Professor Richard Noss and there was a list of issues to be 
addressed and questions to be answered. However, these interviews were flexible in terms 
of the order in which the topics were considered and allowed the children to develop ideas 
and expand more widely on the issues raised by the researcher9. 
The task-based interviews that were used can be called as 'semi -structured'. The semi- 
structured interview is one that has weak focus (a limited degree of control exerted by the 
interviewer over its contents) and a weak frame (a light control over the timing and 
duration of the interview) with opportunities afforded to the interviewee for review or 
editing and the construction of an informal setting (c. f. Scott and Usher, 1999; Powney and 
Watts, 1987). Robson (1993) proposes that in a semi-structured interview, the interviewer 
must work out a set of questions in advance, but is free to modify their order based on what 
seems most appropriate in the context of the interview, or change the way they were 
worded, give explanations, leave out some questions which seemed to be inappropriate 
with a particular interviewee or use additional ones. The interviews of the Phase I were 
based on a protocol of tasks that are described in detail in Chapter 5. 
4.2.3.2 Equipment for data collection of the task-based interviews 
In order to achieve faithful recording, the semi-structured task-based interviews of the 
Phase I were audio-taped and video-taped. The video camera was mainly focusing on the 
actions played out on the screen, it was also focused on the body language and the 
movement of hands, and the children's discussions and my interventions were overlaid 
onto an extra audio-recorder. The equipmentlo that has been used in my semi-structured 
interviews is shown in Figure 4.1. 
9 Piaget (1929) pioneered the clinical interview in the context of cognitive psychology. He states that: 
, it is so hard not to talk too much when questioning a child, especially for a pedagogue ... The 
good experimenter must in fact unite two often incompatible qualities; he must know how to 
observe, that is to say let the child talk freely, without ever checking or side tracking his 
utterance and at the same time he must be constantly alert for something definitive... ' (p. 8-10). 
10 Denscombe (1998) states that at one level, the audio tape-recorder and the video camera are reliable 
research instruments, as they capture the proceedings on the permanent record, and they provide an objective 
record of the proceedings 
in the sense that these research instruments do no interpret the events, they simply 
store them. 
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Figure 4.1: The equipment that has been used in the semi-structured task-based interviews 
The validity and reliability of such approaches has been intensely contested. On the one 
hand, the direct contact at the point of the interview means that data can be checked for 
accuracy and relevance, as they are collected. On the other hand, the impact of the 
interviewer and of the context means that consistency and objectivity are hard to achieve. 
For this reason, the role of the researcher during the interviews needed to be defined. 
4.2.3.3 The role of the researcher in the task-based interviews 
The role of the researcher was that of a participant observer. The general aim of the 
interviews was for the children to make their own decisions in order to understand the aim 
of the task, and to construct their own 'lottery machine' (see section 3.4.1) based on these 
decisions. In the role of participant observer, there were times when it seemed appropriate 
to make different types of interventions". The role of my interventions fell into the 
following categories: probing, explaining, experimental and technical (c. f. Pratt, 1998). 
Probing interventions aimed to make children's thinking transparent when it came to 
inferring the reasons or intuitions that might lie behind their actions. Children were asked 
to give explanations of what they were doing by describing it to a peer, if they had one, or 
to the researcher, and to explain their reasons for doing it. An example of a probing 
intervention is the following where Lisa (L) and Sam (S) try to construct a sample space: 
Lisa: Oh ... no, no! 
Get this ball here and these on the side! 
Researcher: Why? 
L: lf (it) gets out to go there... 
R: So... 
Burgess (1984) claims that: 
'Participant observers are involved in face-to face relationships with those who are researched, and 
that the observers are part of the context that is being observed. This results in the possibility of 
researchers modifying and influencing the research context as well as 
being influenced by it 
themselves. ' (p. 79). 
This stance indicates that as well as observing though participating 
in activities, the observer can ask the 
subjects to explain various aspects of what 
is going on. 
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Sam: We want it to be blocked here. (He makes a circle. ) 
L: Can I do something? I'm going to explode all these balls (the others 
outside of the circle), because if we have less of these (balls), then we 
have many of these (the other coloured balls). 
R: Hmmm 
L: I will explode them, because then the whites, we, will have less, or 
they are going to change the number over here (to the score). 
My role in the above episode was to probe Lisa to describe what she was doing and why 
she was doing it. This made it possible for me to understand her thoughts and also gave to 
her partner the opportunity to follow her thinking and add his own ideas. For this reason, I 
used probes 12 to get the children to expand their thoughts. There were occasions during 
interview when the researcher wanted to delve deeper into a topic rather than let the 
discussion flow on the next point. 
Explaining interventions were made when the children asked for explanation of a situation. 
Almost always, these questions were turned back to the children by asking what they 
thought, or by suggestions that they can try it out themselves (for example see Appendix 4, 
lines 232-233). Such an intervention was not entirely neutral since the children no doubt 
inferred that this was not a completely dead-end direction to follow, and so were perhaps 
unintentionally encouraged to follow that route. 
Experimental interventions sought to make some change in the direction of the activity 
with possible implications for conceptual change. A purpose of these interventions was, for 
example, because the children were stuck (for example, see Appendix 4, lines 347-348). 
Sometimes this was obvious to the children and they sought advice as to how to proceed. 
On such occasions, I offered a suggestion which might lead to a new direction. Another 
purpose of using an experimental intervention was to explore whether a child was able to 
work with a new idea. Such interventions were only used when a child seemed to 
be 
particularly confident and already performing with some fluency. 
Technical interventions were made to give explanations about the software as the clinical 
interview progresses, and sometimes or to overleap bugs in the software. These 
12 A probe is used in the sense of 
Robson (1993), who defines it as a device to get the interviewee to expand 
on a response when you 
intuit that she or he has more to give. 
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interventions mostly took place at the beginning of the interview when children were 
trying to understand the rules of each object in the game, becoming less frequent as the 
interview progressed. An example of a technical intervention is the following: 
Sam: Well, I will make a new rule... 
R: How? 
S: I don't remember. 
R: Can we just continue with this rule? 
Lisa: Yeah ... we have to find the sound here. (She finds the sound stone, she 
makes the rule and switches on the game again) ... Yeah! 
The suggestion of continuing with a rule instead of creating a new one made Lisa to 
remember the use of the sound stone from the stone library. 
4.2.4 Data analysis of task-based interviews of Phase 1 
The development of the lottery game took place through the iterative design phase during 
which the games themselves were modified, reflecting a new insight into the way that 
those games probed children's meanings for randomness and probability. The study of the 
children became increasingly systematic as the games converged on a design, which 
appeared to be effective in enabling the observation both of initial meanings for the 
stochastic, and the subtle changes in those meanings as new connections were forged 
during activity. In Phase 1, the episodes were delineated according to three broad codes: 
A. The design of the lottery game: This concerned the changes that needed to be made in 
the lottery game in order to make it more interesting in the context and more transparent in 
developing and exploring children's probabilistic intuitions. 
B. The design of the software: Beating in mind that the software was developed as the 
study grew, each of the two iterations also gave feedback in the design of the software, by 
suggesting new functions to feed into a new version of the software. The new version 
worked for the task as the next iteration. 
C. The children's expressions of randomness: The data of each iteration were analysed in 
order to find out how children made sense and use the ideas of randomness, fairness, 
distribution, certain, impossible events, probability of an event. 
The above general codes for analysing the data were based on the previous 
literature 
review. The stress on this analysis was given to the 
design of the game. In the iterative 
design phase the purpose of analysis was mainly aimed on the design of the lottery game 
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and the design of Pathways and less on the children's expressions of randomness, as the 
last axis was the main aim of the learning investigation phase. Table 4.2 describes the 
methods used for analysing the data of the iterative design phase. 
Iteration I and 2 
Methods used a The videotapes and audiotapes of four children, Nichol 13 , Kate, 
to analyse data JerTy and Ellis were partially transcribed (iteration 1). The 
videotapes and audiotapes of children, Lisa and Sam, were 
transcribed in detail (iteration 2). 
" The transcriptions of the semi-structured interviews were used to 
develop tags that represented possible emerging issues and the 
transcripts were annotated using these tags. 
" The main issues were developed and discussed with my 
supervisor Professor Richard Noss by considering these tagged 
transcripts alongside the children's semi-structured interviews. 
Table 4.2: Data analysis in the iterative design phase of each iteration 
As indicated in Table 4.2, the audiotapes and videotapes were transcribed. The first 
transcription of audiotapes and then the transcription of videotapes was a method of 
checking the data with other sources (c. f. Denscombe, 1998). The data were analysed 
based on these three broad codes (the design of the lottery game, the design of the 
software, the children expressions of randomness). The emphasis of the analysis was given 
to the first two codes (the design of the lottery game and the design of the software). The 
initial analysis of the third code was based on the following sub-codes: Cl: Expressing 
Randomness, C2: Certain and Impossible Events, C3: Probability of an Event. Some 
samples were discussed with my supervisor to assess the validity and finally applied once 
more to the data. Each iteration is presented in more details in Chapter Five. 
4.3 Phase 2: Learning Investigation Phase 
This section describes the general outline of the final interviews. It describes first the idea 
of the tilt box, with which each interview began and it also refers to children's previous 
experience with the software. The outline of data collection where the 
idea of the semi- 
13 All names of the children are pseudonyms. 
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structured interviews, the role of the researcher as a participant observer, and the ethical 
issues taken into consideration are the same as these have been already described on the 
game use of Phase 1. Moreover, this section describes the coding that was undertaken for 
data analysis of the interviews. 
4.3.1 The tilt box experiment 
At the beginning of each interview of the final iteration, before children interacted with the 
game, a device was used to question children about random mixtures, similar to Piaget and 
Inhlelder's (1975) tilt box (see Diagram 4.4). It consisted of a rectangular tray, which 
could be able to swing up and down by means of fulcrum fixed to its base sides. Eight 
equally sized marbles of four different colours, two of each colour, were arranged in the 
tray, and also there was a divider that can be placed in the middle of one of the sides. The 
researcher balanced the tray, made an arrangement of the marbles, and then let the tray go. 
For example, a typical initial arrangement might be simply 'red-red-blue-blue-green-green- 
purple-purple' 14 . 
Diagram 4.4: The Tilt Box 
Piaget and Inhelder (1975) state that children of the age considered 
in this research do not 
anticipate the 'irreversibility' involved in random mixture; 
instead, they tend to find any 
kind of order on the grounds of common properties of the elements or of 
their original 
arrangement. As a result, they are not able to start understanding 
what chance is. 
14 A snapshot of a tilt box experiment can 
be found in appendices (see Appendix Al). 
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The intention of undertaking this tilt box activity at the beginning of each interview was 
intended to investigate Piaget and Inhelder's claim. Another reason for doing their 
experiment at the beginning of each interview was to generate baseline data that would 
confin-n whether the study was dealing with a representative sample of children, and also 
to assess the extent to which the tool mediated knowledge of chance. 
4.3.2 Children's experience with Pathways in Phase 2 
The data of this study was collected alongside the development of Pathways software (as 
described in Chapter Three). The children in this study were already experienced working 
with Pathways. The researcher trained them how to read and construct rules in the software 
and use the main parts of Pathways: 'tool box', 'stones', 'toy box', 'backgrounds'. They 
had already played games in Pathways (see Appendix A2) that introduced them to creating 
rules by using condition and action stones. They also performed tasks in Pathways that 
probed (a) children's thinking about conditions and actions and (b) children's 
understanding the meaning of showing and reacting to colours, sending and receiving 
messages (see Appendix A2.1). These activities seemed to be a necessary preparation for 
children to do the probabilistic task, in order for the software to be usable to the children 
and for the children's attention to focus on interacting with the task rather than 
understanding the software. 
4.3.3 Data collection of learning investigation phase and associated methodological 
issues 
The data collection of the learning investigation phase refers to the main collection of data. 
The methodological details are discussed later, but the overall schedule is set out in Table 
4.3. 
-91- 
4. Methodology 
Phase 2: Learning Investigation Phase 
Date September-December 2001 
Number of children 23 children (12 girls and II boys) 
Age of children 5: 10,6: 0,6: 6,6: 7,6: 8,6: 10 6: 11,7: 0,7: 3,7: 5,7: 6 
years old 
Background of children mid-socio-economic 
mid range of mathematical ability 
Duration 23 children x (2 to 3 hours each one) 
divided into four meetings, 
working individuall Y15 
Place of interview 
16 After school at researcher's house, U. K. 
After school at researcher's house, Cyprus 
Children's experience with 23 children x1 hour each 
the Pathways software Working on tasks on Pathways. The context of the 
tasks is presented in Appendix A2. 
Table 4.3: The schedule for the learning investigation phase 
4.3.3.1 Semi-structured task-based interviews in Phase 2 
The children were interviewed before (see tilt box experiment 4.3.1) and during their 
interaction with the computer game 17 . These interviews were videotaped and audio 
recorded and then transcribed in detail. The questions that were given in the interviews of 
the learning investigation phase were based on a protocol of questions and tasks (see 
Appendix A3). The aim of these questions was to prompt discussion and their nature 
changed through the iterations as certain issues become increasingly apparent, but the 
structure of each version of the interview was the same. The interview started with children 
trying to find the rules of the game and then to solve different problematic situations by 
making manipulations in the game, for example by manipulating the sample space. 
The interviews were based on the 'Space kid' game, which is described in detail in section 
5.4. The children in the final iteration worked individually. The interviews exploited 
discussions between the children and myself. Many times discussions were used to validate 
and probe more deeply the thinking behind their actions. 
These discussions gave a picture, 
15 The requirement of working individually was so that the children could not 
'hide' some of their 
probabilistic ideas behind those of a partner, as 
this had happened in the previous iteration. 
16 In the place of interview were only the child and the researcher. 
17 The procedure was the same as 
in Phase I (see section 4.2.3.1). 
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not only of the performance, but also of the thinking that stimulated or arose out of these 
actions. Children were asked to try out their ideas, describe what happened, give their 
explanation of why this happened, and if it did not work, as they wanted, what else they 
could change. The activities of the task aimed at providing opportunities for the 
construction of meanings, affording a range of opportunities to use the game for the 
children to express themselves. 
4.3.3.2 Equipment and the role, of the researcher in the learning investigation phase 
The semi-structured task-based interviews of the learning investigation phase were 
audiotaped and videotaped. The video camera was mainly focusing on the actions played 
out on the screen, it was also focused on the body language and the movement of hands, 
and the children's discussions and my interventions were covered onto an extra audio- 
18 recorder 
The role of the researcher was that of participant observer, interacting with the children in 
order to probe the reasons behind their answers and their actions. The general aim of the 
interviews was for the children to make their own decisions and manipulations in order to 
find a solution to the task's problematic situations. In the role of participant observer, there 
were times when it seemed appropriate to make different types of interventions either 
probing, explaining, experimental, or technical19. 
4.3.4 Data analysis of the learning investigation phase 
The data analysis of the learning investigation phase was firstly based on the key 
mathematical ideas (sample space and distribution), which were represented by the 
problematic situations of fairness, unfairness and probability of the occurrence of an event. 
The data analysis of this phase was developed as Diagram 4.5 shows. 
18 The procedure was the same as in Phase I- For more 
details see section 4.2.3.2. 
19 For more details the reader can refer to section 
4.2.3.3. 
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Initial Transcripts 
Coding Scheme 
EE1 1 
(23) 
Ste 
I 
Coding system Sketches (23) 
(Version 2) 
Step 21 Summaries IJ 
(15) Mpn 
Step 4 
Coding system 
(Version 1) 
Diagram 4.5: The procedure that has been followed for the data analysis of the learning investigation phase 
Diagram 4.5 describes the procedure that followed for the data analysis of the learning 
investigation phase. The initial coding scheme was based on the initial interpretations of 
the literature review (see section 2.4), my experience as an educator interacting with 
children of this age and on the aims of the study. The initial coding scheme of the study 
provided to some basic headings: Expressing Randomness, Certain and Impossible Events, 
Probability of an Event. These headings were used as a step I for an initial analysis of the 
transcriptS20 . The transcripts were presented in columns, giving also the line numbering of 
the transcript, the code for the content and the screen-shot of the computer game. 
Sometimes some notes could also be included in the transcript based on notes taken during 
the process of transcribing or annotations that gave a richer meaning to the words that were 
spoken. As some interviews were undertaken in the Greek language, the transcripts were 
translated into English by the researcher and well checked by a bilingual speaker of Greek 
and English. From the transcripts some summaries were created to describe how the 
thinking of the child of each transcript was expressed (see Appendix A5, for an example). 
The summaries of the transcripts were the step 2 of the data analysis and helped the 
researcher to develop a first more elaborated coding system of the transcripts (step 3). In 
the first version of coding system, some sub-headings were added to the initial coding 
scheme. For example, in the heading of expressions of random mixture were added the 
sub-headings: unsystematic movement, changing the mechanism. Using this coding 
system, the researcher went back to the transcripts and tried to code them (step 4). The 
coded transcripts (coding system version 1), gave the researcher the opportunity to make a 
sketch of each child (step 5, see Appendix A6, for an example) and thus, to create new 
version of coding system (step 6), validated by examples to researcher's supervisor. The 
20 A transcript can be found on Appendix A4. 
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transcripts were finally coded (see Appendix A4) based on the new version of the 
following coding system (step 7). 
4.3.5 The final coding system of the transcripts 
The final coding system of the transcripts was based on four general groups: a. local and 
global thinking, b. expressing the rules, c. engagement with the game and d. expressions of 
random mixture. These groups were divided into different categories as follows: 
A. Local and Global Thinking 
A]. Initial descriptions of the game 
Al. 1 Outcome oriented 
A1.2 Sample space oriented 
A2. The use of global evidence in judgements of equality and proportional thinking. 
The codes here were used in order to find out how the child expressed the local and global 
events in the game (see section 3.4.1). The codes were also used to see how each local and 
global events in the game have been used by children to judge their thinking of equality 
and proportionality. 
B. Expressing the rules 
BI Expressionsfor the rules of the objects 
B 1.1 The rules of the objects are expressed by using the third person. 
B 1.2 The rules of the objects are expressed by using the first person 
B2 The children are looking at the rules to explain the unpredictable and to explain the 
movement of the ball. 
B3 If the relative numerical strength is in terminal then looking at the rules is sufficient. 
The codes of how children expressed their rules were looking at how each child expressed 
the rules of the game and how the child made use of the rules in order to explain or judge 
randomness. 
C. Enizaizement with the game 
CI Use new objects 
C2 Make changes to the game just to havefun. 
D. Expressions of random mixture 
DI Unsystematic movement 
DIJ Liberal: e. g. 'Moves where it wants to go', 'By it self. 
DI. 2 Controllable: e. g. 'The computer controls it'. 'It knows, we don't'. 
D1.3 Control the uncontrolled situation. 
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D2 Changing the mechanism 
D2.2Changing the variations of the white ball 
D2.2.1 Change the number of the white balls. 
D2.2-2 Change the starting place of the white ball. 
D2.2.3 Change the speed. 
D2.2.4 Change the size. 
D2.2.5 An attempt to change the rules of the white ball to control the movement. 
D2.3 Change / Move the objects of the game 
D2.3.1 Change the place of the two planets. 
D2.3.2 Change the rules of the balls. 
D2.4 Create new objects 
D2.4.1 Having new objects in the sample space. 
D3 Spatial Representation of sample space / Changing the variations of sample space 
D3.1 Construction of faimess 
D3.1.1 Moving and changing the number of the elements of sample space 
D3.1.1.1 Symmetrical teams 
D3.1.1.2Making a pattern 
D3.1.1.3Making circles 
D3.1.2 Changing the size of the elements of sample space 
D3.1.3 Changing the arrangementof the balls 
D3.2 Construction of unfairness 
D3.2.1 Certain and Impossible events 
D3.2.2 Probability of an event 
D4 Judgement of equality in fairness 
D4.1 Almost the same numbers on the scorers means that the game works/it is fair. 
D5 Proportional thinking 
D5.1 Equality of balls vs counting 
D5.1.1 Many times children didn't count the balls to see if they are equal, but they created 
strategies to have the same amount of balls. 
D5.1.2 Equality of an event: 1: 1=2: 2 = .... =n: n ? 
D5.1.3 Do they add or do they destroy balls to make both colours having equal numbers? 
D5.2 Double vs proportional thinking 
D5.2.1 They could control the equal and sometimes the concept of double but they 
confused on any other ratios. They deal with big numbers by using the words 'more' and 
'less 9. To make decisions on ratios the global event helps more than the local. 
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D6 Infinity 
D6.1 They make changes in the game and the mechanism to get bigger numbers. 
D6.2 Method of trial and error 
D7 Possibility 
D7.1 Everything is possible to happen. Extreme variability is possibility. 
The codes of expressions of random mixture were used for the main analysis of the data 
and were looking at children's expressions of randomness. The codes were based on how 
children expressed the movement of the white ball in the game, what changes they did in 
the mechanism for expressing randomness, how they changed the variations of sample 
space, how they judged equality in fairness and how expressed proportionality, infinity and 
possibility. An example of a coded transcript is presented in Appendix 4. A snapshot of 
this appendix is as follows: 
Line Codes 
119 J: You see, now it means that they have the same size. Our space kid is A2 
near the yellow line. D3.1 
121 R: How long do we need to leave the game on? 
122 J: Four seconds ... may be ... I don't know. We need to see. 
But now it D6 
123 moves quickly. The white ball goes many times on the circles (the 
124 big balls), because they are big. Now the blue has more points, now D6 
125 the red.... the blue ... the red. 
126 
127 R: For how long do we need to leave it going? 
128 J: We need more seconds ... The red now is 91 & 80... 
D6 
For example, line 119 of Appendix 4 has been coded by the A2 (The use of global 
evidence in judgements of equality), D3.1 (Construction of Fairness) codes. Here, the child 
referred to the same size of the balls in the lottery machine to express fairness in her game, 
while she was also using the global event of the game (the space kid) to judge her 
construction. Moreover, lines 122-128 have been coded by D6 (Infinity) code, as she 
expressed her ideas of leaving the game to run longer, in order to be able to judge her 
construction and achieve fairness in her game. 
The analysis of the data of the learning investigation phase is presented 
in chapters 6,7, 
and 8. The following chapter, the Game Evolution will give a 
description of each iteration 
that took place up to the structure of the final game. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Evolution of the Game 
5.1 Overview 
This chapter outlines the evolution of the 'lottery game' through the three iterations of the 
research. The chapter refers to the Phase I (Iterative Design Phase) of the study (see 
section 3.2). It aims to show how the design of the game changed in response to the 
children's actions, and how children themselves responded to the game. The evolution of 
the lottery game took place over three iterations. I will describe the game as it evolved 
through each iteration, its problematic situations, the reactions of the children and how the 
problematic situations probed the children's probabilistic ideas. 
5.2 Iteration 1 (Phase 1): The storm game 
5.2.1 Description of the storm game 
The storm game was written in 'Rule-Maker' software (see section 3.3.2). In this game the 
story was presented to the children as follows: 'A clown is cycling through a park. The day 
seemed to be great, but suddenly a cloud appears in the sky. The clown tries to avoid the 
storm, so it moves forwards and backwards in order not to be under the cloud. What will 
happen? Ixt's see... '(see Figure 5.1). The lottery machine consisted of red and green 
balls, placed in a linear position. The children could add and move balls of any colour from 
the lottery machine and shuffle them by clicking the mouse. 
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5.2.2 Problematic situations of the storm game 
There were four versions of the storm game: balls game, cloud game 1, dice game and 
cloud game 2. The problematic situations of each version were as follows: 
Game 1: Balls Game 
The task of this version was children to try to get the red ball to the top of the lottery 
machine. Secondly, they needed to predict what would happen in the next shuffle. Thus, 
the problematic situation here was to make manipulations in order to succeed to get a red 
ball at the top of the lottery machine. The children could add and take away balls from the 
lottery machine (see bottom-fight comer on Figure 5.1). They shuffled the balls, by 
clicking on the lottery machine, and added and took away balls from the lottery machine 
with the aim of getting a red ball on the top. This activity gave the children the opportunity 
to express their thoughts about randomness through the role of the red balls in the game. 
Game 2: Cloud Game I 
This was a game in which the behaviour of a cloud was governed by the rule 'if red is on 
the top then I make fightning... ' Here, the children expressed their thoughts about the 
probability of an event, then they made probability comparisons and how these affected the 
scores in the game. The rules of the cloud are described in Figure 5.2. The cloud had the 
rule 'always move forward and if red is on the top then make lightning'. 
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Figure 5.2: The actions and conditions of the cloud 
In this game the children had to find out the rules of each object in the game in order to 
understand the connections between them. Furthermore, they were asked to make changes 
in the 'lottery machine' in order to construct a fair game, and to make more changes if their 
first ideas did not work. The children worked in pairs. One controlled a storm cloud, which 
was connected to a 'lottery machine'. The other child controlled a biker-clown, moving 
right and left, by using a joystick, trying to avoid being under the cloud. The child who 
controlled the cloud could make changes in the lottery machine in order to win. In the next 
round, the child who controlled the biker-clown could make changes to the lottery machine 
to avoid having too many strikes in the game. In this way, the children had to decide what 
changes they could make in order to make it easier for them to win. 
Game 3: Dice Game 
In this game the behaviour of the cloud was governed by the rule 'if thrown six... ' This 
required the children to express the probability of an event with another 'machine'. 
Game 4: Cloud Game 2 
In this game the children were asked to change the rules of the cloud in order to be similar 
to those of the dice game. Hence, they had to compare the lottery machine with the dice 
machine. 
5.2.3 Findings from the analysis of the iteration I data 
Four children participated in this iteration. The number of children was intentionally small 
as the aim was to inform iteration 2 of the game design process, with the focus 
firmly on 
the design issues. The rationale for the analysis of the data focused on the design of the 
game rather than on the thinking of the children 
(for more details about the data collection 
in this iteration, see Chapter Four). 
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5.2.3.1 The design of the storm game and the expressed probabilistic ideas 
The first design change that emerged from the 'game use' was the presentation of the 
lottery machine. The presentation of the lottery machine confused all four children. For 
example, Ellis 2' described the 'balls game' as 'the red ball goes in columns and it goes 
forward. It changes colour and position'. Both pairs, after playing for some time with 
shuffling the balls, were looking for patterns between the two colours of the balls: 
Kate: We have a pattern. Red- green- red- red- green. Two patterns. 
Jerry, in response to my question about whether at the next shuffle the red ball would go on 
the top, answered: 
J: No! We saw that it goes down, up, down, middle, down, middle, down and up, down, 
up, down, middle, down, middle, down. 
Researcher: Ok. Do you think that it always follows the same procedure? 
J: Yeah. Because we saw it. 
R: Do you think this will happen again? 
Nichole: I think it will. Let's see.... 
J: Hey! What's wrong? Now it follows one pattern and another. 
Jerry still believed that the balls follow a pattern that changes over time. After shuffling the 
lottery machine seven times she decided: 
Jerry: No there is not a pattern. 
Researcher: So, how do they work? 
J: Like crazy. 
But what confused me is that after this statement; she was still looking for the 'right 
pattern'. 
Jerry: No, no ... I got 
it. 
And she tried to explain to Nichole what happened and how the pattern worked. 
It was clear that there was a particular difficulty concerning the linear representation of 
the 
balls and that the desired result for a red ball to be on the top. 
Although the four children 
tried many times to add and take away balls, clicking on them to make them change places, 
the idea that the colour that they wanted should be the one on the top confused them, 
although it was explained by the researcher. 
J: So, what are the green balls for? 
N: Nothing. But, I have red on the top. 
21 The names are pseudonyms. 
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J: So, take a green and put it on the top. 
J: The balls move behind each other quickly. (She tries it out. ) No, they don't change 
places they just change the colour. The red becomes green and some greens red. 
Jerry tried to find out how the balls were being shuffled. Because of the linear 
representation of the lottery machine, she seemed to be confused that the balls had just 
changed their colour. 
All the four children understood easily that the actions of the cloud in the Cloud Game 
were connected with the lottery machine balls. It appears that this was based on knowing 
how Rule-Maker worked and the effect of 'if ... then ... ' rules. Jerry's comment after 
exploring the cloud's robot was 'So, if we don't have any red here (on the tree), we do not 
have any strikes'. This rule gave the children the opportunity to connect the storm game 
with the balls game. Also the decision to use balls instead of dice made it easier for them to 
change objects (colours) and to count the number of events. 
It can be concluded from this phase that the four children could easily manipulate the 
lottery machine and could mentally connect the objects of the game. In the game the 
children made predictions, constructed representations inside the lottery machine and tried 
to make things happen -all of these are key activities for learning according to Harel 
(1991). However, it seems that the linear representation of the lottery machine encouraged 
all the four children to look for patterns in the outcomes. 
The children expressed randomness in the game in many different ways. They called the 
game 'moving balls', 'giggling balls', or even 'crazy balls'. The children found it 'hard' to 
be sure of their predictions. The 'icons' of the coloured balls made it obvious for them that 
equality of colours in the sample space generates fairness. This was something that the 
children did not appreciate when they played the dice game. A reason for this might be that 
with balls each outcome was represented by a different object (ball), but in the dice game it 
was difficult for the children to compare the different figures of the numbers. 
It seems that the design choice to use coloured balls gave the children an opportunity to 
express ideas about impossible and certain events. Kate expressed the concept of 
impossible event. Kate needed green balls in order to have a possibility to win and she 
understood that the absence of red balls would prevent 
her playmate to play. Also, when 
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Jerry and Nichol made the rules of their game and Nichol put only red balls in the 
probabilistic machine, Jerry complained 'So, I will lose. It is not fair. The cloud will strike 
all the time'. That led Jerry to express the concept of certain event. There was a certainty 
of winning for her playmate and impossibility for her. 
The use of coloured balls made it possible for the children to have as many events as they 
like without being obliged to think about numbers in order to express ideas about the 
probability of an event to occur. The children had to decide whether the red ball would be 
on the top, and Jerry realised that the probability of an event increased when that event 
appeared more often in the sample space. On the other hand, Nichol did not have a clear 
idea about this, although she seemed to realise that she had to change the quantity of the 
balls in the lottery machine in order to make it easier for her to win. At one point Jerry 
decided to put in her lottery machine only one red for Nichol. As she said 'There is a bit of 
fairness, but I have more (balls). I'm making it to win. ' Later, she put as many greens as 
she could and she concluded that was very easy for her to win. 
Although there was a direct connection between the objects of the game, it seemed that the 
design of the game made it less easy for the children to realise about the global events of 
the game, and this might be the reason for some difficulties in finding the probability of an 
event. There was an absence of 'continuity' in that they had to click on the mouse in order 
to find the next outcome of the game and this seems to have interrupted their connection 
between local and global events. 
5.2.3.2 Summary of the design changes for the storm game 
In iteration I the four children expressed some probabilistic ideas, but the game did not 
afford them many opportunities to express probabilistic ideas in the sense of Aim I in 
Chapter Three (iteratively to design a game to afford young children opportunities and 
novel ways to express and develop probabilistic ideas). Table 5.1 presents the key issues 
addressed for design changes in iteration I and their rationale. 
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Iteration 1 
Key Issues Addressed for Design Changes Reason 
Problem due to linear representation of the - This representation encouraged the 
lottery machine. A different representation children to look for patterns 
required 
- The children to be able to construct their - The children would have the 
own representation of a lottery machine opportunity to express better their 
probabilistic ideas 
- Having a continuous movement in the - To develop a better understanding of 
lottery machine (create a 'bouncing ball' the aggregate view of the game - i. e. the 
using Pathways software) global outcomes of the children's lottery 
machine 
Table 5.1: Iteration 1 design changes 
The representation of the lottery machine needed to change for the next iteration, since the 
linear representation encouraged all the children look for patterns. This finding agrees with 
Ayres and Way's (2000) research in which students were also required to predict the 
colour of a next ball drawn and also inappropriately tried to utilise colour patterns as a 
strategy. What was needed was a way for the children not only to add and remove balls in 
the lottery machine, but also to be able to see an 'open structure' in the lottery machine. 
This should make the game even more 'dynamic' (see diSessa, 1995) and might avoid 
children looking for patterns. 
Another key change for iteration 2 was to improve the 'continuity' of the lottery machine. 
The children had to shuffle the lottery machine by clicking the mouse and this action 
seemed to make it more difficult for them to understand the global outcomes of their 
lottery machine. 
5.3 Iteration 2 (Phase 1): The space kid game (version 1) 
Several attempts were made to satisfy the changes that iteration 
1 dictated. This is one of 
the reasons that Iteration 2 could not take place until about a year 
later. Another reason was 
that in order to make the changes to the game there 
had to be changes in the software as 
well. A completely new version of the software was created, 
called 'Pathways', as a 
replacement for Rule 
Maker, and the iteration 2 experiments took place in April 2001. The 
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children participating in this iteration were different from those who participated in 
iteration 1, but were also part of the Playground Project. The description of the children 
involved in iterations I and 2 has been already given in Section 4.2.1. 
5.3.1 Description of the space kid game 
The 'Space Kid' game, which was the focus of iteration 2, can be seen as a form of 
'random walk M. The random walk in the game involved a 'space kid', which moves 
upwards and downwards on a yellow line. These movements occurred one step at a time, 
in response to an outcome generated by the lottery machine. In it a small red ball bounced 
and collided continually with a set of static red and green balls, controlling the movement 
of the space kid. As programmed initially, a collision with a green ball added one point to 
the green score and moved the space kid one step down the screen. Similarly, a collision 
with a white ball added one point to the white score and moved the space kid one step up 
the screen. 
The rules of the game are shown in Figure 5.3. A red ball moved inside the lottery machine 
at a certain speed and collided with green and white balls. When it touched a ball, this ball 
sent a message to the scorer of its colour and a message to the space kid. The space kid 
moved towards a 'planet' (or exploding mine). The rules 23 of the planets/mines were 'when 
I touch the space kid, I blow up and switch off the game'. 
22 Clapham (1990) describes: 
'Consider a Markov chain X I, X2, X3,... in which the state space is -2, -1,0,1,2,3, 
With the integers positioned as they occur on the real line, imagine an object moving 
from 
integer to integer a step at a time. That is to say, from position i the object either moves to 
i- I 
or i+J, or possible stays where 
it is. Such a Markov chain is called one-dimensional random 
walk: if Xn= i, then X.,, = i-1, i or i+1. 
The state i is an absorbing state if, whenever Xn= i, 
then Xn+l= i; in other words, when the object reaches this position 
it stays there. When a 
gambler, playing a sequence of games, either wins or 
loses a fixed amount in each game, his 
winnings give an example of a random walk. 
' (p. 235). 
23 The idea of rules in Pathways was described in section 
3.3.3. 
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5.3.2 Problematic situations of the space kid game 
The problematic situations that the children faced in this lottery game were presented as 
questions. The first question relates to fairness: 
'What might you do if you want the space kid to stay near the yellow line while the game 
runs? ' 
The others refer to the probability of an event: 
What might you do in order to make the space kid reach the blue planet/mine? ' 
"What might you do in order to make the space kid reach the red planet/mine? ' 
The children were asked to try out their decisions, describe what happened, why they 
thought it had happened and if it did not work as they wanted, what else they could change. 
5.3.3 Findings from the analysis of the data 
In this iteration it was planned to have eight children, but after the first two task-based 
interviews, some immediate changes were indicated. So, in the remainder of this iteration 
only two children participated (for more details see section 4.2.1). As in iteration 1, the 
focus was on the design of the game and not on the thinking of the children, so that in- 
depth study of a small number of children was appropriate for the research. 
5.3.3.1 The design of the space kid game and the expressed probabilistic ideas 
Both children, Lisa and Sam, found the context of the game interesting and they found it 
easy to read the rules. This seemed to 
be a result of their previous experience with the 
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Pathways software. As had been hoped, the red ball bouncing inside the lottery machine 
(the major change from the previous iteration), offered continuity to the outcomes, and also 
helped the children not to focus on patterns in the outcomes as happened in the previous 
iteration. 
Another point that emerged from this iteration was that one child (Lisa) wanted to have 
two different sample spaces at the same time, one for one colour of balls and one for the 
other colour. As will be seen later, this suggested designing 'bricks' to sub-divide the space 
of the bouncing ball in the lottery machine. What Lisa tried to do was to copy another 
bouncing ball, but because of the fact that the red balls did not have any rules, except to 
move with a certain speed, her idea did not work. 
L: That (one bouncing ball) is to be for the white ones and that (another 
bouncing ball) for the green ones ... eh 
S: It's not going to work. There is not a particular space for each one to move. 
This will touch the white balls as well and this one green ones, as well. 
L: No, no! But. If we just make another rule ... oh ... if I spread these around. 
Researcher What are you doing now? 
L: The green balls will go up until here. The others to be on the opposite. 
R: Oh! That's a good idea! Why is that? 
S: The white is going to have more. 
R: So, did the space kid go back to the yellow line? 
L: Yeah! 
R: Oh ... that then works ok! 
L: Yeah, but this one (the one red ball) went everywhere and that one (the other 
red ball) went everywhere. 
Lisa wanted to create a rule where one bouncing ball would send a message only if it 
touched a particular colour. Unfortunately this could not work because of the absence of an 
appropriate 'stone' in the Pathways software. It needed a rule to say 'If I touch a particular 
colour, I bounce off and ...... The issue of separate sample spaces was solved 
in the last 
iteration by adding bricks to the game design (see section 5.4). 
Both children were asked what they would do if they wanted the space kid to stay near the 
yellow line. The idea of this question was 
for the children to construct a random sample 
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space where white and green balls would be selected with the same frequency. This was 
achieved either by constructing a patterned spatial representation or by making a circle 
with different colours so as to hold the red bouncing ball inside it. Lisa also considered the 
possibility of the red ball escaping the circle, so she destroyed every other ball that was in 
the lottery machine and not in the circle. 
The movements of the space kid, up and down, influenced Sam's construction for the 
sample space. Sam separated the two colours depending on the message that they gave. 
The white balls, which gave the message to the space kid to go up, were put on the upper 
level of the lottery machine and the green balls on the lower level. Sam however noticed 
that his lottery machine did not work, as he wanted, because of gaps between the balls. 
That was because the red bouncing ball stayed longer on the white balls, which made the 
space kid on average to move upwards. As Sam noticed, by having no gaps between the 
balls, the red ball would not stay for a long time in one group of colours. Thus, he achieved 
the wanted result. 
The idea of certain and impossible events was easily expressed when the children were 
asked to make changes in the sample space in order for the space kid to reach the blue or 
the red planet. It seemed that the spatial representation of the lottery machine gave Sam the 
opportunity to construct a fair sample space and to express ideas of fairness, impossible 
and certain events. The two children related the idea of randomness and the probability of 
an event with 'a feeling'. Their intuition about whether the space kid will go up or down 
was (see section 5.3.1) a different way to express the probability of an event. It seems that 
the 'feeling' became more certain when their construction worked for a long time. Lisa 
claimed that their game was still working, so it was a 'good construction'. The expression 
of connecting the effectiveness of a construction with the time for which the game ran 
occurred a number of times later. 
5.3.3.2 Summary of the design changes for the space kid game 
The game seemed to be interesting for the two children and it probed many probabilistic 
ideas. However, there were some significant changes in the software and in the game that 
needed to be implemented before the next iteration (see Table 5.2). A first immediate 
design change required was to work around bugs the software for using sounds. Another 
bug that had to be solved immediately was in the sending and receiving of messages. After 
a few minutes of showing and reacting to colours/messages synchronisation was lost 
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between the receivers of messages, the score counters and the space kid (although the 
scorer added a point when they received a message the space kid did not move 
immediately). 
Iteration 2 
Key Issues Addressed for Design Changes Reason 
- Sending and receiving bugs to be fixed -To improve the link between the 
appearance of local and global events 
- Change colours of the balls to indicate the -To have consistency between the 
movement of the space kid colours of the balls, the colour of the 
messages, the mines/planets and the 
movement of the space kid 
- Design a 'brick' object - To be able to divide the lottery machine 
4sample space' if required 
Table 5.2: Iteration 2 design changes and their rationale 
Table 5.2 indicates that a first key issue addressed for design changes was to solve the bugs 
in showing and reacting to messages. Also some 'bricks' were needed for the children to 
divide the lottery machine into different parts, so as to manipulate the sample space and 
distribution in more diverse ways. Furthermore, the colours of the balls needed to be 
changed. The planet/mine and the balls that control space kid's movement to this 
planet/mine needed to be the same colour, in order for the children more easily to connect 
the movement of the space kid with the collisions in the lottery machine. By the end of this 
iteration I also decided that in the final iteration, children should work individually with 
the task, since many times, in iteration 1 and iteration 2, some children were shy and hid 
their thoughts and decisions behind the other child's. 
5.4 Iteration 3 (Phase 2)-Final Game: The space kid game (version 2) 
Iteration 3 took place in October and November of 2001. This was the final iteration, used 
to collect the final data of the study. 
5.4.1 Description of the space kid game (version 2) 
The game for this iteration was similar as that in iteration 
2, with the changes and 
corrections to the Pathways software carried out. 
The game, as in iteration 2, involves a 
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'space kid' moving upwards and downwards on a yellow line with planets/mines at the 
ends. The colours of the balls in the game had been changed and the look of the lottery 
machine for this iteration is illustrated in Figure 3.9 (section 3.4-3). 
5.4.2 Problematic situations of the game 
The final game consisted of four steps. The problematic situations were used as a base line 
for the researcher to probe the interaction between the child and the task, with the 
researcher shaping the interview based on the actions and responses of each child. 
Step 1: 
m On the screen: The space kid, lottery machine, the bouncing ball, one blue and one 
red ball, the scorers of the balls (see Figure 5.4). 
Figure 5.4: The step I starting point of the space kid game in the final iteration 
5 Goal: Make the space kid move up and down. 
Step 2: 
m On the screen: As in phase 1, plus two planets/mines, one blue and one red a short 
distance above and below the space kid. There are more balls in the lottery 
machine. (see Figure 5.5). 
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Figure 5.5: The step 2 starting point of the space kid game in the final iteration 
m Goal: Make changes so that the space kid stays near the yellow line and does not 
touch the two planets/mines. 
Step 3: 
m On the screen: As in step 2 plus two white balls bouncing around. A brick object (a 
light brown rectangle) is available that can be copied, moved and used to divide the 
lottery machine space (see Figure 5.6). The brick has a rule 'If I touch something, it 
bounces off me... ' 
Figure 5.6: The step 3 starting point of the space kid game in the final iteration 
m Goal: Make changes to the lottery machine so that: a. the space kid stays near the 
yellow line b. the space kid touches one of the two planets/mines. 
N Probes by researcher: How do children express their ideas about randomness, 
fairness, certain and impossible events, probability of an event, proportional 
thinking. 
- III- 
5. The Evolution of the Game 
Step 4: 
On the screen: As in step 3. 
Goal: To build a new probabilistic game. 
Probe: How do children express randomness? 
The tasks of each step are described in the protocol of the task-based interview - see 
Appendix A3. The data collection of this iteration has been described in section 4.3.3. 
5.5 Summary of the Game Evolution 
The evolution of the game took place in three iterations. Table 5.3 shows the suggested 
changes of each iteration. 
Iteration 
No 
Iteration 
1 
Iteration 
2 
Iteration 3 
- Avoid the use of linear - Fix the sending and Final iteration: 
representation of the lottery receiving bugs Satisfies the 
Changes machine aims of the 
needed - Change the colours of study 
for the - Children to be able to construct the balls to indicate the 
next the spatial arrangement of the movement of the space 
iteration lottery machine kid 
- Have a continuous movement - Design a 'brick' object 
in 2-dimensions in the lottery for separating the lottery 
machine (create a bouncing machine space if required 
stone using Pathways software) 
Table 5.3: The suggested changes for each iteration 
Iteration 1 suggested changing the linear representation of the lottery machine, as this 
seemed to influence the children's predictions. It also suggested the need to have a 
continuous movement in the lottery machine, as the absence of this did not help children to 
link effectively the local and global events of the game. Iteration 1 also suggested the 
possibility for children to construct not only the number and colour of the lottery 
machine's balls, but also the whole structure of the machine. This was the reason of the 
constructing a 2-d spatial representation of lottery machine, which can be characterised as 
the key finding of Phase 1, iterative design phase. The children could make changes to the 
two-dimensional continuum space to make changes to the global events of the game. In 
this context, without this characteristic, the children were generally unable to express 
notions of random mixture. 
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Iteration 2 satisfied the iteration 1 changes, as far as it concerned the construction of a 2- 
dimensional continuous spatial representation of a lottery machine. In contrast of the 
lottery machine in iteration 1, children in iteration 2 seemed able to express the notion of 
random mixture in two-dimensional space continuum environment. The computer 
environment supported several ways in which the idea of mixture could be expressed. The 
children changed the position, size or number of the red and blue stable balls in the sample 
space, or they described in words the 'uncontrolled' continual movement of the white ball. 
Iteration 2 also indicated some further changes to the design of the game. It indicated some 
bugs/problems in the Pathways software and also suggested making consistent the colours 
of the balls to be the same as the colour of the planets/mines. This helped children to link 
the movement of the space kid with the selection of the coloured ball in the lottery 
machine. Iteration 2 also suggested the possibility of having some tools (bricks) for 
children to manipulate and divide the space of their lottery machine. Iteration 3 
implemented the iteration 2 changes and was judged to satisfy the aims of the study. Thus, 
it was regarded as the final iteration for the main data collection; and the data from this 
will be analysed in the next three chapters. 
The analysis of the final data will be described in the following three chapters. Chapter Six 
will analyse how children's thinking moved from sample space to global outcomes, 
Chapter Seven will explore children's understandings of faimess and Chapter Eight will 
examine children's quantitative ideas of randomness. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Linking Local to Global Events 
'The space kid will be in the middle, may be little up or little down, it depends 
on the white ball. You see! It (the white ball) moves by itself. It goes to 
different places and if it goes down and there is a red ball there, it touches it 
and our space kid moves up. ' 
(Jane, 6 and 7 months year-old girl) 
6.1 Overview 
This chapter is part of the Phase 2, learning investigation phase, and it analyses data from 
iteration 3, the final iteration. This involved children working with the 'Space Kid' game 
as described in Chapter Five. Twenty-one of the twenty-three children initially focused on 
the movement of the white ball inside the yellow square. The first part of this chapter 
considers the continuous 2-dimensional movement in the lottery machine and describes 
children's ideas about the movement of the white ball. The second part considers how the 
position of the white ball influenced children's ideas, and the last part considers children's 
ideas about the connections between local and the global events in the game. 
6.2 The continuous movement in the lottery machine 
As Jane's description above shows, the children saw a connection between the space kid 
and how the white ball moves. The analysis of the data presented here was mainly based 
on Code A: Local and Global Thinking (see Chapter Four, section 4.3.5), which referred 
on the children's connections between the local events of the game and the global ones. 
Jane describes this arbitrary movement by saying that the ball moves by itself, going to 
different places. Jane seemed to be interested in watching the arbitrary movement of the 
white ball, which moves around into different places. She also seems to understand that 
this affects the space kid's movement, which in a fair game should stay in the middle, near 
the yellow line. 
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Rachel (7 3/12 year-old girl) is one of the twenty-one children who initially focused on the 
movement of the white ball rather than focusing on the movement of the space kid. She 
focused on the lottery machine, trying to impose on the white ball some kind of determined 
and predictable movement. The analysis here was based on code D1: Unsystematic 
Movement (see section 4.3.5), which refers to the children's descriptions of the movement 
of the white ball. However, the continuous movement of the white ball did not allow her to 
predict the movement of the ball. In the following snapshot Rachel's first reaction is 
described, after she made her first change in the sample space. 
Rachel: The scores will change, now. The blue will get 
fewer points because the white ball hardly ever 
goes to the comers. 
Researcher: Why is that? 
Rachel: The white ball moves like this both here and 
there. It moves up, down, right, and left. (She 
is indicating the movement on the screen, by 
avoiding the comers). I don't think that it goes 
to the comers... Let me try to see. 
She starts the game. 
Rachel: You see, I was right! Oh! No! One point for it, 
another one, oops! 
Researcher: How does the white ball move? 
Rachel: it moves where it wants to ... I mean if it is 
here (she is pointing on the screen), in the 
middle, it might go here and here, and here, 
everywhere. Look we have equal points now! 
0 
Figure 6.1: Rachel's first 
construction 
Figure 6.2: Interpretation 
of Rachel's description of 
the movement of the 
bouncing ball 
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At first, Rachel explained the ball as 'deliberate', avoiding the comers that the white ball 
'hardly ever moves to the comers of the square'. In fact, a more general observation is that, 
like twenty-one other children, Rachel's explanation of randomness focuses on the 
movement of the white ball in itself, rather than, for example, on when the coloured ball is 
touched and with what frequency. But, in the above episode Rachel realises that the ball 
'moves where it wants to'. It seems that the aggregate view of the movement of the ball 
helped Rachel to link local events derived from randomness (the movement of the white 
ball) with a global understandings (the movement of the space kid). Also, the continuous 
movement of the ball helped her to link the short-term movements of the ball with its long- 
term movements (see Chapter Three, section 3.4.1). The following diagram shows how the 
medium helped Rachel to link the different levels of randomness (see Diagram 6.1). 
RULES 
SPATIAL 
CONTINUOUS 
Outcomes 
Movement of the 
space kid 
Sounds 
Scorers 
Short Term Behaviour of MOVF. 
MFNT Long Term Behaviour of the 
the Game 
i>L 
Game 
Diagram 6.1: How the task linked the parts of the game in Rachel's thinking 
Diagram 6.1 illustrates how the rules of the game linked the sample space to the outcomes 
in Rachel's case. The rules linked the movement of the white ball with the movement of 
the space kid, the movement, sounds and the scorers, which represented the outcomes of 
the game. The representation of the two-dimensional continuous lottery machine made 
it 
possible for her to see the movement of the white ball not only as a short term 
behaviour of 
the system, but also as a long term behaviour. The data showed that the continuous 
movement of the white ball in the game helped Rachel to connect the short-term movement 
of the white ball to its long-term movement. 
This event played a major role in connecting 
local and global events and Rachel's description shifted many times 
from local to global 
events. A snapshot that shows this shift 
is the following: 
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Rachel: I will destroy some balls 
Figure 6.3: Rachel's 
construction of fairness 
She starts the game. 
Rachel: Did you tell me to be on the yellow line? (She 
laughs). Oh... it moved to the blue planet. 
Researcher: Why was that? 
Rachel: Because the ball moved like that and touched 
the blue balls... I don't remember very well 
how it was moving ... When it touched a ball it 
changed direction ... I don't know how it 
moved around. 
At first, Rachel tried to guess the initial movement of the white ball and make a decision 
about how the ball would move and which balls would touch more frequently. Her first 
decision worked on the short-term movement of the ball, but not in the long term. 
However, the continuous movement of the white ball in her lottery machine made her 'not 
to remember', as she said, the particular way the ball was moving. This was the reason that 
she finally admitted that she did not know how the ball was moving around. 
6.2.1 Short-term movement 
The continuous movement of the white ball could be categorised in short-term and long- 
term movement. Twenty-one children out of twenty-three initially described a short-term 
movement of the white ball. Short-term movement refers to the exact previous movement 
of the white ball. Like Rachel, Zeta (6 4/12 year-old girl) also tries to find a particular way 
for it to move. 
Researcher: How is this little ball moving? 
Zeta: By hitting things. 
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R: Do we know where will it move? 
Z: If it is here and moved there it will move there and touch this ball here and 
then here. (She is pointing on the screen). 
Zeta was pointing to the short-term movement of the white ball, based on her previous 
experience of watching the ball moving around. This short-term movement of the white 
ball is also obvious in Simon's (7 10/12) construction. 
Simon: First of all I should move this ball and get the star 
and I will do it like this! 
Researcher: What will happen now? 
S: First it (the white ball) will move to the big blue 
ball and then to the big red one and then to the 
two blue balls and then to the two red balls and 
then again to the blue and then again to the 
reds 
Figure 6.4: Simon's 
construction based on the 
short-term movement of the 
ball 
Simon placed balls in the sample space, having in mind a particular movement of the white 
ball. It seems that the predictable reflection of the white ball when it struck a coloured ball, 
made Zeta and Simon believe that the prediction of the white ball's movement was 
possible. This idea of reflection might be why Lucy (7 8/12 year-old girl) tried to make the 
white ball bigger in order to be more obvious for her where it would bounce and reflect. 
Lucy: Ok. That's fine. I will make this bigger to make it 
move from one side to the other. 
0... 
Figure 6.5: Lucy's 
construction based on 
reflection 
Lucy here made the white ball bigger to be easier for her to understand where it would 
move and which ball would touch. 
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Twenty out of twenty-three children based their constructions on this idea of reflection in 
the short-term movement of the white ball. They constructed a 'fair' space with two 
separate 'teams' of balls one at the top and one at the bottom so that the white ball will 
bounce on one side and reflect to the other. For example, John's (6 10/12 year-old boy) 
construction shows that he thought of placing two teams, up and down, in the sample 
space. 
J: It (the white ball) will move once up and once 
down ... but ... this (the space kid) will not move very far 
away from the yellow line. 
Figure 6.6: John's 
construction based on the 
movement of the white ball 
as bouncing ball 
Although John's idea worked for his space kid to stay near the yellow line, most of the 
children's ideas based on the short-term movement of the ball did not work properly and 
did not bring desired result in the game -for example Simon's idea (see Figure 6.4). Thus, 
all the children had to change focus to the long-term movement of the ball, as described in 
the next section. 
6.2.2 Long-term movement 
The long-term movement of the white ball refers to the aggregated movement of the ball. 
The twenty-one children's gradual awareness of the lack of a pattern and lack of control 
over the movement of the ball encouraged them to change focus to the aggregate, long- 
term movement of their ball. Lucy characterised the white ball's movement and mixture as 
follows: 'it goes right-left, up, down and on the balls. We don't know where it goes. It 
moves in the yellow square, where it wants to go'. 'Mixture' for Lucy meant that the 
movement is where the ball 'wants to go', without any obvious pattern or pre-ordained 
paths. 
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An example that shows how continuous movement played a role for the twenty-one 
children to link the short-term movement of the white ball to the long-term movement is 
the case of Victoria (6 6/12 year-old girl): 
Researcher: How did you arrange the balls? 
Victoria: If it (the white ball) goes like this it might get the 
red (ball) and then the blue (ball) and then to move 
down like this or it may move like this and move 
up and get this one and then that one or to move in 
a different place and get this and this. 
She starts the game. 
V: Come on! Look! It (the white ball) gets red again! 
Now it (the space kid) moves down and then up 
and ... Whatever I say it happens! Come on... It (the 
space kid) moves up and then down. Oh ... no, we 
have more points for the red colour. I wanted to get 
one red and one blue. Go up, now move down... 
R: Does it listen to You? 
V: No! I will place somewhere else the white ball. 
Here! Let me start the game again. 
V: Come on... (she knocks on the table), come 
on ... Oh, not again. 
I can't control this white 
ball.... 
She stops the game. 
Figure 6.7: Victoria's first 
construction based on the 
movement of the bouncing 
ball 
Here, Victoria based her ideas on the previous movement of the white ball, thinking that it 
would follow the same path. As the game progressed, she began to realise that even if she 
was able to predict where the white ball ended up, she could not predict how it might get 
there (i. e. its path of movement), and she could not control or predict exactly its next move. 
Finally, Victoria focused on the movement of the space kid instead of the white ball. 
Zeta argued that the white balls '... were touching balls and when they touched them they 
I did not manage to control them'. The 'unmanageable movement of the were moving 
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white balls was one of the children's ideas about randomness. Helen (7 6/12 year-old girl) 
said 'The white ball moves randomly ... but we want to touch the balls in order to get the 
same points for blue and red scorers'. 
Therefore, the following section the ideas of this 'arbitrary' movement of the white ball 
will be described, as this arbitrary movement is linked to randomness in the game and it 
will help us to understand better the children's thinking about randomness in general. 
6.2.2. lThe arbitrary movement of the white ball 
The arbitrary movement of the white ball presented a mystery for all the children. After 
Jane (6 7/12 year-old girl) played the game several times she attempted to describe the 
movement of the ball: 
Researcher: How is the white ball moving around? 
Jane: It moves up and down, iight and left and when it touches one ball and gets a 
point it then goes everywhere in the yellow square. 
R: Does it know where to go? 
J: It knows. 
R: How does it know? 
J: It does know, we don't, but it knows. 
R: How does this happen? 
J: For us it moves randomly, but it might know where to go. We don't know 
where it goes because we didn't make it to go somewhere 
Jane seemed to understand that the movement of the white ball is arbitrary. She makes a 
distinction between the people who play the game, including her, and the computer, saying 
that the computer knows where the ball moves, but we do not. She thinks that, in general, 
the white ball knows by itself where to move, as if somebody, on the computer, magically 
controls it. She also said that we could know where it is moving if we made rules that 
could control the movement. So, an idea of controlling the movement was for her to build 
some rules, and she realised that by having no rules about the ball's movement it was not 
possible for her to know where it went. 
Tom (7 year-old boy) also expressed the connection between the arbitrary movement of the 
ball and randomness. He described how the white balls selected a ball to touch. 
T: I don't know. They only have a speed. They don't do anything else. They don't 
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know. They just move and touch them randomly. 
For Tom, the white balls are uncontrollable objects that are moving in a 'random' way. He 
argues that he does not know where the balls were moving and the balls do not know 
where to move either. It seems that this make him think of randomness to describe in the 
movement, so there was nothing 'hidden' in their movement that he had to find out. Tom 
looked and found the rules of the balls, discovering that the white balls had only a rule to 
move with a certain speed and did not 'obey' any a rule about how to move. This was what 
made him accept that a random behaviour was taking place in the game that could not be 
controlled by him. Irene's (7 6/12 year-old girl) reaction when she started the game was to 
describe the white ball's movement and then she tried to find the rules behind it. Initially 
she said 'It is just moving around without doing anything'. Her focus at the beginning was 
on how the white ball moved around and when she realised that she could do nothing about 
the white ball, unless she created a rule for the ball; she started thinking of how to place the 
coloured balls. 
Anthony (5 10/12 year-old boy) connected arbitrary movement with chance: 
Anthony: No, we do not know which ball will touch. It (the white ball) moved there 
and there and there ... it selected a ball by chance. We didn't know where it 
would go. It picked a ball by itself and scored a point. 
Researcher: Have you tried to control which ball to touch? 
A: A little bit ... we changed it a little ... adding balls inside (red and blue 
balls) 
Anthony described the white ball as selecting a ball to hit by chance. He seems to 
understand the idea of chance in the game, and he also seems to believe that dealing with 
probabilities is an attempt to control, 'a little bit', the arbitrary movement of the white ball. 
It is arguable then that probability for Anthony is an attempt to control randomness. There 
is a change here in Anthony's approach to the game: he finds that he is unable to control 
the actual (random) movement of the ball, and so he tries to control the outcomes of the 
game by manipulating the coloured balls and thus constructing the events inside the lottery 
machine. 
Similarly, Lucy expressed this feeling of controlling the randomness in sample space when 
she constructed a 'random controlled' situation of fairness. As she said 'I made the white 
ball move in order now they are going to have equal numbers'. Paul (6 10/12 year-old boY) 
also expressed this 'uncontrollable' idea about the white ball. He also decided to control 
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the fair global outcome of the movement in a different way, attempting to make all the 
balls bounce around, collecting points. 
Paul: Ok now! Ah! I know what to do! 
rT- 
Be changes the balls and the speed again. 
Researcher: The blues have more points than the reds. 
Paul: Do you know what to do? We can take out all the white balls and give speed 
to the red and blue balls ... when the blue touches a blue or a red touches a red 
ball, it gets two points otherwise it gets one point. 
Paul gave movement to the red and blue balls and decided to change the rules under which 
points were scored and the mixture of the balls was made more complex. A similar attempt 
to change the system for a fair outcome based on the arbitrary movement of the white ball 
was George's (a 6 8/12 year-old boy) idea: 
George: I have an idea. If the red touches the blue then it will 
be better. I will make the red smaller in order to move 
and touch the blue ball and then they will get the same 
points. Wow... It is a good idea! Bang! I will do 
something else. I will make these small and start the 
game. 
Figure 6.8: George's idea of 
changing the mechanism of 
the lottery machine 
Again, George wanted to avoid the 'uncontrollable' movement of the white ball, moving 
around and collecting points. So, he decided to make the red ball move around so that it 
would touch the blue ball to get one point for the reds and one point for the blues, in order 
that the game would be fair. 
This section has considered children's focus on the short term and long-term movement of 
the white ball. In the following section, I present cases where children's constructions 
focused on the position of the white ball in the lottery machine. 
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6.3 The position of the bouncing ball and the children's construction of 
sample spaces 
The children's thinking about the spatial arrangement of the lottery machine can be 
categorised in two broad classes concerning how children thought about the position of the 
white ball. The analysis of the data presented here was based on code D2.2.2: Change the 
starting place of the white ball (see in section 4.3.5), which refers to children's expressions 
on the place of the white ball. The analysis in this section divided children's expressions on 
two categories: a. when the position of the bouncing ball matters (14 out of 23 expressed 
this idea at the beginning of the game), and b. where the position of the bouncing ball does 
not matter (22 out of 23 expressed this idea at the end of the game). 
6.3.1 The position of the bouncing ball matters 
In Rachel's case, it seemed the position of the white ball played a role in her fair and unfair 
constructions. 
Rachel: The ball will move down and get the same scores. 
I think the ball will move like this and this and 
this. 
Researcher: How will the ball move? 
Rachel: The ball, if it wants to touch the blue ball it will 
also touch the red ball as well. Or, it can move 
here and here. 
She starts the game. The white ball did not touch 
any coloured balls. 
Rachel: Well, I can also do something else, but I have to 
stop and start the game again. 
Researcher: That's ok! 
Rachel: I need to copy this... Ok! That's it. 
cl 
Figure 6.9: Rachel's first 
construction where the 
position of the bouncing ball 
matters 
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0 
Researcher: What will we get now? 
Rachel: Equal scores. The poor space kid will be there, 
getting rest. Let me start it. 
She starts the game. 
Rachel: D you know something? If I put a bail like this 
then the white ball will move like this and we get 
equal scores. Look! 25-27! 1 will try this idea now. 
She stops the game. 
Rachel: I will do something else to the balls. I will get the 
magic wand and copy one blue here and one red. 
We will have definitely equal scores. 
Researcher: Why are you so sure? 
Rachel: I don't know, but you will see. That's it. 
She starts the game. 
Figure 6.10: Rachel's 
second construction where 
the position of the ball 
matters 
Figure 6.11: Rachel's final 
construction for a fair 
sample space where the 
position of the bouncing ball 
matters 
In this episode, Rachel made three attempts to construct fair spatial representations. 
Actually, the last one did not substantially change from the first representation. The only 
issue for Rachel was the placement of the white ball. In her first construction, the white 
ball was in a symmetrical position between the coloured balls, but it could not bounce, as it 
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did not touch any ball. So, instead of changing the position of the white ball, Rachel 
Preferred to change the place of the coloured balls and, eventually, to introduce more of 
them in the lottery machine. She did not want to destroy the symmetrical position of the 
white ball, although, in these constructions, the position of the white ball would not affect 
the probability of an event. However, Rachel's strategy suggests that she wanted to place 
the white ball in the middle in order to construct a fair sample space and that she was 
concerned with the axis of symmetry. The white ball, in Rachel's fair constructions, always 
lay on a symmetrical axis of the coloured balls. Perhaps this 'invisible' axis was the 
concept behind the symmetrical arrangement of the coloured balls each time. This kind of 
strategy was very common in constructing fairness (see the following chapter, section 7.2). 
In many of Rachel's asymmetrical constructions of unfairness the position of the white ball 
also plays a role, being placed in an asymmetrical configuration. 
Rachel: I will do something ok! I will make them bigger! 
This is what I want to do. 
Researcher: What are you doing? 
Rachel: Whatever is in my mind! I don't know... Destroy 
them... and make these big enough. Oh ... oh. I want 
to put these two together. Let's start the game. 
0 
She starts the game. 
Researcher: Let's see if it is going to get any points ... 
Rachel: I am telling you it won't get any points .... 
Only one 
is ok! Oh another one ... oh ... 
it stopped 2-19! That's 
good. I will do something else... You will see what 
happens! 
Figure 6.12: Rachel's first 
unfair construction where 
the place of the ball 
matters 
I1 
She starts the game 
Figure 6.13: Rachel's 
second unfair construction 
where the position of the 
bouncing ball matters 
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Rachel: Nothing at all! No points... I made it so small we 
cannot even see it! Excellent! Did you see it? Yes! 
The position of the white ball in these constructions seems to be influenced by her thinking 
about the short-term movement of the white ball. This is the reason that the result of her 
first trial was not as successful as she wanted. Eventually, she succeeded in getting the 
desired outcome, by making the blue ball smaller than before to decrease the probability of 
getting it. It can be said that here, where the balls were placed in asymmetrical form, the 
position of the white ball was not influenced by any 'invisible' axis, but rather it was 
connected with the short-term movement of the ball: Rachel wanted to trap, not very 
effectively, the white ball between the two red balls, as she wanted to increase the 
probability of the reds. 
Another case concerning the position of the white ball in an unfair construction, influenced 
by short-term movements, is that of Nichol (7 8/12 year-old girl). 
Nichol: Now the space kid will move down ... 5 reds and 
5 
blues, but the blue front balls are more, the white ball 
will move like this and touch the most. It is a bit mixed 
up, but not exactly. 
She starts the game. 
Figure 6.14: Nichol's unfair 
construction where the 
position of the bouncing 
ball matters 
Nichol based her decision on the short-term movement of the white ball and because she 
wanted the blue to win she placed more blue balls near the white ball. 
On the other hand, there were also some cases where the position of the white ball played 
an important role in the spatial construction of unfairness focused on the 
long-term 
movement of the white ball, where blue or red balls trap it. For example, 
in Lucy's unfair 
spatial arrangement, for blues to win, the place of the white 
ball makes a difference in her 
construction. 
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Lucy: I will put the red ball on the edges. I will do a wall 
with the balls and I put the white ball on the blue balls. 
0 ým 
00 
Figure 6.15: Lucy's unfair 
construction where the 
position of the bouncing ball 
matters 
Lucy here tried to trap the white ball and make the space kid get easily to the blue planet. It 
can be concluded here that Lucy wanted to set up a separate sample space of blues. She 
made a 'blue wall', so that the white ball was trapped and it was very difficult to touch any 
red balls. Not only did the number of the balls essentially increased the probability of 
getting blue, but also was the spatial arrangement of the balls and the placement of the 
white ball. The following section describes some of the cases where the position of the 
bouncing ball did not matter. 
6.3.2 The position of the bouncing ball does not matter 
Almost all the children (22 out of 23), after playing the game and seeing the movement of 
the ball in the long term decided that the position of the white ball in a fair environment 
does not matter. For example, in John's (6 10/12 year-old boy) case of constructing a fair 
environment with the same number of balls in two separate 'teams', he placed the white 
ball in a place, so as to influence the long-term movement of the white ball. 
John: Let me copy some.... 1,2 ... 5 blue and I will copy 5 
here. 1,, 2,.. 5 red balls! 
Figure 6.16: John's 
construction where the 
position of the ball does not 
matter 
John constructed two similar spatial arrangements of the two colours, indicating in a way 
the equality of these two arrangements. I expected John to place the white ball in the 
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middle, as 14 out of 23 children did at the beginning, to show the axis of symmetry 
between the two teams. But John was more influenced by the long-term movement of the 
ball- he thought that the place of the white ball would not play a role for his desired result. 
The same happened with Cathy (7 6/12 year-old girl), who she also did not place the white 
ball in the middle of her fair construction. 
Cathy: I will destroy some balls. Now, I have three reds 
and two blues ... I will destroy another ball from the 
reds. Let me see how I will arrange them... Hm 
Researcher: How did you arrange them? 
C: I placed them in a way to move up and down. 
U 
Figure 6.17: Cathy's 
construction where the 
position of the ball does not 
matter 
Cathy describes her decision here without worrying where she had placed the white ball. 
As Simon (7 10/12 year-old boy) said in a similar construction 'It doesn't matter where 
you placed the white ball. It will move in different ways. Diagonal, zic-zac ... somehow ... it 
is bizarre... Wherever you placed it, it will slip over and touch the balls... ' This 'bizarre' 
movement made 22/23 children to think at the end that it does not matter where the white 
ball is placed in a fair sample space, as it will 'slip over' and get the other balls. The 
children realised the limitation of being able to find the exact movement of the ball. It can 
be said that this realisation was the point where children started to think about the 
existence of randomness, described by Simon as a 'bizarre' happening in their game. 
The final section will describe how children connected the local events, either by the rules 
or by the long-term movement of the white ball, with the global events, the scorers or the 
movement of the space kid. 
6.4 The children's connection of local and global events 
The connection between the movement of the white ball, getting points and making the 
space kid move up and 
down seemed to be for all children an easy target to achieve, as 
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they were familiar with making rules and connecting one object with the another in the 
game (see section 4.3.2). Of course, this was an intention of the design, for children to 
have both local and global events (see Chapter Three, section 3.4.1) on the screen and to 
use this visualisation to make connections. Some evidence of using the visualisation comes 
from Simon's reaction when he started the game: 
Researcher: Would you like to start the game and tell me what happens? 
Simon: This little ball is moving and when it touches the balls it moves up and 
down and this triangle (the space kid) moves up and down and opens its 
wings. 
R: When does it move up? 
S: It moves ... Ah! We have these counters that count how many times the 
white ball touched the blue and the red balls. 
For Simon it was easy just to watch the. game and describe what was happening. On the 
other hand, Mathew (7 year-old boy) wanted to be surer of how the game was working and 
he examined the rules of each object. 
Mathew: I cannot imagine the rules, but... I think the space kid will move up when it 
(the white ball) touches the red and when it touches the blue ball to go 
down. Can I find out? Let me see... 'When it gets the blue envelope (iconic 
for message) to move down, when it gets the red envelope to move upl. 
Researcher: Where are these envelopes coming from? 
A From the counters. Let me see... 'When the game starts it counts from zero 
and when it gets a red envelope it adds one point'.... Ah! I know. The 
counter gives it to the space kid and moves up... Ah... they get the 
envelope. Let me see these rules for a minute! It shows the same thing 
'when the game starts is zero and when it gets the blue envelope it adds 
onel. 
R: Who is sending these envelopes? 
A Let me see whether the blue has a rule... It does! 'When I touch something 
I push it back and I send a blue envelope ..... ah... it is sending the blue 
message ... when I touch the white 
ball I push it back and get points. Let me 
see the red one ... it is the same 'when 
I touch the white ball I push it back 
and send a red message to the space kid and to the red counter'. Ah! These 
are sending the messages when the white ball touches them! 
Mathew here developed an understanding of the game and the connection between sample 
space and global outcomes 
by using the rules of the game. But, how did these connections 
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affect children's probabilistic decisions? The following paragraphs illustrate some extracts 
of how children made their probabilistic decisions. 
Jane first made her fair construction and then she used the global effect of it to decide 
whether her sample space was fair or not. 
Jane: I can make the red bigger as well. 
Researcher: And then? 
J: The scorers will be equal. 
She takes the star tool and she makes the red ball 
bigger. 
Figure 6.18: Jane's fair 
construction based on the 
global effect 
J: I think the red will win. 
R: Why is that? 
J: I think I made it a little bigger than the other... We 
can open the game and if the scorers are the same 
that means that they have the same size, otherwise 
the one is bigger than the other. 
R: What about the space kid? 
J: 1f it is as now that means our balls have the same 
size 
Fairness in Jane's sample space was judged from the global outcome of the game. Jane had 
in her mind that in order for her environment to be fair the balls should have the same size. 
The scorers and the space kid shaped her decision as to whether these two balls had the same 
size or the one was bigger than the other. 
Anne (6 10/12 year-old girl) used the global outcome of the game (the sounds) to show that 
her fair construction was working. 
Anne: It didn't work! I will do something else now I'm 
making it a little fairer. I want the balls a bit more 
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nearly. 
900 
Researcher: Do you think now it's going to work? 
A: Let's see... 
She switches the game on. 
It's working!! It's near the yellow line! It should go 
'boo', booing', 'boo'... 
She uses the sound that the space kid makes when it 
moves up and down. 
R: Why do you think is working now? 
A: Eh ... they (the points on the scores) are near! 
She switches o the game and changes the sounds. I'm ff 
making the same sound! 
R: Do you want to have the same sounds? 
A: Yes ... because if you are at the other side of the room, 
you won't know which ball it was touching. What I 
want you to do is to go to the other side and try it out! 
Figure 6.19: Anne's 
construction based on the 
global outcomes 
R: Ok ... Shall I just shut my eyes? 
A: Ok! Ready? 
Anne here expressed her belief that her construction is fair by changing the sounds of the 
space kid and making them the same. Perhaps what she wanted to show was that the total of 
the two different sounds would be the same, as the space kid was going to stay near the 
yellow line and the global outcome of her fair game would be neutral. Also she asked me to 
go to the other side of the room to tell her which balls the white ball was touching. She might 
have wanted to show that in the long term for a fair probabilistic game I would not be able to 
distinguish which event on a short term is winning. 
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6.5 Summary of Chapter Six and provisional findings 
This chapter described how the children in this study linked the local and global events of 
the lottery game. The continuous 2-dimensional movement in the lottery machine appeared 
to provide a rationale for children to connect the short-term behaviour of the game with the 
long-term outcome. It was also a way for children to accept that the movement of the ball 
was arbitrary, and furthermore to accept the existence of randomness in the game. The 
analysis of data has shown that all the twenty-three children paid attention to the position 
of the bouncing ball in the construction of their sample space when they were focusing on 
the short-term behaviour. The starting point of the white ball was an invisible axis of their 
construction. The episodes considered here lead to the following provisional findings, 
some analytical points that emerge from the local analysis of the data-at-hand, but which 
will be fleshed out in more detail in the final chapter when it can be looked at more 
globally in relation to other data and findings from the theoretical framework of the thesis 
outlined in earlier chapters. 
Provisional finding 6.1: All the children tried to find patterns to 'explain' the movement of 
the white ball. These patterns were based on the path traced by the white ball in order to 
'achieve' a hit. However, because of the continuous movement of the ball it quickly 
became impossible for them to predict. It was this impossibility that led to the 
interpretation of the ball's movement as 'arbitrary'. This arbitrary movement was the 
'urging force' for children to express their ideas for randomness. 
Provisional finding 6.2: It might have been expected from the children's age that 
constructing a meaning for randomness would be extremely difficult. A reason for that 
would be that children of this age tend to focus on controlling the 'thing' that delivers 
randomness. However, the episodes above indicate that in the dynamic/spatial medium of 
expression provided by the lottery game (placement of balls, changes of size and number) 
children did construct meanings for randomness in the sense that they realised the need to 
control the outcome without controlling the random movement. 
The next chapter describes how the children experienced fairness and unfairness in their 
lottery games. These episodes mainly occurred when children sought to find ways to 
control the outcomes of the game, after having connected local and global events, and 
having accepted the existence of randomness. 
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CHAPTERSEVEN 
The Construction of Fairness and Unfairness 
'I like to have fairness 
... that they had the same score... Because they didn't 
get one more than the other. They got almost the same numbers, may be a little 
9 more. It is fair both of them to win ... they are not going to cry and fight . 
(Anthony, 5 and 10 months year-old boy) 
7.1 Overview 
Like the previous chapter, this chapter is also part of the Phase 2, learning investigation 
phase, and the data analysed in this chapter came from the final iteration (iteration 3). The 
final iteration involved children working with the 'Space Kid' and its focus was on 
describing and analysing how the game mediated the children's expression of chance 
events. This chapter will be divided into three parts. The first part deals with faimess, and 
the strategies that children employed in order to construct a fair environment. These 
strategies can be seen as falling into two categories, symmetrical and asymmetrical. The 
second part describes how children constructed unfaimess in their games, illustrating how 
children built unfair situations and how they handled certain and impossible events. The 
final part of this chapter gives a summary of the chapter and some further analysis and 
provisional findings of the data that have been described in the previous two parts. 
7.2 Fairness 
As the game consisted of two 'teams', the blue and the red team, all the children expressed 
the idea to create a sample space where these two teams would get equal points. As 
Anthony described, fairness in a game is something that 'makes you not cry', so it is an 
important factor for playing a game. John (6 10/12 year-old boy) also explained that 
fairness was something that was 'good' and 'right' to have in a game. 
Researcher: Ok ... Let me copy another 
blue ball ... (there is one red ball and one blue ball 
in the lottery machine). 
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John: Why? Don't! 
R: Why? We can do that with the magic wand. 
J: No! You cannot do that! It is not right, it is not fair! 
This children's wish to play a fair game was a strong motivation for them to construct a 
fair random sample space. After Chris' (7 8/12 year-old boy) first attempt to construct a 
fair sample space, he stated that fairness was not an easy thing to construct in a 
probabilistic game. 
Chris: Oh ... it moves upwards... I don't know what to do. I will try something 
else ... You know, it is too difficult to do it! 
Researcher: Why is it too difficult? 
C: We don't know how this is moving... I will try something else. 
The uncontrolled movement of the white ball made fairness in the game a difficult 
condition to be achieved, but an interesting one to be constructed. The analysis of the data 
presented here was mainly based on Code D3.1: Construction of fairness (see Chapter 
Four, section 4.3.5), which referred on the children's expressions of constructing fairness. 
The following section describes children's strategies for constructing a fair environment; 
these can be seen as falling into two categories, symmetrical spatial representations and 
asymmetrical spatial representations. 
7.3 Strategies for the construction of fairness 
The strategies that children developed for constructing a fair environment can be generally 
divided into two categories with several sub-categories: 
a. Symmetrical spatial representations: symmetrical balls, symmetrical 
groups of balls, making patterns, making circles 
b. Asymmetrical spatial representations: equal number and size of two 
balls, mixed up balls: equal number and size of balls, different size 
and number of balls 
The analysis of the data presented on the first category (symmetrical spatial 
representations) was mainly based on Codes D3.1.1: Moving and changing the 
number of the elements of sample space with its sub codes D3.1.1.1: 
Symmetrical 
teams, D3.1.1.2: Making a pattern, D3.2.2.3: Making circles. The analysis of the data 
presented on the second category 
(asymmetrical spatial representations) was mainly 
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based on Codes D3.1.2: Changing the size of the elements of sample space, D3.1.3: 
Changing the arrangement of the balls and D3.2: Construction of unfairness (see 
Chapter Four, section 4.3.5). 
7.3.1 Symmetry of placement to represent fairness 
Twenty-two out of the twenty-three children tried to achieve a fair game by placing the 
balls symmetrically. Their representations of a fair sample space were associated strongly 
with symmetry, expressed by: a. constructing symmetrical balls, b. constructing 
symmetrical teams, c. making patterns and d. making circles 
7.3.1.1 Representation of fairness with symmetrical balls 
Children used 'symmetrical balls' for construction of a sample space where the two 
colours were to have the same probability of an event. The characteristic of this strategy is 
that the symmetrical position of the balls matter. Children who constructed an environment 
by using this strategy were very concerned about where each ball was placed, as Mathew 
(a 6 year-old boy) described for his construction 
Mathew: The trick is to put them separately, near the white ball 
and get the same points, near to each other in the 
middle. Oh... It gets the red more times .... It needs 
another 4 points to be equal... Ops ... Come 
on ... come on.... again ... 
Equal! 
Figure 7.1: Mathew's fair 
symmetrical construction 
Mathew found that the 'trick' of fairness in the sample space was to have symmetry 
between the two balls. He connected fairness with the idea of balance. The blue ball was 
placed near the red one and the white ball was placed in the middle, showing the 
symmetrical axis. Tom (7 year-old boy) made a similar construction. He also placed the 
two balls symmetrically. 
- 136- 
7. The construction of fairness and unfairness 
Tom: Let me check the rules again... Ok! I will change the 
size of this ball and I will make this to be the same. I 
will put them like this. I will make the white balls 
bigger. Ok. I will move them like this 
0 
0 
0 
R: How did you place them? 
T: One to the one side and the other to the other side. 
Figure 7.2: Tom's fair 
symmetrical construction 
Tom constructed fairness in the game by having balls on opposite sides of sample space, 
equidistant from the centre. Tom also made the balls bigger than before, so that it 'is sure 
that we are going to get 100 points quickly'. (This quantitative aspect of randomness will 
be analysed in Chapter Eight. ) 
Symmetry between the balls was also expressed in Simon's (7 10/12 year-old boy) 
construction. He placed his construction by placing each blue ball symmetrically with a red 
one. 
R: What are you trying to do? 
Simon: Something alike a cross. The (white) ball will touch 
each ball 
Figure 7.3: Simon's fair 
symmetrical construction 
Simon's symmetrical construction needs to have each blue and red ball in a particular place 
and each pair symmetrically placed with another. His construction was made in a way such 
that the collisions with either colour had the same probability of occurring. This was 
achieved by placing the balls symmetrically, so that when the white ball touches one 
colour it should touch the other colour as well. This construction might 
be seen as a 
construction based on thinking about individual events in the 
lottery machine. 
- 137- 
7. The construction of fairness and unfairness 
Getting a big score quickly was also what made Karen (7 3/12 year-old girl) put more balls 
into her fair construction, placing the balls again in a symmetrical position. She worked 
with the balls both individually and as groups. 
Karen: I put here one red and one blue and then three red 
balls and three blue balls. 
0 
* (. 1 
Figure 7.4: Karen's fair 
symmetrical construction 
Karen's description shows the way that she thought of placing the balls inside the sample 
space. She first described the place of the two single balls, which put in the middle with the 
white ball between them, and then she described the other balls of each colour, referred to 
them as two groups of three balls placed in symmetrical positions. 
There were eighteen out of the twenty-three children who represented fairness with a 
symmetrical ball construction. The children who made this construction were very 
concerned about where each ball was placed. The blue ball was placed symmetrically to 
the red one and many times the white ball was placed in the middle, showing an 'invisible' 
symmetrical axis. It seems that the children who started with a symmetrical placement of 
individual balls developed their representation to symmetrical groups of balls. In fact, 
working with symmetrical groups was another common strategy for the construction of 
fairness, as described in the next sub-section. 
7.3.1.2 Representation of fairness with symmetrical groups of balls 
In this strategy children did not seem to care so much where each individual ball was 
placed. They were concerned with the positioning of groups of balls, seeing the behaviour 
of the sample space in the long term. This is obvious in Brian's construction (6 6/12 year- 
old boy), who not only separated the two colours, but also made this clear by putting lines 
between the two teams, defining new rules for these new objects. 
Brian: I want to make a line... I will blow this ball... I know, I 
will do something. 
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r-T - he separates the two colours and he constructs a new 
object 
R: What do you want to do? 
B: I need a rule for this object. 'When the ball touches me, 
I take all the messages from all the red balls and I give 
them to the red scorer'. I need the same to happen to the 
blue balls. 
Figure 7.5: Brian's fair 
construction with 
symmetrical groups 
Brian made it obvious in this construction that he treated the coloured balls as separate 
teams, putting a line between them and distinguishing them. As his rules were stating, he 
wanted the balls to give messages to the two lines to add a point to the scorers. Brian used 
this approach to prevent any possibility for the white ball to remain in the gaps between the 
balls, a possibility that he had seen earlier. 
The separation of the balls into two groups was also expressed by Karen's final 
construction of fairness. 
Karen: I just thought of it! Look! This will be my last try! 
That's it! Two lines. 
Figure 7.6: Karen's 
separation of the two groups 
Karen separated the two groups symmetrically, putting a brick between them, which 
had 
the rule (see section 3.3.3) 'when I am touching any object I bounce it off'. 
This brick 
aimed to reflect off the white balls. Her actions suggest that she might 
have thought to 
have two separate sample spaces, one for each colour each with its own white 
ball inside 
so as to collect the same number of points. 
She was trying to have an equiprobable 
sample space by dividing it 
into two parts one for the one event and one for the other. 
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Jane also described the construction of two symmetrical groups: 
Jane: I'll put near all the red balls and then all the blue ones. 
Then, I will take these two teams and I will put them near 
each other. 
She starts the game. 
J: Oh! They are equal! 
00 
Figure 7.7: Jane's fair 
construction of symmetrical 
groups 
In Jane's idea, the two groups were placed near to each other and the white ball was placed 
in the middle. 
Simon also worked with symmetrical teams: 
Simon: ... Let me show you ... This will go 
here and this one 
here ... I think is ok! It will move up the same times that 
it will move down. 
S: Ok! I can do it! That's ok! I added another blue and 
another red ball. 
"U 
. 
Figure 7.8: Simon's first 
construction of two 
symmetrical groups 
Figure 7.9: Simon's fair 
construction of symmetrical 
balls and groups 
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S: You know something. I will add some more balls. I will 
put these balls together ... to communicate (he laughs). 
0 
0 
Figure 7.10: Simon's final 
fair symmetrical 
construction 
R: What do you think will happen? 
S: We are going to have a better result. 
Simon first constructed a sample space with two symmetrical teams with the same number 
of balls, and then he continued his construction by adding two more balls. He placed them 
by having in mind an imaginary diagonal symmetry axis. He finished his construction by 
placing another two balls symmetrically, having now a vertical and horizontal symmetry 
axis. 
A different approach was Fiona's (7 year-old girl) first construction of fairness, which also 
has to do with two symmetrical teams, but not with equality of numbers. As she explained: 
Fiona: Our task is to make the blue score to get as many 
points as the red score. So, I put them like this. First of 
all, let's put this here. Number five. This to go there 
and another two changes. I think it will keep that on 
the line. I am trying to make this remain stay. Let's try 
it out. 
40. '04 , ooooo 
0 
0000"o 
0 Wo 
Figure 7.11: Fiona's 
symmetrical fair 
construction 
As she explained, the reason behind this construction was to make the space kid stay near 
the yellow line. It seems from her sample space that she tried to contain the white ball 
between the blue and the red rows; she did not care about counting the number of the balls, 
Generally, twenty out of the twenty-three children represented fairness with symmetrical 
groups of balls. In this strategy children expressed an idea of having two separated sample 
spaces, one for each colour, with the same structure and working in parallel to collect the 
same number of points. Furthermore, Fiona's symmetrical fair spatial representation 
did 
not work. The blues got more points than the reds 
because the white balls were blocked in 
the upper part of the sample space. She also expressed 
her representation of fairness by 
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separating the two events, implying two separate sample spaces. But, the way she 
constructed these two sample spaces was biased. This caused her to move to a new 
construction, by placing the balls in a patterned way. Her idea is described in the next 
subsection, which illustrates how children made patterns for constructing a fair sample 
space. 
7.3.1.3 Representation of fairness with a pattern 
In Fiona's use of pattern, she first constructed one line of balls and then repeated it in order 
to develop her pattern. As she described: 
Fiona: I am making this on a line, so ... if it goes like that it 
will stay around the line. Then, I have to repeat 
this ... because I have all the balls like that ... Here 
So, it's like a pattern on a line. 
Researcher: Will it help you? 
F: I think so... So let's put this here... Now it will 
work! Yeah... If we put this here.... That's ok! It 
has to work! 
R: Why does it have to work? 
F: I put them all in a different place. That has to 
work! 
00 000 00 
(D eo 
0 0 0 011 
000 0 0 
00 
0 0 0 00 
Figure 7.12: Fiona's 
patterned fair construction 
Fiona was very positive that this construction would work. The idea was to create first the 
4sample' line of the pattern and then to repeat it until the yellow square was filled. This 
solution for Fiona had to work, and her feeling that it is 'correct' was very strong. Patterns 
were also used as a way to have an equal number of red and blue balls, without counting. 
Lucy, in a similar construction, described how a pattern was working 
Lucy: They are going to have equal numbers. It (the white ball) will move up, on 
the edges ... the 
ball will get the same points. I will also copy another white 
ball to move quickly ... They will 
become rows. 
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She starts the game. 
Researcher: What happens? Where do the white balls go? 
Lucy: It goes everywhere ... around the balls. They have equal numbers now! I 
got one ball and another. I made a row and then another row and I made 
the white ball to move in a way and now they are going to have the same 
numbers. 
The logic behind this was for one colour to be near the other, so that when the white ball 
was going to touch one colour it would touch the other as well. 
Chris' (7 8/12 year-old boy) idea was a combination of symmetrical groups and making 
pattems. 
R: What are you doing? 
C: I am arranging one red, one blue, one red, one blue. I am 
building a wall! 
R: Ah! Why have you made a wall? 
You will see! 
. 
S 
Figure 7.13: Chris' 
patterned and symmetrical 
groups fair construction 
Chris first made a sample space in which the two teams were spatially separated. He added 
a wall of alternately placed red and blue balls. He seemed to construct this wall as an 
expression of having two separate sample spaces. As is shown from this construction of 
fairness, a strategy does not always operate alone; children may combine several strategies 
in order to achieve the wanted result. A patterned spatial arrangement of the events was 
expressed by twelve children. The logic behind this was for the balls of one colour to be so 
near to balls of the other colour that if the white ball touched one colour it would touch the 
other as well. The next section refers to a symmetric circle representation of fairness. 
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7.3.1.4 Representation of fairness with circles 
Another symmetrical strategy that eight out of twenty-three children used for the 
construction of fairness was to make circles and trap the moving balls inside them. In 
Cathy's (7 6/12 year-old girl) case, a pattern was developed into a circle. 
Cathy: Let me see ... ok! I will put it here... But, will it move 
where I want? ... I will put these two there. Ok! I will 
put the white ball in the middle to get every ball. It is 
like a cross! Let's try it out! 
She starts the game. 
Cathy: ... Eh ... Let me copy one to have a look ... Ok! Another 
little ball. Move this a little bit. 1,2,3 ... Let's start it. 
0 
Figure 7.14: Cathy's cross 
construction 
000 
Figure 7.15: Cathy's cross 
construction developed into 
a circle 
Cathy here first decided to make a pattern, a 'cross' as she called it, and tried it out to see 
whether it was working. As this did not work in the short-term, she decided to bring the red 
balls closer, add another white ball, and this developed into a patterned circle. The idea of 
the circle was for the white balls to touch the red or the blue balls the same number of 
times. The circular arrangement of balls emerged in an attempt to place the balls 
equidistantly from the centre. In Anne's (6 6/12 year-old girl) case, a circle turned out to be 
the starting point for a symmetrical development. Anne started by having the white ball 
in 
a circle and then constructed another symmetrical random representation by copying more 
balls. 
Anne: ... 
I'm going to make all the balls have the same 
size. I'll do another arrangement. 
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Researcher: So, what are you doing now? 
* 
00 
Anne: I'll make more copies of them. 
She starts the game. 
Researcher: Oh 
... does it work? 
Anne: Yeah ... It keeps going up, down, up, down 
Researcher: Ok! 
Anne: I'll make more copies... 
She stops the game. 
Researcher: What's the arrangement now? 
Anne: That one (the blue ball) is facing that one (the 
red ball) and that one is facing that one and so 
on... I've got also a better idea! They (the red 
balls) will be opposite a blue one. There! 
Researcher: What did you do? 
Anne: The blue ones are facing the red ones and the red 
ones are facing the blue ones. 
Researcher: Ok! What number will you have here (on the 
scorers)? 
Anne: I don't know, I'll try it out! 
She starts the game. 
Figure 7.16: Anne's fair 
circle construction 
Ire 
g0 
&to 
0*, ' cý 
' 00 0, 
b 
Figure 7.17: Anne's circle 
construction developed into 
a patterned symmetrical one 
Anne here thought about making a circle and placing the balls in a patterned way. Although, 
her construction was working from the beginning, she decided to develop her sample space 
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into a symmetrical form with red and blue balls facing each other, so that each ball to be 
selected by the white ball the same times as the others. 
Irene (7 6/12 year-old girl) also developed an idea for a patterned circle, when she decided 
to add more balls to her lottery machine. 
Irene: I will get this blue ball, put it where the red was 
and I will place the red near to it, such as to have 
blue, red, blue 
Researcher: Why are you doing this? 
Irene: I am making it like a pattern because with this way 
they could have equal points! Is it right? 
R: There is no right and wrong... I just need your 
ideas! 
1: Ok... I think now it's ok! 
000 
00 00 
She starts the game. 
1: Oh... you bad red balls! Oh ... 
look! 21-21! 
Something happens! Look we have equal numbers! 
(She laughs). They got 61 points!... Oh ... it is ok! 
Wow... 102! 104! Oh it moved down... 112-122... 
Oh, the poor space kid! It moves up now! Oups! 
A... It seems to move up now... Ahhhhhhhhhhh 
207-207! She laughs! 
Figure 7.18: Irene's semi- 
circle fair construction 
Irene's construction of a fair sample space empowered her thinking about symmetry and 
she continued to construct sample spaces by surrounding the white 
ball in a patterned way. 
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Irene: I will make something else. I found the way! 
Figure 7.19: Irene's 
patterned fair construction 
Her idea of 'surrounding' the white ball and making a pattern was to 'control' the white 
ball in a way, touching both blue and red balls the same number of times. As she said 'it is 
better for both colours to get the same points on the counters'. 
It appears from the data that symmetrical placement is a very useful strategy for children to 
construct a fair environment. Twenty-two out of twenty-three children used one or more 
symmetrical strategies to construct their fair environment and twenty of them were 
satisfied with their constructed result. The fact of using so many symmetrical 
representations for constructing a fair environment shows that the children associated very 
strongly fairness with symmetry. Where children tried more than one symmetrical strategy 
in their game, it might be because even if their construction did not work in the short-term 
they tried to make another symmetrical representation for the construction of fairness. 
Table 7.1 shows which strategy each child used and how many children of the 23 used 
each of this strategy. 
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Symmetrical Strategy 
Name Age 
(Y: M) 
Sex Symmetrical 
balls 
Symmetrical 
groups 
Making Patterns Making circles 
Anne 6: 10 F 
Anthony 5: 10 M 
Brian 6: 6 M 
Cathy 7: 6 F 
Chris 7: 8 M 
Demis 7: 5 M 
Fiona 7 F 
George 6: 8 M 
Helen 7: 6 F 
Irene 7: 6 F 
Jane 6: 7 F 
John 6: 10 M 
Karen 7: 3 F 
Lucy 7: 8 F 
Mathew 7 M 
Nichol 7: 8 F 
Orestis 7 M 
Paul 6: 10 M 
Rachel 7: 3 F 
Simon 7: 10 M 
Tom 7 M 
Victoria 6: 6 F 
Zeta 6: 4 F 
The total number of 
children (out of 23) 18 20 12 
8 
Table 7.1: The total number of children constructing different symmetrical strategies for fairness 
Table 7.1 shows that the children tended to construct more than one symmetrical strategy 
in their game, or used a combination of strategies. Symmetrical balls and symmetrical 
groups were the two strategies that most of the children used for constructing a fair 
environment, and as the data show 22 out of 23 children used at least one of these two 
strategies. The children who constructed a symmetrical balls strategy tended also to 
construct a symmetrical groups strategy, after they had linked local and global events. It 
was also noteworthy that of the eight children who constructed a 'making circles' 
symmetrical strategy, five of them also constructed a strategy of making patterns. 
The data 
presented here also show that children instead of looking 
for symmetrical ways to describe 
the random behaviour developed symmetrical representations 
for constructing a random 
fair environment. Table 7.1 also shows that one child, 
George, did not express any 
symmetrical strategy, but 
he constructed an asymmetrical one for expressing fairness. The 
24 All names of the children are pseudonyms. 
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following section illustrates another way of representing fairness that was developed by 
using asymmetrical representations. The table also shows that the sex and the age of the 
children did not influence their decisions of constructing unfairness in their game. 
7.3.2 Asymmetrical spatial representations of fairness 
Table 7.1 shows that 22/23 children tried to construct a symmetrical spatial representation 
for the construction of a fair environment. It also shows that 22/23 of them used multiple 
strategies. Fifteen out of twenty-three children also used asymmetrical spatial 
representations of fairness, basing their decisions on short term and long term movements 
of the ball. These strategies had the following characteristics: a. equal number and size of 
two balls (7/23) and b. mixed up balls (11/23), which can be also divided into: equal 
number and size of balls (10/23) and different number and/or size of balls (7/23). 
7.3.2.1 Representation of fairness with an equal size of two balls 
This strategy occurred when children wanted to have two balls in their sample space and 
they were not concerned about their spatial arrangement. The fair environment played a 
major role in helping Jane (6 7/12 year-old girl) to recognise the importance of whether 
two balls were equal in size or not. As she said 'if one of the balls is bigger, it (the white 
ball) will touch the most of the time, because the ball takes up more space in the yellow 
square'. Her criterion for whether the two balls had the same size is if they get the same 
score, and thus the game was fair. 
Jane: I think the red will win. 
Researcher: Why is that? 
Jane: I think I made it a little bigger than the other... We 
can start the game and if the scorers are the same 
that means they have the same size, otherwise the 
one is bigger than the other. 
R: What about the space kid? 
J: if it is as now (on the yellow line) that means our 
balls have the same size 
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She starts the game. 
0 
Figure 7.20: Jane's 
asymmetrical fair 
construction 
J: You see, now it means that they have the same 
size. Our space kid is near the yellow line. 
Jane looked at the effects of the outcome of the lottery machine and she used the global 
events, the scorers and the space kid, to see whether her environment was fair. She made a 
connection between the spatial appearance of the sample space and the possible outcome 
from the game in the longer term. Her construction implies that she realised the arbitrary 
movement of the ball and she was not concerned with where to place the two balls, but to 
make them have the same size. 
The children who used this strategy based their idea on the view that there are two events 
in the game, so by having two equal sized red and blue balls in our lottery machine we 
achieve fairness (the two events become equiprobable). Fairness was a 'data condition' in 
their game and was used by them to be sure that the two balls were equal in size. In this 
construction fairness was achieved by the placing of the balls, controlling the size of the 
balls and making connections between the spatial appearance of sample space and the 
possible outcome of the game in the longer term. The eight children who used this strategy 
seemed to find it easier to handle two global events by having only two local events in 
their lottery machine, only two balls, and they decided to make these balls bigger than the 
default size, but the number to stay the same as the global events of the game. Next, I will 
describe constructions, which mix up more than two balls to produce a fair representation. 
7.3.2.2 Representation of fairness with mixed balls 
Mixed balls constructions have more than two balls in the lottery machine and show a 
different kind of thinking about the two global events. Children in this case did not connect 
the number of the global events with the number of the events 
in their lottery machine and 
they used more than two balls in their lottery machine and mixed them up. 
The children 
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developed this strategy after they watched the continuous arbitrary movement of the white 
ball and realised that the white ball does not follow a patterned movement. Two sub- 
categories of this strategy can be identified, based on a. equal number and size of balls 
(used by 7/23 children), or b. different number and/or size of balls (used by 10/23 
children). 
7.3.2.2.1 Equal number and size of balls 
The case of Paul (6 10/12 year-old boy) is an example of a construction of equal size and 
number of balls of each colour. He used more than one ball of each colour, but he tried to 
make each colour to have the same number and size between the balls. 
Paul: We have to make all of them bigger. All the balls to be as 
big as that one. I will make this bigger. They (the scores) 
may get the same points... it (the space kid) may go 
down. I will switch on the game now. 
0 
Figure 7.21: Paul's mixed 
asymmetrical fair 
construction 
Since the number of the balls was more than two in this case, the arrangement in the 
sample space played a role, as the white ball could be blocked in amongst and thus 
generate unequal points. Perhaps this is the reason why Paul was unsure whether this 
construction would bring a fair result. 
In Helen's (7 6/12 year-old girl) case there is a mixture of large and small balls. 
Helen: ... 
Move some balls... Ok! We have two big red 
balls and two big blue balls, three little red balls 
and three little blue balls. Now, I think they will be 
equal. 
Researcher: How did you arrange them? 
S 
0 
Figure 7.22: Helen's mixed 
asymmetrical fair 
construction 
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H: Let's say it move to the red first and then to the 
blue, it will move like this, it will get the red again 
and then the blue. When it goes to the red it will go 
to the blue as well. It will get both colours. 
Helen constructed here two big balls of each colour and three small balls of each colour. 
She placed them in a way that the movement of the white ball could reach each ball the 
same times and she suggested a possible movement of the white ball. She mixed them up 
by keeping the number and the size of the balls balanced for the two teams and she 
considered how the place of each ball would influence the movement of the bouncing ball. 
Lucy also based her decision on the movement of the white ball. 
Lucy: It (the white ball) will go all the way round. Let's 
say the white ball will move right, left, in the 
middle, up, down, on the edges and it will touch all 
the balls. We have ten balls now... The scorer will 
get many points. 
Researcher: Which scorer? 
L: The red or the blue one.... They might get the 
same scores. They will get many points. The balls 
are mixed up. 
0- 
Do 0 
Figure 7.23: Lucy's first 
mixed asymmetrical fair 
construction 
Since Lucy could not find a particular pattern of movement of the white ball, she took the 
same number and size of blue and white balls and mixed them around. This construction 
did not get a fair result, because the white ball got blocked between balls and 
it could not 
reach all the balls evenly. This led Lucy to make a further construction of mixed 
balls I 
which included many duplicate white balls. 
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L: I mixed them up ... I put them just in a way to be equal. 
... I will copy some more white balls, here and here. Now, 
they might get all the balls the same times. 
*&eng 
Figure 7.24: Lucy's second 
mixed asymmetrical fair 
construction 
Lucy in this construction tried to 'block' the white balls in different places in order to get 
all the 'unreachable' balls. The construction worked over the long term, to Lucy's delight 
and satisfaction. It seems that the movement of the bouncing ball influenced children's 
idea of mixing balls. The idea of 'unreachable' balls that was expressed by Lucy is 
something that Simon (7 10/12 year-old boy) described as having 'a sabotage' in his lottery 
machine. This effect made Simon and other children try to construct a fair environment 
with different number or/and size of balls, as is described next. 
7.3.2.2.2 Different number and/or size of balls 
Simon made a fair environment by placing the balls around the space and thinking about 
which balls were making 'sabotage' to the others. 
Simon: I think we are going to get equal numbers. Let's 
see 
Tf- 
He starts the game. 
S: Oh .... 
look they got equal numbers... 
Researcher: I don't understand why. The reds are more than the 
blues. 
S: It doesn't matter how many they are. What it does 
matter is the shape. One ball might sabotage 
another one. 
0* 
00 
Figure 7.25: Simon's mixed 
fair construction 
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R: 'Sabotage'? 
S: You see here this blue ball ... when it (the white 
ball) goes like this it will touch that one and not get 
the red one... 
Because of the spatial representation of sample space Simon developed a strategy where 
the number and size of the balls was not the characteristic of a fair environment, but the 
place of the balls also played a major role. So, he constructed a sample space with 12 reds 
and 10 blues, with all the balls having the same size, and placed them in a way that made 
him expect that the two colours would get equal points. Simon's construction shows 
evidence of thinking about how each event in the sample space could have a different 
probability to occur. As he described, the repetitive position of a ball changed the 
probability of a ball being hit. By 'sabotaging' some balls in his sample space, Simon 
decreases the probability of these events to occur and creates events in his lottery machine 
with different probability to occur. This is an example that shows how children 
(reinvented' the probabilistic idea of distribution. Simon's idea of changing the probability 
of the events in the lottery machine was used in order to make the game fair by having 
unequal numbers of coloured balls. 
George (6 8/12 year-old boy) made a more 'strict' mixture of balls that was also influenced 
by the 'sabotage characteristic'. He constructed inside his sample space a pyramid, without 
worrying about the number of the balls of each colour. 
George: ... I have a very good 
idea. I will make... you will 
see in a while. I will make a shape... You will see. 
I will put this here... I am making a shape. 
Researcher: Which shape? 
G: Something that I forgot its name. 
R: Ah! Is it like a pyramid? 
G: Yes! I will do it like this. The blue will get the first 
point and first our space kid will move down and 
when it will touch the red it will move upwards. 0 
000 
4000 
Figure 7.26: George's 
mixed pyramid 
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Although George placed more red balls in his construction, he placed them in a way that 
some coloured balls would prevent the white ball from touching other balls. Thus, he 
expected to achieve fairness in his game. George's case is another construction having an 
unequal number of balls', which have different probability to be hit (the idea of 
distribution), and as a global outcome to have a fair result in the game. 
Another construction of an asymmetrical fair environment was Tom's (7 year-old boy). He 
did not have the same number of balls of each colour, and attempted to compensate the 
(-spatial' imbalance by modifying the size of the balls. 
Tom: I know. To put all these up 0 
0 
Figure 7.27: Tom's 
asymmetrical fair 
construction 
R: How are you arranging them? 
T: When it goes to the red to get the blue as well. 
Tom tried to place one colour on the top of the other, as he thought that was the easiest 
way for the white ball to get both colours at the same time. It is worth mentioning that the 
starting point for Tom's construction was for all the balls to have the same size in the 
lottery machine (as is described in Chapter Five, iteration 3). I-Es idea showed that he did 
not think of equality of the two colours in terms of the number of balls, but in ten-ns of 
equalising the space that each colour occupied inside the sample space. So, Tom tried to 
achieve equality in space by having the two colours occupying the same space. He made 
three blue balls to be equal with one red ball. Tom seems to make with his construction a 
number-space connection. Each blue ball in the game had a different probability to occur 
from that of the red ball, and this led Tom to have a different number of balls, thus 
achieving an equiprobable global outcome of the two events, and fairness in his game. 
The representation of fairness with mixed balls was expressed after children had realised 
the unpredictable continuous movement of the white ball. The ten children expressed this 
construction either by having equal number and size of balls or different number and/or 
size of balls. The goal of this strategy was 
for the two events to have equal probability 
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distributions, achieving an equiprobable global outcome of the two events. The following 
section describes the strategies that children used to construct unfairness. When children 
tried to construct fairness they also faced the idea of unfairness when their fair construction 
did not work. They also had to think of unfairness explicitly when they faced the 
problematic situations of one team to get more points than the other, or the space kid to 
reach one of the two planets. 
7.4 Unfairness 
The construction of unfairness can be divided into the following representation forms: a. 
different number of balls, b. different size of balls and c. spatial arrangement of balls. Also, 
the children had to construct an unfair environment when they engaged in the problematic 
situation of certain and impossible events. 
7.4.1 Unfairness due to different numbers of balls 
The children seemed to understand that having more balls of one colour makes the game 
unfair. John (6 10/12 year-old boy) made a construction of an unfair environment for the 
blues, his team, to win. 
John: Ok! I will put this here. Ok! 
Researcher: Which colour is going to win? 
J: We won't get equal points! Well, you know, we 
are with the blues because there are more blue balls 
inside the sample space now. 
00 
Figure 7.28: John's unfair 
construction 
John constructed his sample space for the blues to win, with one large ball for each colour 
and another two small blue balls. It seemed to be easy for John to connect unfairness by 
having an unequal number of balls. 
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7.4.2 Different size of balls 
The space that each ball occupied in the sample space, the size of each ball, was a criterion 
for children to judge an unfair environment. Brian explained in the following arrangement: 
Brian: The ball will get more points because it's bigger. It will 
get more points. It has much bigger place and this is 
very small and if it goes like this it will touch it and like 
this it won't touch it. It can get more points faster than 
the red one, because it's bigger. If it goes like this and 
like this it will get more points. 
S 
Q 
0 
Figure 7.29: Brian's unfair 
construction 
So, in an unfair environment the winning ball is bigger than the other- it takes more space 
and it gets points faster than the other ball. Anne also described the importance of the 
occupied room and space inside the sample space in the following snapshot. 
Anne: The blue balls are bigger. 
Shelaughs. 
Researcher: Is it going to be fair now? 
A: I don't think so ... It's not! 
R: Why? I have four blue balls and four red. 
A: Because these two blue balls are bigger and they 
take much more space. The ball can hit them 
more because they have more space. 
R: What do you mean by 'more space'? 
A: It means is more full. So, the ball will mostly 
touch those ones. 
R: What does it mean if you have more space in the 
lottery machine? 
A: It means like cheating... 
00 
0 
000 
Figure 7.30: Anne's unfair 
construction 
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In Anne's construction there was an equal number of blue and red balls, but the two blue 
ones took more space around the circle. Anne here made, like Tom above, a number-space 
connection. But, in Anne's situation the number stays the same and the space is used for 
increasing the probability of an event. This made it obvious for Anne to describe this 
sample space as unfair and that the blue balls are going to win. As she said, when the balls 
take more room in the sample space the result is like cheating. She also described the 
unfair environment as a 'cheating' one when she made a spatial arrangement of the same 
size and number of balls. Anne worked on her fair representation of having a pattern in a 
circle and then unbalanced the fairness by having the same structure, but increasing the 
space of two balls. She seemed to realise that when you unbalance the distribution, you 
unbalance the outcome as well. It seems that her idea of distribution made her also think of 
the possibility of keeping the size and number of the balls the same and to change the 
probability of the events by changing the place of the balls. The following section 
describes how Anne changed her construction by changing the spatial arrangement of the 
balls to achieve unfairness. 
7.4.3 Spatial arrangement for unfairness 
Spatial arrangement was a strategy where children had the same number and size of balls, 
but they arranged them in a way that they made them feel like cheating. As Anne described 
Anne: I want to make it easier for the space kid to go 
up... 
Researcher: What are you doing? 
R: I don't understand ... I need you to explain to me. 
A: I have four balls ... so, I'm blocking them. 
R: What about the red balls? 
A: I'm going to do that and the white ball is going to 
hit the balls and go up, up, up ... (the space kid 
will move upwards). "" 
Figure 7.31: Anne's spatial 
arrangement for unfairness 
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R: Why did you put the same number of blue balls? 
A: So, not to be a cheating game. If you don't have 
the same numbers it"s like cheating! 
R: So, you don't cheat 
A: It's like cheating, but not exactly! 
Anne constructed an unfair environment here, by blocking the white ball inside a red 
circle. As she said, this arrangement would make the space kid move up easily. Although 
she placed the same number and size of balls, she believed that the way she arranged the 
balls inside the sample space was an unfair representation. It is again 'like cheating', but 
not exactly, as she said, because the number and the size of the balls are equal, this might 
be the reason of not deleting the blue balls. She seemed again to realise that when she 
unbalanced the distribution, she unbalanced the outcome as well 
The following subsection describes another case of unfairness, for certain and impossible 
events, and illustrates the children's representational forms for constructing these events. 
For constructing unfairness, the children did not only employed strategies of changing the 
number of balls, but also of changing the probability of each event to occur by keeping the 
same number of balls. 
7.4.4 Certain and Impossible events 
The children's constructions of certain and impossible events were employed in the 
representational forms for which there were not events of the one or the other colour, 
depending on for which team an outcome would be certain or impossible. Certain and 
impossible events were necessary when they faced problematic situations like 'what could 
you do in order the space kid get to the one planet very quickly' or 'what could you do if 
you wanted the blues not to get any points'. All the twenty-three children were successful 
on certain and impossible events and they realised that if one event was certain the other 
event is impossible to be occurred. 
Karen (7 3/12 year-old girl) expressed a view that the construction of certain and 
impossible events for her was very easy. As she said 
Researcher: Can you do something to get to the red planet 
quickly? 
-159- 
7. The construction of fairness and unfairness 
Karen: 
R: 
K: 
That's easy. I will use the ball. I will leave I red 
ball and 10 blues. Is it on the blue that we want it 
(the space kid) to go? 
No, it should move quickly to the red planet. 
Then, let's have only one blue, just not to be too 
mean, and the others to be red. I will leave three 
white balls to move quickly! 
O0. 
S .. oO. 
0 
00 
K: 
R: 
K 
R: 
K: 
She starts the game. 
Look! Wow... it got to the red! 
The game stops. 
If we want the blues not to get any points? 
Then we don't want any blue balls. 
She takes away the blue ball. 
Are you sure about it? 
Very sure... You want to have a look? Look! 
She starts the game. 
Figure 7.32: Karen's 
construction with many 
reds and one blue ball 
Karen's idea was first to have only one blue, just 'not to be too mean' as she explained, but 
she placed this ball in a position where it was not easy to get a point. However, as blues got 
some points in the game, she decided not to have any blue balls and then she was very sure 
that it was impossible for the blues to get any points. 
Demis (7 5/12 year-old boy) started his constructions the other way around. He wanted for 
the white balls to be impossible to touch any red balls and to be certain for the space kid to 
move down to the blue planet. As he said 
Dernis: ... 
Let's do something else. I will destroy some 
objects... I will not use any bricks. I will move all the 
reds 
Researcher: Why? 
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D: In order not to touch the red balls ... the white ball to 
touch the blues and then (the space kid) to move 
down. This is easy... 0 
W 
0 
Figure 7.33: Demis' 
certain/impossible 
construction 
He starts the game. 
R: Will the space kid move upwards as well? 
D: No, there are not any red balls. That's it! 
R: Ok... Now, let's say that we are not allowed to have 
no reds, but again we need our space kid to move on 
the blue planet. 
D: Only to move down? 
R: Yes, what will you do? 
D: Ok 
He stops the game. 
D: I will put a red ball on the site. That's it. 
IT- 
he starts the game. 
R: We got some red points... 
D: But, it moved down! ... 
D: We cannot have reds inside and not to get any reds! 
How this could happen? I couldn't do it! I will do 
something else... I don't need any bricks, but I will 
put blue balls here. That's it! 
001 
000 
0 
- 
Figure 7.35: Dernis' second 
construction with one red 
and many blues 
For Demis it was obvious that with no red balls inside the lottery machine, it was impossible 
to get any red points and thus, 
it was certain that the space kid would move down. With a 
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Figure 7.34: Demis' 
construction with one red 
and many blues 
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red ball inside his lottery machine, even having decreased the probability of getting red in 
his distribution, he also expressed the idea that he could not be sure that the reds would not 
get any points, as he explained that he could not have reds inside the lottery machine and not 
get any reds. 
Helen (7 6/12 year-old girl) was also clear that in order not to get any blue points there 
should be no blue balls. 
Researcher: Ok... Can you do something in order that our 
space kid move straight away to the red planet? 
Helen: Yes! I will take away all the blue balls and then it 
will not touch any blue balls, so it will move 
upwards. 
R: Are you sure? 
H: Yes! It will not move down. There are no blue 
balls. No blue balls, no points! 
R: Do you want to try it out? 
H: Yes, I am sure! (She laughs) 
Figure 7.36: Helen's 
impossible/certain 
construction 
As Helen described, no blue balls means no points and this representation made it sure for 
her that the space kid would move straight away to the red planet. 
As the above episodes indicate, all the children constructed very easily representations for 
impossible and certain events. They also grasped that if the probability of one event is 
certain then for the other it is impossible. They also expressed a distributional idea in, 
where they can have both colours in their game, but decrease the probability of one colour 
to be selected. But, as they explained, decreasing the probability of an event is different 
from the impossibility of an event to occur. Table 7.2 shows a global view of the use of 
each strategy from each child. 
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Name Age 
(Y: M) 
Sex 
Unfairness 
Different number Different Spatial Certain and 
of balls size of balls arrangement Impossible events 
Anne 6: 10 
- 
F 
Anthony 5: 10 -M 
Brian 6: 6 M 
Cathy 7: 6 F 
Chris 7: 8 M 
Demis 7: 5 M 
Fiona 7 F 
George 6: 8 M 
Helen 7: 6 F 
Irene 7: 6 F 
Jane 6: 7 F 
John 6: 10 M 
Karen 7: 3 F 
Lucy 7: 8 F 
Mathew 7 M 
Nichol 7: 8 F 
Orestis 7 M 
Paul 6: 10 M 
Rachel 7: 3 F 
Simon 7: 10 M 
Tom 7 M 
Victoria 6: 6 F 
Zeta 6: 4 F 
Number of children 
(out of 23) 
21 13 10 23 
Table 7.2: The total number of children constructing different strategies for unfairness 
Table 7.2 summarises the strategies that each child developed for the construction of an 
unfair environment. It shows that all the twenty-three children tended to construct an unfair 
construction for certain and impossible events. It also shows that 21/23 children used the 
strategy of having different number balls in constructing unfairness and 13/23 children 
used the spatial construction either by changing the size of the balls, or by having a spatial 
arrangement of the balls. Table 7.2 also shows that children who constructed different size 
of balls also constructed different number of balls, for achieving unfairness 
in their game. 
It can be said that there was a 'link' here between the number of the 
balls and size of the 
balls in the spatial lottery machine. The table also shows that the sex and the age of the 
25 All names of the children are pseudonyms. 
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children did not influence their decisions of constructing unfairness in their game. The next 
paragraph illustrates some provisional findings of Chapter 7. 
7.5 Summary of Chapter Seven and provisional findings 
It seems that fairness is a major characteristic in children's games of this age and a desired 
characteristic, especially when it concerns two different teams. The twenty-three children's 
representations for constructing fairness and unfairness in the lottery machine fell into two 
main categories: symmetrical and asymmetrical. Almost all of the children (22/23) 
expressed fairness with symmetry and twelve out of twenty-three children also expressed 
fairness with asymmetry. It is significant that the children who shifted from symmetric to 
asymmetric constructions seemed to be stimulated by their interaction with the game. For 
example, in Simon's case (as has been illustrated in the previous paragraphs) there is first 
an expression of constructing fairness in a 'strict' symmetric way, but after interacting with 
the lottery game he also expressed the idea of having a mixed fair construction where each 
event in the sample space could have a different probability to occur. In general, after 
recognising the arbitrary movement of the white ball in the lottery machine, fifteen out of 
twenty-three children seemed to care less for strict spatial symmetry. It also appears to be a 
distinction between knowing from before what brings fairness in the game, like symmetry, 
and developing an asymmetric arrangement by checking whether or not brings fairness in 
the game. The episodes analysed in this chapter lead to the following provisional findings: 
Provisional finding 73: The results show all the children's thinking tended to move from 
finding and describing outcomes to constructing models of fair and unfair random 
behaviour. For the construction of fairness twenty-two children initially expressed their 
intuition that symmetry represents a fair situation, with an exception of George who 
expressed asymmetric fairness. Symmetric fairness was built as a result of what the 
children already had in mind of what is fair, and that there is a connection between fairness 
and symmetry. Eighteen of the children constructed fairness by having balls on opposite 
sides of sample space, equidistant from the centre. Twenty of the children also tried to 
have an equiprobable sample space by dividing it into two parts one for the one event and 
one for the other. The animated lottery machine gave them the opportunity to judge their 
ideas through the lens of the global outcomes. Thus, the manipulations and continuous 
movement of the game afforded the children a concrete 
instantiation of their intuitions, and 
-164- 
7. The construction of fairness and unfairness 
thus an opportunity to 'debug' and develop them. The symmetric fairness seems to be in 
line to historical evolution where symmetry was connected with ideas of probability. This 
is analysed more globally in Chapter Nine, section 9.4.3. 
Provisional finding 7.2: Where children shifted from symmetric to asymmetric 
constructions of fairness and unfairness they implicitly used the idea of distribution in 
order to change the likelihood of an event occurring. In constructing fairness fifteen of the 
children seemed to 'reinvent' the idea of equiprobable distribution. It appears that the 
children found a way to achieve fairness by 'unbalancing' their sample space. It can be 
said that there was expressions about the idea of distribution in ways that are related with 
asymmetrical constructions. Ten of the children also made a connection between the 
spatial appearance of the sample space and the possible outcome from the game in the 
longer term. They constructed asymmetric fairness and they judged their construction 
based on the global events of their game. 
Provisional finding 7.3: In constructing unfairness the children realised that by 
unbalancing the probability of an event increases or decreases the likelihood of an event to 
occur. The game encouraged the children to base their construction of unfairness not only 
on changing the probability of an event by increasing the quantity of events, but also by 
increasing the likelihood of an event, by changing the distribution. Twelve of the children 
seemed to connect distribution with the size, the amount and the place of each coloured 
ball in the lottery machine. The children needed to express distribution in their 
constructions of the lottery machine and they had a tool to do so. 
There were cases in this chapter in which children, while they were expressing ideas of 
fairness and unfairness, expressed also quantitative ideas of randomness (see for example 
Tom's case, section 7.3.1.1). Chapter Eight will illustrate children's expressions of 
randomness employing quantitative judgements, referring to the judgement of equality, the 
law of large numbers, the idea of uncertainty and proportional thinking. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Quantitative Ideas of Randomness 
8.1 Overview 
This chapter concentrates on the children's quantitative ideas of randomness, focusing on 
their employment of quantitative judgements. This chapter is also part of the Phase 2, 
learning investigation phase. The chapter is divided into five parts. The first describes 
children's judgements about equality; the second refers to ideas about infinity and the law 
of large numbers; the third describes ideas about possibility; and the fourth section deals 
with proportional thinking. The last part of this chapter presents a summary of the chapter, 
some further analysis and provisional findings of the data presented in the previous four 
parts 
8.2 Judgement of equality 
The children's judgement of final equality in their games was expressed when the children 
had to construct a fair probabilistic environment. The analysis of the data presented here 
was based on code D4: Judgement of equality in fairness (see in section 4.3.5), which 
refers to children's expressions for judging equality in their game. 
Paul: '... It (the space kid) is above the yellow line... Ah! 
Something happens now! 40 - 43. It's a small 
difference. ... Oh... 
look almost equal! Now, more 
blues ... 
That's ok! Someone might get more, but 
they will be equal. Our space kid will be near the 
yellow line. ' 
00 
C. 
00 
1ý1 I, 0* L- 
Figure 8.1: Paul's fair 
construction 
Paul (6 10/12 year-old boy), above, constructed a fair sample space and he also used 
multiple white balls. As he said, the sample space worked 'ok', even though the space kid 
ended up a little above the yellow 
line (the score was 40-43). For Paul, the judgement of 
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equality was based on having the space kid near the yellow line. He used the global 
outcome, the movement of the space kid, to judge what is equal and he did not look at 
having exactly the same numbers on the scorers. As he explained 'someone might get 
more, but they will be equal'. Although there seems to be a contradiction between the 
expressions 'having more' and 'be equal', this suggests that for Paul the absolute 
difference between the scorers did not play the central role in judging his construction. A 
similar episode happened with Tom (7 year-old boy). Tom explains that 'equality' means 
when the scores are almost the same (like 84-86,99-98,228-222). Lucy (7 8/12 year-old 
girl) also described that what counts in a fair game is not to have a big difference between 
the two scorers. As she said 'I can make something... I will do something not to be a big 
difference between them. To be near... ' Lucy's idea agrees with Tom's one, and explained 
that what does matter on equality is to have only a small difference between the two 
numbers of the scorers. 
In the extracts above, the children used the scorers to explain the equality of the outcomes. 
On the other hand, most of the children used the space kid to judge this equality. Jane (6 
7/12 year-old girl) explained 'It (the game) is going to be fair when it (the space kid) will 
be in the middle, may be a little up or little down, depends on this white ball'. It seems that 
Jane here used the word 'little' in reference to the movement of the space kid to express 
the equivalent meaning of what Lucy meant by using the word 'almost' for the equality of 
numbers. Helen (7 6/12 year-old girl) also used the space kid to describe the equality 
between the two teams 
Helen: I don't know... Maybe it will stay near the yellow 
line. 
**coo* 
040000 
Figure 8.2: Helen's fair 
construction 
She starts the game. 
Helen: It remains near the yellow line. It goes down or up 
and when it comes to reach the blue planet it goes 
up and when it comes to reach the red planet it 
moves down and then it moves to the yellow line. 
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In this episode, Helen used the word 'near' to express her judgement about equality. She 
seems to understand equality in fairness by using the global outcome in the game, the 
space kid, and she judged her construction by the fact whether or not the space kid was 
near the yellow line. As she said in her vivid description, the space kid went down or up 
and when it moved away from the yellow line, got near to one of the two planets. Another 
criterion for children judging their construction was to generate 'big numbers'. This leads 
us to the next section, which describes children's constructions in the game for intuitively 
achieving the law of large numbers. 
8.3 The law of large numbers 
The children expressed in a number of different ways the idea of having a big number of 
outcomes and then judge their construction. From a mathematical point of view, these 
expressions point towards the situated abstraction (see section 2.3.2) of the law of large 
numbers 26 in terms of the mechanism of randomness or the state of the objects in the game. 
The analysis of the data presented here was based on codes D2: Changing the mechanism 
and D6: Infinity (see Chapter 4, section 4.3.5), which refer to the changes that children did 
on the structure of the computer game and also on their expressions of infinity. Their 
constructions can be categorised into: 1. increasing the speed of the white ball (expressed 
by 7/23 children), 2. adding more coloured balls in the sample space/distribution 
(expressed by 16/23 children), 3. adding more white balls (expressed by 21/23 children), 4. 
making the size of the white ball(s) bigger (expressed by 5/23 children), and 5. leaving the 
game to work for longer time(expressed by 23/23 children). 
8.3.1 Increasing the speed of the white ball 
The idea of changing the speed of the white ball occurred when children had made their 
fair construction, but could not get their desired result. Paul explained: 
Paul: Let's see... Oh! We have more blue scores. It moved down. Oh ... I will change 
the speed of the white balls. I won't watch the numbers. It will move too fast! 
He takes the star and changes the speed of the white balls. 
26 This idea will be looked at more globally in Chapter Nine, section 
9.4.6. 
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Paul made the white ball move faster than before in order to demonstrate that his 
construction worked, since he believed that, in the long term, his construction was 
working. The same idea came from Anne: 
Researcher: Let's think now! What can you do to get the equal scores? 
Anne: Make it faster! 
R: Which one? 
A: The white ball! 
These examples show that the children were not thinking of making changes in the lottery 
machine construction, but they wanted to have 'bigger numbers' in the game. This is also 
an expression of a belief that their construction was working for big numbers. The next 
section describes where children added more coloured balls to achieve a 'bigger result' in 
order to judge if their construction was working or not. 
8.3.2 Adding more coloured balls 
Getting more points quickly was also expressed by adding more balls inside the sample 
space. For example, Simon (7 10/12 year-old boy) added more balls to his construction. 
Simon: It moved up now-equal numbers! Oh! Now it moved down.... Let's see 
if it moves up. You know something. I will add some more balls. 
He stops the game. 
S: I will put these balls together ... to communicate (he laughs). 
Researcher: What do you think will happen? 
S: We are going to have a better result. 
Simon did not change the basic idea of his construction, but he expected that by adding 
balls to get bigger numbers his idea would work in the long-term. His action to increase the 
overall number of balls may be indicative of an implicit application of the law of large 
numbers. Adding more balls was a strategy that children used very often for constructing a 
fair sample space. This strategy was also very often combined with other strategies in 
which children generally expressed the idea of having more trials. Sixteen children also 
accelerated the results in their game by adding more bouncing white balls before they 
judge their construction whether was working. 
8.3.3 Adding more white balls 
Adding more white balls was a strategy used by nineteen out of twenty-three children in 
order to make their construction work for 'bigger' numbers. Fiona's 
(7 year-old girl) 
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attempt to get bigger scores was to copy more white balls and make them to touch more 
easily the coloured balls. 
Fiona: It still doesn't work! I think I have to make 
another change to the balls. Another ball. 
Researcher: Will it work with this change? 
Fiona: Yeah 
... the white balls move around and 
touch all these balls. Ok... and another thing 
(she copies more white balls) ... that makes it 
work! Wand ... wand ... right! Let's try it on. 
She starts the game. 
400 
0 
0 0 
0 
Figure 8.3: Fiona's 
construction to get 'more 
points' 
Fiona added more coloured balls in her construction and she also added more white balls. 
Fiona's action can be seen as a situated abstraction of the idea that bigger outcomes judge 
better her construction. As she said, her construction would work better by having more 
white balls that would make the scorers move more quickly. Fiona appears to recognise 
that her construction would be good if it would give a proper result in the long-term. She 
decided not to change anything in the structure of the coloured balls, but to judge her 
construction by generating bigger numbers and watching the global outcomes. Another 
change to the bouncing ball for getting more points was to change its size as the next 
section describes. 
8.3.4 Making the size of the white ball bigger 
Making the size of the white ball bigger was an attempt to make the scorers to work 
quickly on the screen. This was what Mathew did (a 7 year-old boy) when he wanted to get 
4many points'. 
Mathew: ... 
I will do something else. (He stops the 
game). I will construct two white big balls. I 
will copy some more red balls, five as the 
blue ones. 
0) 
00 ne 
Figure 8.4: Mathew's 
construction to get 'more 
points' 
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Researcher: Now, we have 5 reds and 5 blues, how many 
points will they get? 
Mathew: Many points ... they will get equal points. 
Mathew made changes to get bigger number scores by adding more red and blue balls, 
adding another white ball and making the size of the white balls bigger. Mathew's 
statement implies that he is attempting to get equal numbers and there is a need to get large 
numbers in order to achieve this. The following section describes another idea for getting 
bigger numbers in the game, not by making any changes in the mechanism of the game, 
but leaving the game to run longer. 
8.3.5 Leaving the game running longer 
Eleven children out of the twenty-three expressed the importance of time in their game and 
they expressed it in different ways. They first needed to see their construction working for 
a while and then judge it. Helen expressed her idea of giving more time to her construction 
by not stopping the game and keeping a watch on it. 
Researcher: 
Helen 
Helen: 
Researcher: 
H: 
What will happen? 
The blues get more points.... Now they are equal. We need to leave it 
for a while. 
A r- 
ATTer a while she added: 
Yes ... here it 
is! It keeps going... It doesn't 
touch the planets. 
Will we get 1000? 
If it keeps moving up and down all the time 
and not go too (much) up then we will get 
1000... We can keep it going the whole 
night! Ah... 700! 
10 00 00 0 0"* l> 0 
**0 00 
Figure 8.5: Helen's idea for 
getting large numbers 
For Helen, leaving the game to work for a 'whole night' without stopping was a criterion 
to judge whether her construction was representing 
fairness. If the construction would 
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work for the whole night (if the space kid would not touch one of the two planets and stop 
the game) that meant the construction was fair. Evidently, she used the expression of ' the 
whole night' to 'express' the law of large numbers in some form. This is an impressive 
statement, for a child to see that letting something work for a long time would produce a 
convergent outcome. 
Orestis (7 year-old boy) expressed an idea about time by moving the two planets to the 
edges. As he said 'First, I will move the planets on the edges' and he was waiting for the 
scorers to get equal points. 
Researcher: How did you arrange them? 
Orestis: I mixed them up. Now, they might get equal numbers. 
He starts the game. 
R: Are they getting equal points? 
0: Not yet. 
Orestis expressed the idea that time is needed to get equal points. His words 'not yet' are 
evidence that he needed time to wait for his construction to work. He implied that his 
construction must be judged in the long-term and he seemed to believe that time would 
take care of the (short-term) inequality. 
Demis (7 5/12 year-old boy) also did the same thing with the planets, giving his 
explanation as follows: 'Ah!... I have to move these two planets as well... I will put them 
down here and up there ... not to touch them'. 
The idea was for the space kid not to touch 
them so quickly. Another child, Mathew, explained: 
Mathew: ... But, it (the space 
kid) touches them. Shall I put them (the planets) a 
little far away from it? 
Researcher: If you want to. Why? 
AI will put them here... 
R: It (the space kid) won't get them there. 
A Ok! I will put them here then. To take a while to get them. I will also 
put a fairy there, to watch them. I will put it here. 
R: Will our space kid get a planet now? 
M: May be if it goes too high. 
He starts the game again. 
A It will take a long time to go to planet. It will move up and down... 
They (the scorers) get equal points... 
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Mathew wanted to move the two planets in order for his game to work for a 'long time'. 
The two planets had been placed at the beginning, by the researcher, near the yellow line. 
Seeing this, Mathew realized that the space kid would touch them at once. So, he wanted to 
place the planets away, at the edges of the screen, in a position that it would be 
'impossible' for the space kid to reach them. His strategy is to let his game run for a 'long 
time% so that the scorers will equalise. 
As the above snapshots show these children recognised a need for leaving their 
construction to work longer in order to judge it. Thus, the children expressed the idea of 
judging their construction in the long-term with a need to have larger numbers in their 
outcomes, implying the need of the 'law of large numbers' in their game. The next section 
describes how children faced the idea of uncertainty in their game. 
8.4 The idea of uncertainty 
Twenty-one of the children often expressed uncertainty for an event to happen for sure, 
considering that they could not be completely sure of the result of the game. The analysis 
of the data presented here was based on code D7: Possibility (see section 4.3.5), which 
refers to children's expressions of uncertainty. Lucy expressed this possibility that 
everything can happen in sample space by using the words 'sometimes' and 'may be'. 
Researcher: Is it going to be fair now? 
Lucy: Maybe, let's see! 
She starts the game. 
R: So, what's the result? 
L: Sometimes the red has more points 
She stops the game. 
L: Ok ... We have ten 
balls. 5-5. 
R: Is our space kid going to be near the yellow line? 
L: I don't know. Sometimes yes, but maybe sometimes not. 
R: What do you mean? 
L: Sometimes they will be equal. But, I have to start the game first. 
She starts the game 
- 173- 
8. Quantitative ideas of randomness 
Lucy expresses some 'fear' of uncertainty accompanying her predictions by using the 
words 'sometimes', 'may be', 'I don't know'. The only thing that would convince her was 
to try her game out. The same happened with George (6 8/12 year-old boy) who wanted to 
start the game first before he expressed his thoughts about what would happen in the game. 
Researcher: How many points will we get? 
George: We have to start the game. Nobody knows. We have to turn the game 
on. 
Researcher: ... Ok... Let me ask you something. If we have another blue and 
another red ball, how will our space kids (he had copy another space 
kid) move? 
George: Nobody knows about it. You have to start the game in order to know. I 
couldn't know. 
R: What might they do? 
G: It may touch the red ball and they will move up. 
R: What about the scorers here? 
G: May be, but may be the red will get more, may be the blue will get 
more. Let me start the garne. 
He starls the game. 
George understands that everything is possible in the sample space, that he can only make 
predictions for the result, but not to be sure about it until he starts the game and 
finds out. 
He also seems to realise that in the short-term, he may not have the same results even 
if he 
kept the same structure of the lottery machine. 
Demis (7 5/12 year-old boy) also admitted that he was not able to know the exact 
final 
result of a trial. 
Researcher: Will our space kid move to a planet? 
Figure 8.6: Demis' 
construction for expressing 
possibility 
Den-ýs: I don't know.... I never 
know exactly what 
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number they (the scorers) will get. 
Demis expresses the fact that he never knows exactly what number the balls will get. It 
seems that he uses the word 'exactly') to refer to the local events of the game. Even though 
he made his construction in order the space kid not to touch any planet, he also understood 
that this might not work as he wanted. In the second quotation he asserts that the score will 
reach 500, and then expresses his fear that his prediction might not happen. He also refers 
to needing time to get his result, tacitly implying a 'law of large numbers', as analysed in 
the previous section. 
Rachel (7 3/12 year-old girl) expressed her belief that everything is possible, even when 
the probability of an event is small. 
Researcher: Ok! The blues will get 6 points, how many 
points will the red get? 
Figure 8.7: Rachel's 
construction to express 
possibility 
Rachel: I point. You see, we have 6 balls ... Hm 
you know something ... the 
blues will get 5 
points and the red one. 
Researcher: Why? 
Rachel: The white ball will move like this and then 
like this and here ... so it might get this 
ball 
here and then to move to the red like this. It 
is possible, you know. We could also get 6 
blues and 3 reds, may be ... it 
is possible. 
Researcher: Which one is the most likely to happen? 
Rachel: The most likely will be the blues to get more 
points. 
Rachel predicts that it is more likely for the blue to get the most points, 
but she also 
explains that it is possible for red to get more points than one. 
She was trying to guess how 
many points each colour would get, 
by thinking about the possible movements of the white 
ball in order to touch the red ball. As she said, it is possible to get 
6 points for blue and I 
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Point for red, but also possible to get 6 points for blue and 3 points for red. This snapshot 
also shows Rachel 1) s attempt to express a proportion for the outcomes, which leads us to 
the next section describing children's ideas about proportional thinking. 
8.5 Proportional Thinking 
The analysis of the data presented here was based on code D5: Proportional Thinking (see 
section 4.3.5), which refers to the way children tried to express proportionality in their 
games. The children's ideas about proportional thinking can be divided into three 
categories: a. equality of two events, b. double points, and c. probability of an event. 
8.5.1 Equality of two events 
Almost all of the children (22/23) seemed to understand the idea of equality of two events, 
that is, the idea of 1/1: 2/2: ... : 8/8: ... : n/n. In the following episode, Anthony (5 10/12 year- 
old boy) expresses this idea by comparing a previous construction of eight balls for each 
colour with a construction having three balls for each colour. 
Researcher: Let me take away some balls and I will leave 
three reds and three blues ... What do you 
think will happen? 
0 
Anthony: Maybe we will get equal points ... they are 
3- 
3 balls so we are going to have equal 
numbers ... before we 
had 8 and 8 balls and 
we had equal numbers ... so, now it will 
be 
the same. Shall I start the game? 
0 
0 
Figure 8.8: The 
construction for Anthony to 
express equality of two 
events 
Anthony expressed the idea that having 3-3 balls or having 8-8 balls is the same and they 
will bring the same global result, the space 
kid to remain on the yellow line. Although this 
seems obvious, it is remarkable how 
Anthony, implicitly, sees the ratio 3/3 equals with 8/8. 
Similarly, Victoria (6 6/12 year old girl) explained: 
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Victoria: It (the white ball) might move here and here and it might move here. I 
didn't know where it was moving but it moved in different places. To 
have equal points we need to have 1-1,2-2,5-5. 
Researcher: 25-? 
Victoria: 25, but the yellow square doesn't have space for 25 balls. 
Victoria also understood that for equality of an event it is needed to have the same number 
of balls in each team, when the other variables of the balls, like size and arrangement are 
the same. As discussed in the previous chapter (on construction of faimess and unfaimess), 
the children found ways to have equality between the two colours without explicitly 
counting the balls, for example by making a pattem -they did not mind about how many 
balls they had inside the yellow square, as long they had an equal number. This is further 
evidence of the children's understanding of equality between different constructions. 
Although, most of the time they preferred to add balls in the sample space rather than take 
balls away. The next section discusses how children expressed the idea of 'doubling' the 
results in their game. 
8.5.2 Double points 
Some children expressed a meaning for 'doubling' in their games. For example, Chris (7 
8/12 year-old boy) seemed to make ratios of numbers. 
Researcher: Can you make something in order for the red 
to get double the points of the blues? 
Chris: You mean two times? 
R: Yes 
C: We have 8 points (the blue scorer showed 
from the previous trial the number 8), so the 
red should have 16 ... So, 
let's have 2 red and 
I blue! 
R: Will it get double points? 
Figure 8-9: Chris' 
construction to get 'double 
points' 
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C: May be this will get 10 and this 14... I don't 
know... may be more! I don't know. 
Chris here was looking at the previous number in the blue scorer and thinking how many 
points should the red get when the blue scorer was showing 8 points, and after that he 
simplified this to two reds and one blue ball. Finally, he constructed his sample space, by 
placing the blue ball in the middle. Although he made all these correct adjustments, he 
finally expressed his feeling that he could not be sure of the result and the scorers might 
get different numbers than the ones that he predicted. 
Tom also (7 year old boy) gave an explanation of doubling: 
Researcher: Now, there are two reds and four blues. How many 
points will the reds and the blues get? 
Tom: 20 the reds and 40 the blues. 
R: Why? 
T: Because these are more. 
R: If the reds get 30 how many points will the blues get? 
T: I don't know. I understand that the blues will get 40 
and the reds 20 points... I am not sure, because my 
computer didn't do this. 
R: How do you understand this? 
T: We have 4 balls there and 2 balls here that means 10 
and 10 makes 20. 
R: Why does it make 20? 
T: If you have two balls and when this is here and this 
here again we are going to have two points. 
R: If we are going to get 40 points for the reds? 
T: These might get 20 points. 
R: How many blues and how many reds? 
T: 4 blues and 2 reds. 
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express 'double points' 
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R: If I get 40 blues? 
T: 20 reds. 
R: If I get 80 reds? 
T: 30... 
Tom first explains how one team would get 40 and the other 20 points and he also 
expresses the possibility of the reds to get 10 and the blues 20. For him it was easy to see 
that 10 and 10 makes 20 and 20 and 20 makes 40, but it was not so obvious to find out two 
equal numbers that made 80 (perhaps because 80 was a too big number for him to deal 
with). He also understood that he could not be sure about the result. At the point that he 
could not find a method of dividing 30 by 2, he said that the reason of this was that his 
computer at home did not make this calculation! 
Cathy (7 6/12 year-old girl) also chose to try out first the construction of doubles and then 
to justify her answer. 
Researcher: Let's have now 6 balls, and the reds are two and 
the blues are 4. How many points do you think 
each colour will get? 
Cathy: Hm ... 7 points 
for the reds and the 
blues ... eh ... may 
be 12. Can we try this out? 
R: Ok! 
She starts the game. 
R: Let's see when the reds get 7 points how many 
points will the blues get? 
C: Hm ... Look! 
The reds got 8 points and the blues 
16 points. 
She stops the game. 
R: Why did they get 16 points? 
C: Because the blue balls are more than the reds. 
Eh ... 
look! 8 and 8 makes 16! Two eights make 
16. Double points. 2-4 so, 8-16! 
Figure 8.11: A construction by 
Cathy to express 'double 
points' 
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Cathy started by making a guess about how to get double points, and she immediately tried 
it out. When the results showed the two teams had exactly double points between them, she 
stopped the game and made her calculations. She then compared the result with the 
numbers of balls and thus found the proportion between them, 2: 4 = 8: 16. 
In the case of Paul (6 10/12 year-old boy) there was an expression of difficulty about the 
concept of 'twice 9 when he had a small number of balls and a bigger one. 
Researcher: If we want the red scorer to get twice as much as the blue scorer, how 
many balls do we need? 
Paul: We need two red balls and one blue. 
R: If we have four red balls how many blues do we need? 
P: 3 blues... Let's see! 
It was easy for Paul to express the concept of 'twice as much' by using the proportion 2: 1, 
but it seemed that he could not manage with bigger numbers than this. Paul's expressions 
imply an understanding of 1-1 correspondence, he wanted I point for the blue so he would 
put 1 blue ball and 2 points for the red, and so started place 2 red balls inside his lottery 
machine. 
Another explanation of doubling came from Demis (7 5/12 year-old boy). 
Researcher: Let's say now that we have 4 reds and 2 blues. 
How many points will the red get and how 
many the blue ones? 
Dernis: I think the blues will get 20 points and 40 the 
reds. 
R: Why do you think that? 
D: Because it is one more. 
R: Hm ... 
it's one more ... what 
do you mean? 
D: One more and it gets the reds ... we need two 
more balls, one to add for the blues and one to 
take away from the reds. 
Figure 8.12: A construction 
by Dernis to express 
'double points' 
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R: Why will they get 40 and 20? 
D: Because each one let's say gets 10 points. The 
red points get 40, because they are 4 balls and 
the blue points get 20 because they are two 
balls. 
R: If I want the reds to get double points from the 
blues what else will you do? 
D: Leave it as it is. We don't need to do 
something more. If this and this (the red balls) 
don't exist then they will be equal, so this is 
double than this one. 
Demis was happy with this construction and he expressed a belief that it would work for 
getting double points for the red balls. As he described, if there were not two more red 
balls, then the game would have equal scores. Demis here multiplied by 10 each ball in the 
lottery machine. It seemed to be easy for him to see the relation between 2: 4 and 20: 40. He 
also seemed to understand doubling in terms of taking away and adding balls from one 
team to the other. In the following snapshot he expressed his ideas for 'ten times more'. 
Researcher: Ah... Can you make something in order for the 
reds to get ten times more points than the blues? 
Demis: Eh... ten times more? I have to copy balls. 
1 put 11 reds and 2 blues 
R: Ok... So, when the blues get 10 points, how 
many points will the red balls get? 
D: I think the reds will get 200... Let's see 
He starts the game. 
D: Oops... I don't know, it doesn't work! 
Figure 8.1 : emis' 
construction for 'tens time 
more' 
As Demis counted 10 points for each ball inside, he was asked then to predict the opposite 
and make a sample space with the reds to get 
10 times more than the blues. This 
modification was difficult 
for Demis. He seemed to make just a guess for creating a sample 
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space, which he eventually realised did not work. This evidence shows that also for Demis 
doubling is not a ratio. Demis' expressions imply an easy understanding of 'doubling' 
points and a difficulty of understanding the proportion for tens. 
George's construction for doubling went as follows: 
George: I will put them like this. If it moves there it will 
touch the red and if it moves there it will touch 
the blue. We need another ball. 
Researcher: Which colour will get more points now? 
G: May be the reds because they are two. 
R: Where will our space kid move? 
G: Upwards. 
He starts the game. 
G: Now it gets the blue, it gets both... now the red. 
R: How many points will the red have? 
G: It has 10 points and the blue has 5 points. You 
see, two times 5 makes ten, it needs another 5. 
We need another blue to get 10.1 will stop the 
game. I have a very good idea. I will make 
something else... you see in a while. I will 
make a shape. 
Figure 8.14: George's 
construction for doubling 
George started thinking at the scale of I and 2 points. But, after he started the game, he 
realized that this construction worked for 'multiplying by two', so it would work for any 
double he wanted. As he explained, two times 5 makes 10 and that worked in the same 
way as two times I makes 2. Thus, George did not initially see the relation between the 
numbers, but after he started the game he began to think about multiplying the numbers. 
There is evidence here of the game mediating George's thinking on how he can double the 
points. 
This section has shown that the children expressed their thinking about 
doubling based on 
the part-part relationship. Although their 
ideas on doubling the outcomes seemed to be 
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expressed easily and they used the medium to confirm their thought, it seemed that they 
did not connect doubling with ratio. The next section describes children7s expressions on 
the idea of probability of an event and how they tried to predict the result of their 
construction. 
8.5.3 Probability of an event 
Concerning the probability of an event, twenty-one of the children expressed an outcome 
not as a ratio, but by saying which colour is going to get more or less points. They seemed 
to prefer not to estimate the scores for the two colours and they preferred to start the game 
first. Zeta (6 4/12 year-old girl) made the following comments. 
Researcher: Let me ask you something. If I put 7 blue balls 
and I red what is going to happen? 
Zeta: The white balls will touch the blue balls most. 
R: How many points will the blue get and how 
many the reds? 
Z: I don't know. Let me start the game. 
Figure 8.15: A construction 
for Zeta to express the 
probability of an event 
She starts the game. 
For Zeta it was obvious that blues were going to get more points, but she did not make any 
calculations to predict the scores. Irene (7 6/12 year-old girl) seemed to express how many 
points each ball would get by guessing a big number for the team that has more balls and a 
small number for the team that has fewer balls. 
Researcher: Ok... So, they are 10 balls, 9 blues and 1 red. If the red gets 10 how 
many will the blue get? 
Irene: 19... Because the red is one and the blues are 9 and they surround the 
white ball. 
R: If now the white ball touches 100 times on the balls, how many times 
will it touch on the red and how many on the blues? 
On the blue might touch 88 times or 100 and on the red 78... 
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Irene here guessed some big and small numbers, depending on which colour was more 
likely to win, without even thinking whether the total of these numbers was similar to the 
total scores she had seen. She dealt with decisions about these numbers by using the words 
'more5 and 'less'. Thus, she made decisions on which colour finally is going to win, but 
she did not seem to think about proportion in way to express a possible number result. 
Nichol (7 8/12 year-old girl) also made an attempt to work with ratios. 
Researcher: Let's say we have two blue balls and one red. If 
the red shows 10 points how many points will the 
red get? 
0 
Figure 8.16: A construction 
by Nichol to express 
proportional thinking 
Nichol: 10 the blues and 9 points for the reds. 
R: If I put another red ball? 
0 
Figure 8.17: A second 
construction by Nichol to 
express ideas about ratios 
N: Now we will have 10 for the blues and the red 
may be the same. 
R: If I have another blue ball? 
N: One more for the blues. Let's say 6 and 5. 
R: If I copy another blue ball? 
N: Then the blue will have may be 30 and 10 the 
reds 
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R: I will put the balls like this now. 4 blues and 2 reds. What 
will the score be? 
N: The blue will get more points. 
R: How many more? 
N: 4 points more. 
She Starts the game. 
N: Hm ... this might get more ... It doesn't work, but the blues 
are winning. 
Nichol here reveals some proportional thinking. She was adding and taking away from the 
score of the one team the difference between the numbers of the balls of each colour. She 
S 
. 
a 
Figure 8.18: A third 
construction by Nichol to 
express proportional 
thinking 
knew which team was going to win, but her predicted result was based on how many more 
balls one team had than the other. As she did not express any doubt about the result, she 
did not have the feeling to try her construction out and use the medium at this point for 
changing her idea. At the end, when she tried her constructions and realised that her way of 
thinking did not work, she predicted only which team was going to win and not how many 
points each might get. George tried also to give an explanation of proportion. 
R If we have now two reds and three blues? 
0 
G: 
R: 
G: 
Hm... The only thing that we can do is to start the game 
and find out. 
What is your guess? 
Figure 8.19: A construction 
by George to express ratios 
The blues will have more because three is more than two. You see! You know, 
these (the blues) will get (he is thinking by working with his fingers) 6 and the 
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reds might get 4. You know 2 and 2 makes 4 and 3 and 3 makes 6 (He shows me 
by his fingers). I will start the game. 
He starts the game. 
G: Wow... It got 2... We got different points, but the blues got more. 
George here doubled the number of balls, of both colours. He used his fingers as a 
representation to explain his thinking, and how he reached the conclusion that 2: 3 = 4: 6. 
George showed that he did not only work with a 1-1 correspondence, but he found also a 
way of doubling the numbers of each colour and comparing them. In the end, when he 
started the game, he got different numbers from the ones that he predicted (although they 
had the ratio of 1: 2), he expressed only the idea that the blues would get more points than 
the reds. Table 8.1 shows which category each child used. 
Categories of 'proportional thinking' 
Name 27 Age Sex Equality of Double points Probability of an event 
two events More/Less points Ratio 
Anne 6: 10 F 
Anthony 5: 10 M 
Brian 6: 6 M 
Cathy 7: 6 F 
Chris 7: 8 M 
Dernis 7: 5 M 
Fiona 7 F 
George 
Helen 
Irene 
6: 8 
7: 6 
7: 6 
M 
F 
F 
Jane 6: 7 F 
John 
Karen 
6: 10 
7: 3 
M 
F 
Lucy 7: 8 F 
Mathew 7 M 
Nichol 7: 8 F 
Orestis 7 M 
Paul 6: 10 M 
Rachel 7: 3 F 
Simon 7: 10 M 
Tom 7 M 
Victoria 6: 6 F 
Zeta 6: 4 F 
Number of children (out of 23) 
22 1 
10 22 
Table 8.1: The total number of children expressing different categories of proportional 
thinking 
27 All names of the children are pseudonyms. 
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Table 8.1 shows that 22/23 children expressed the idea of equality of two events to occur. 
Also, twenty-two out of twenty three children expressed the probability of an event to 
occur by referring to which colour would take the more and less points. It was also note 
worthy that although ten of the children double the points of each team for expressing the 
'twice as much' idea, only three of them expressed a belief that this 'double' strategy could 
be generalised. Table 8.1 also shows that George is the only child who did not express the 
probability of an event by giving a 'qualitative judgement' (more/less points), but he tried 
to express probability of an event only in a ratio. I remind to the reader that George was the 
only child who did not construct any symmetrical strategies for expressing fairness in his 
game (see Table 7.1) and he only expressed unfairness with a spatial arrangement (see 
Table 7.2). The table also shows that the sex and the age of the children did not influence 
their decisions of constructing unfairness in their game. 
8.6 Summary of Chapter Eight and provisional findings 
The above episodes have described how the twenty-three children of the study expressed 
randomness by employing quantitative judgements or by making some calculations. 
Mainly, these judgements were involved in the children's understanding of equality in the 
game and their understanding of the need to have big numbers in the game (an intuitive 
form of the law of the large numbers). Children seemed also to express how they 
understood uncertainty in their constructions, and some primitive ideas about proportional 
thinking. The episodes of Chapter Eight lead to the following analytical points, and which 
will be analysed more globally in the following chapter. 
Provisional finding 8.1: The children of the study tended not to use the absolute 
differences in the outcome scores to judge equality in fairness. Instead, they used the 
global outcomes of the game and made judgements based on the small differences between 
the different experiments (see for example Helen in section 8.2). This judgement of 
equality is evidence of children's making connections between local and global events, and 
how they shifted their thinking from the local experiments to the global events in their 
game. Although it was easy to read off the exact points of each team at any time, they 
preferred not to refer to the absolute difference but to judge equality when the two teams 
had a 'small variation', which could be seen from the distance that their space kid had 
moved from the yellow line. 
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Provisional finding 8.2: The children of the study often made changes in their 
constructions to get more outcomes. All the children left their game to run for a longer 
time and twenty-one of the twenty three made changes to the mechanism of the game to 
get more outcomes in less time. The game provided ways in which children could engage 
with the idea of getting 'bigger numbers' besides leaving the game work for longer. It 
seems that children's expressions provide evidence of situated abstractions of the law of 
large numbers. They seemed to understand that they would get a better result from their 
sample space when there are many trials. It can be said that by experiencing the game they 
understood that something that is unstable with a small number of outcomes becomes 
stable with a large number of trials. The children in this study seemed to develop an 
intuition about the stability of long-term trials, a shift of focus that the game promoted by 
looking at the aggregate outcomes of any construction. 
Provisional finding 8.3: Many constructions of the lottery machine had the probability of 
getting the one event to be very small. Even then, the children expressed their 
understanding that everything is possible. They seemed to realise that extreme variability is 
also a possibility to happen (see example of Rachel in section 8.4). Their predictions were 
expressed with an uncertainty. 
Provisional finding 8.4: All the children seemed to understand that 1/1: 2/2: ... Wn in a 
medium that enabled them to make manipulations by adding and taking away balls. They 
seemed to realise that equal ratios would produce an equal outcome. Children could easily 
change their construction by changing the number of the balls. They made a similar 
construction of balls by changing the number of the events in their game. This behaviour 
occurred when children faced the problematic situation of creating fairness in their game. 
Provisional finding 8.5: Ten out of the twenty-three children developed different 
mechanisms for thinking about doubling based on the part-part relationship. They tried to 
manage with a proportion that exhibits the concept of twice as much and to use the 
aggregated view of the environment to see whether it worked or not. The children's 
expressions show that it was easier for them to express the idea of doubling with small 
numbers than with big ones (see example of Tom in section 8.5.2). Given this, their ideas 
on doubling the outcomes seemed to be expressed easily and they used the medium to 
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confirm their thought or to develop it; however, they did not manage to work effectively 
with other proportional numbers like tens. 
Provisional finding 8.6: Twenty-two out of twenty-three children typically expressed the 
probability of an event in the form of 'which colour would get more points than the other'). 
They did not care so much as to quantity (how many points each team might get). The 
medium gave to 3 out of 23 children an insight to think that there might be a 'strategy' for 
predicting the score (see example of George in section 8.5.3), but they could not achieve 
proportional thinking about probability of an event- these children tried to make some 
predictions about how many points each team would get, but after they started the game 
their focus also tended to shift to which team would win or not. 
The provisional findings that have been described above, as well as the provisional 
findings of Chapter Six and Chapter Seven will be fleshed out in more detail and would be 
looked at more globally in the next chapter, 'Conclusions', in relation to the theoretical 
framework of the study (described in Chapter Two). 
-189- 
9. Conclusions 
CHAPTER NINE 
Conclusions 
9.1 Overview 
This chapter summarises the findings of the research, with reference to the two principle 
aims of the study. First, it describes the design aim, and summarises the findings from 
Phase 1: iterative design phase. Second, it describes the findings from the Phase 2: the 
learning investigation phase, which explains how the computer game (the lottery game) 
mediated children's thinking about probability (the second aim of the study). Specifically, I 
analyse here the situated abstractions of randomness, fairness, unfairness, equality, the law 
of large numbers, possibility and 'proportional' thinking. Finally, this chapter discusses 
some implications for the teaching of probability, based on the research, the limitations of 
the present study and some suggestions for further research. 
9.2 Summary 
The main tool for this research was a computer-based lottery game, designed to help the 
children to connect concrete and abstract ideas, by building situated abstractions of 
mathematical knowledge. Pratt's (2000) and Wilensky's (1995) constructionist paradigm 
for understanding probability illustrates the case that by designing tools that are specially 
designed for expressing randomness and chance, and encouraging learners express their 
ideas with them. 
This study provides further evidence for working in the constructionist paradigm, dealing 
with young children's probabilistic constructions and expressions whilst using a computer 
lottery game. The lottery game was specially designed for the expression of randomness 
and chance. Thus, the lottery game provided a 'window' onto the idea of sample space in 
which children could manipulate in a concrete way the elements of the sample space. This 
notion of 'window' (see Noss and Hoyles, 1996) is a metaphor to describe the way in 
which the computer interface offers to the researcher insights into the children's meaning 
making as they work in the microworld. 
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The central aims of the study were 1. iteratively to design a computer game to afford 
young children (age 51/2 -8) opportunities and novel ways to express and develop 
probabilistic ideas; and 2. to describe and analyse how the game mediated the children's 
expression of chance events. 'Expressiveness' is meant in the sense that one can express 
ideas in a concrete form while actions are carried out by interacting with a too] (see 
diSessa, 2000). Moreover, Noss and Hoyles (1996) state that expressive power opens 
windows for the learner; it affords a way to construct meanings, where meanings are 
expressed in actions. 
The next two sections summarise the findings of the study, with reference to the two main 
aims, findings about the design of the game, and the analysis of how the game mediated 
children's expressions of probabilistic ideas. 
9.3 Aim 1: Findings from the iterative design phase 
9.3.1 General background to the design process 
I will first describe how the idea of designing a lottery game was developed. The lottery 
game was designed for the expression of ideas about randomness; the intention was to 
create a "dynamic tool", which goes beyond the static and discrete probabilistic 
environments that children experience in schools. The game was designed with a program 
called 'Pathways' (which developed itself as the iterations of the game development took 
place). Pathways gave the opportunity for the game to be based on three main principles: 
a. A 'lottery machine', a visible manipulable engine for the generation of random 
events, represented an "executable sample space" or distribution in the game. With 
it, the children could directly manipulate the outcome of the game. 
b. The presentation of the lottery machine in the game was geometrical/spatial and it 
contained balls of different colours, which made it possible for children to carry out 
as many events as they wished without being obliged to think about numbers and 
also, in the final iteration, to change the probability of an event to occur 
by 
changing the size of the balls and their location/arrangement. 
c. The game was programmable in the sense that the user could examine 
how each 
object was connected by rules and how it 
linked in a visible way the short-term 
behaviour of the lottery game with the long-term behaviour. Thus, the children 
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could visualise individual outcome as a single trial in a stochastic experiment, the 
totality of these outcomes gave an aggregated view of the long-term probability of 
the total events. 
Connecting objects with rules encouraged children to examine the rules in order to explain 
the unpredictable and arbitrary movement of the ball. For example, when children could 
not predict the exact movement of the ball, they thought that looking at the rules was 
sufficient to discover how the ball was working. 
9.3.2 Findings from the iterative design phase 
The early iterations of the design process gave the researcher the opportunity to observe 
the characteristics of children's ideas about randomness, and how they expressed these 
ideas. The dominant tendency was to look for patterns, and other research (for example 
Konold, 1989; Pratt, 1998) has shown the same tendency. This is also a claim by Piaget 
and Inhelder (1975), that children before the age of 8 years old are most interested in the 
point of view that considers the pattern of the total number of balls and the 'effect' of each 
experiment on the next - this latter behaviour was also observed in my first iteration. In the 
first iteration, the sample space in the computer game used a linear representation of 
coloured balls, and this confused all the children of the first iteration who thought that the 
colour that they had to get should be placed on the top, which made them ignore the 
structure of the sample space as a whole. 
The main finding from the first iteration was that the 'presentation' of the lottery machine 
had to change, so that the children would be encouraged to look for structure rather than 
patterns. The specific modifications subsequently made was that children could not only 
add and remove balls in the machine, but also construct a 2-dimensional arrangement of 
the balls. The first iteration also showed that in a probabilistic game it was important for 
children to have a 'continuous movement' in the window of sample space to make it easier 
for all children to look at the aggregated view of the distribution and the probability of an 
event. The 2-dimensional arrangement was intended to help children to shift the focus of 
their thinking away from seeking patterns. Further, the scope for manipulation of the 
sample space was designed to encourage children to express their thinking and construct 
sample space in the form they wanted. 
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In the final iteration, the game was not only manipulable, but also presented a continuous 
link between the sample space and the distribution of the outcomes, as shown in diagram 
9.1. 
Sample Space 
Distribution 
Manipulations 
Control the amount 
and kind of events 
Randomness: visible 
and uncontrollable 
Visible and 
controllable 
connection 
(rules) 
REPRESENTATION 
Outcomes 
Local outcomes e. g. sýcorer, 
sounds 
Global outcomes - 
aggregate view of the local 
outcomes e. g. the 
movement of the space kid 
from a line 
e. g. 2D spatial representation 
CONTINUOUS 
MOVEMENT 
Short Term Behaviour of the 
_40 %A,. - 
r"7ong 
Term Behaviour of the 
Game Game 
Diagram 9.1: A general design for a game on randomness 
Diagram 9.1 is generalised from diagram 6.1 and presents the ingredients for the design of 
a game on randomness. In Diagram 6.1 the elements of the game was a. sample space, 
which was expressed by one child's thinking (Rachel's case) by the movement of the white 
ball and the outcomes, which were expressed as the movement of the space kid, the sounds 
and the scores. Diagram 9.1 shows in a more general way that the elements of the game 
are: a. a sample space and distribution that are manipulative (for example there is control 
over the number and kind of events), and the random behaviour exists in a visible, but 
uncontrollable way; b. the outcomes of the sample space and distribution are divided into 
local and global ones (see section 3.4.1); and c. the two dimension spatial representation 
provides the opportunity for the sample space and the outcomes of the game to be seen in 
terms of both short term and long term behaviour. In the diagram, the two circles show the 
elements of the game whilst the two rectangles show how the elements can 
be seen in 
terms of local and global events. 
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In the general design, the connection of the sample space and distribution with the 
outcomes has the crucial property of being both visible and controllable. In the case of the 
Pathways game this connection was achieved by using rules that could be constructed and 
changed by the children. Also, in the general design, the representation of the sample space 
and distribution could have a visible connection with the short and long term behaviours, 
through the two-dimensional spatial and dynamic representation of events. 
A further important characteristic of the game was how it connected the short-term and 
long-term behaviours of the system, to provide children with corresponding local and 
global events. The research findings show that the continuous movement in the game did 
successfully link the short-term and long-term behaviours, thus discouraging children from 
simply looking for patterns in randomness. For example, in the case of Rachel (as shown 
in diagram 6.1) the two-dimensional continuous lottery machine made it possible for her to 
see the movement of the white ball not only as a short term behaviour of the system, but 
also as a long term behaviour. This played a major role for Rachel to connect local and 
global events, and Rachel's descriptions many times involved shifts from local to global. 
It is conjectured that the components of the game, and the connections between the 
components helped children to connect "pieces" of the system mentally, and introduce 
corresponding structure into their thinking about randomness (as proposed by the theory 
of p-prims and schemata described in the literature review, section 2.2.1). These pieces can 
be seen as a first meaning about things, consisting of simple abstractions, not well 
developed generalised pieces of knowledge that originate from specific experiences but 
can be used in similar situations. There are many examples from the data where the design 
of the game helped children to link their p-prims for the understanding of randomness 
(these are described in Chapter Six). In the case of Victoria (section 6.2.2), for example, 
she began to realise that even if some of the times the white ball touched a place that she 
predicted, the white ball did not follow a path for its movement and she could not control 
or predict exactly its next move, and so she finally focused on the 'global' movement of 
the space kid instead of looking at the short term behaviour of the ball. There is evidence to 
make a tentative conjecture here: if the design of a game can instantiate what children's 
pieces of knowledge about randomness are, then working with the game can help children 
to connect ideas for randomness in their thinking. As p-prims are unstructured pieces of 
knowledge, designing a game where its components represent p-prims and the tasks 
require to connect these pieces together, then the children 
by interacting with the game and 
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expressing their thoughts can begin to build an intuitive structure about these pieces of 
knowledge. 
9.4 Aim 2: The game's mediation of children's probabilistic ideas 
The findings from the final iteration of this research provide insights into children's 
understandings of randomness (learning investigation phase). First, I will illustrate the 
findings from the Piaget and Inhelder experiment described in section 4.3.1. Then, I will 
describe the findings of the study in terms of four 'situated abstractions': 
a. mediated expressions of randomness, 
b. symmetric and asymmetric fairness, 
c. the idea of unfairness, 
d. qualitative judgements based on equal likelihood events, 'proportionality' and limits 
(the law of large numbers). 
I introduced the notion of 'situated abstraction' in Chapter Two. Noss, Hoyles and Pozzi 
(2002) describe situated abstractions as a way of describing how a conceptualisation of 
mathematical knowledge can be simultaneously situated and abstract. The key idea is to 
take account of the way in which the tools available, the means of expressing the ideas, 
structure the way that the children think about and express those ideas. 
9.4.1 Piaget and Inhelder's tilt box experiment 
As part of the transition from the second to the third design iteration, it was necessary to 
try to generate some baseline data to look at the effects of the medium of the task on how 
children are able to express themselves. Thus, the twenty-three children of the study were 
asked to attempt Piaget and Inhelder's (1975) tilt box experiment at the beginning of each 
interview, to examine whether the sample of children would appear similar to that of 
Piaget and Inhelder, and also and to find out how different tools might mediate the 
children's understandings of randomness. Ojeda (1999) points out a weakness in the tilt 
box experiment in that some children may interpret the task as being to control the 
movement of the tray to obtain, after each tilting, the balls arranged in their original place. 
Piaget and Inhelder reported that before the age of 8 years old the progressive mixing of 
the balls is either denied or thought of as too regular. In one respect, this, they argue, 
is 
simply another way of avoiding the idea of chance. 
The findings of the present study are in 
line with Piaget and Inhelder's findings, 
in the children interviewed found it difficult to 
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express notions of random mixture, when they were trying to express these notions by 
using a tilt box as a medium. However, when the medium of expression was the computer- 
based game, the children constructed valuable meanings for randomness as shown in the 
previous chapters. These findings study suggest that Piaget and Inhelder's results cannot be 
generalised, independent of the medium of expression. By using a more dynamic medium 
for the expression of randomness, it can be concluded from this study that children of this 
age can express notions of randomness that cannot be predicted by model of stages of 
thinking, as Piaget and Inhelder (1975) or Jones et al (1997) have argued (cf. Chapter Two 
'A review of the literature'). 
9.4.2 Mediated expressions of randomness 
The children's attempt to understand randomness shifted in focus from looking for ways to 
control randomness, towardsfocusing on ways to control events in the sample space. 
In general, all the children had a strong urge to control an unpredictable situation and to 
find ways to predict results. In most games that children of this age play the sample space 
remains hidden or implicit, and they do not access it as an idea. But in the Pathways game 
children access sample space, interacted with it and used it. In particular, the game led the 
all the children of the study to think in a direction that in order to make predictions, they 
should move from attempting to control the 'thing' that delivers randomness (as 
represented by the movement of the white ball in the lottery machine) to controlling the 
events in the sample space (as represented by the coloured balls in the lottery machine). 
As the literature confirms (for example Ojeda, 1999; Ayres and Way, 2000) children have 
a tendency to try inappropriately to utilise colour patterns in order to predict outcomes in a 
random experiment (as iteration 1 of this study also shows), and this results in a difficulty 
to understand the overall random behaviour. The children often focus also on the 'object' 
that delivers randomness e. g. the dice or the coin. Truran and Truran (1999) describe how 
their subjects would normally toss dice using their hands in the belief that there 
is a direct 
human intervention on the outcome. Fischbein (1975) describes how children have the 
belief that random events can be controlled by the individual who triggers the events when, 
objectively, any such control is absent. Thus, the 
belief that successive outcomes of a 
random process are not independent 
is one of the most common 'misconceptions' reported 
about probability. 
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In the interviews of the present study, the children at first tried to find the ways in which 
randomness works by 'isolating' it, looking only at the object that delivers randomness and 
not at the whole random environment. However, the results from the final iteration of the 
study suggest that working with the microworld changed the children's understanding: 
they began to manipulate the events in the sample space instead of looking for patterns to 
control the random behaviour. This change of focus, seems to have appeared, because of 
the continuous movement inside the lottery machine, which made it much more difficult 
for children to look for patterns. 
Kuzmak and Gelman (1986) concluded that very young children have limited ability to 
explain the nature of a random mechanism. However, the features of the lottery game in 
this study allowed children to visualise randomness in their game as not following any 
particular rules, as they could see that the arbitrary movement of the ball had no rules and 
therefore, did not follow any patterns. It seems that this interpretation of the ball's 
movement as arbitrary was a driving force for children to express their ideas of 
randomness. They realised in the long term that the lottery machine was a 'window' to the 
sample space and that the lottery machine did allow them to 'control' in a way the arbitrary 
movement of the ball in order to get the result they desired. 
The mechanism of the game seemed to be a catalyst for building 'situated abstractions'. It 
seems that probability for the children of the study was connected with an attempt to 
control randomness. For example in Anthony's case (a five and ten months year-old boy), 
there is an attempt to control randomness by manipulating the events (see section 6.2.2.1). 
Anthony expressed this by changing the events in the sample space, which enabled him to 
control the random behaviour 'a little bit'. From a mathematical point of view the children 
were expressing, in their own way and mediated by the computational tool-based game, the 
idea that the probability of an event is a tool for describing and predicting unpredictable 
behaviour. The game helped all the children make this shift from focusing to control the 
thing that delivers randomness to focus on controlling events in the sample space. By 
assisting and developing situated abstractions for the idea of randomness, children seemed 
to be able to structure their intuitive understandings of probabilistic ideas. 
Within the 
changes made in the lottery machine children expressed ideas of probability. 
For the young 
children of this study, constructions in the 
lottery machine were an attempt to control an 
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arbitrary behaviour and within the game this idea was an articulated abstraction for the law 
of probabilities. 
9.4.3 Fairness 
The children employed two representational forms to express fairness: symmetry and 
asymmetry. Since normally children connect only symmetry with fairness, the fact that they 
employed both symmetrical and asymmetrical forms for their constructions suggests also 
that they could engage with the idea of distribution in a simple way. 
In order to construct a random fair environment, the children had to develop some 
strategies to achieve fairness. The interesting point here is that these strategies emerged 
from all the children's need of this study to construct fairness, starting from an unfair 
environment and creating constructions to make it fair, without having any options to 
select from a variety of pre-constructed situations. The strategies that are described in the 
next paragraphs emerged from their constructions while they were facing the problematic 
situation of the construction of fairness (expressed as what they can do in order for the 
space kid to remain close to the yellow line, see figure 5.4). The shift from outcomes to 
construction of models via the machine, suggests that the lottery game situation afforded 
the construction of fairness to be connected with both symmetrical and asymmetrical 
spatial representations. Twenty-two out of the twenty-three children tried to achieve a fair 
random game by employing a symmetrical representational form for the events in their 
lottery machine. They expressed this symmetry in four different ways: 
a. symmetrical individual placement of events, 
b. symmetrical group placement of events, 
c. pattemed spatial arrangement and 
d. circular spatial arrangement 
Constructing sample spaces with symmetrical individual or group placement was the 
twenty-two out of twenty-three children's attempt to show that they wanted to have two 
separate sample spaces, one for each colour, with the same structure and working in 
parallel to collect the same number of points. In one notable example 
(section 7.3.1.2, 
figure 7.6), Karen produced a fair sample space by placing groups symmetrically and 
constructing also a 'brick wall' between them. 
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A patterned spatial arrangement of the events was another strategy that twelve out of 
twenty-three children developed for creating a random fair environment. The logic behind 
this was for balls of one colour to be so near to balls of the other colour that if the white 
ball touched one colour it would touch the other as well. This construction of fairness was 
a way to have an equal number of balls without explicit counting (see, for example, 
Fiona's case in section 7.3.1.3). As already noted, children used patterns very coherently to 
express the construction of fairness in a random environment. Hence, there was a distinct 
change in the way they expressed randomness in the sample space - from looking for 
patterns in random behaviour to building symmetrical patterned sample spaces which have 
fairness in their outcomes. 
A final symmetrical construction that the eight of the twenty-three children developed was 
making circles. A circle was made to trap the white ball in order for it to touch the balls in 
the circle the same number of times (e. g. Anne's case in section 7.3.1.4). 
Symmetry of placement was a strategy developed 'naturally' by the children (with an 
exception of one child who constructed an asymmetrical strategy for fairness) while 
constructing a fair environment, and twenty-two children constructed more than one 
symmetrical strategy. They judged their construction by using the outcomes of the game, 
that is, using the aggregate view of their results, it was notable that most of their 
constructions were successful. 
Fifteen of the twenty-three children expressed fairness by constructing asymmetrical 
spatial representations. There were two categories of this: a. equal number and size of two 
events in a spatial arrangement, and b. 'mixing up' of events. 
The first asymmetrical strategy (equal number and size of two events) arose when the 
children wanted to have two balls in their lottery machine and they were not concerned 
about their arrangement. Fairness in this case was achieved by the placing of the balls, 
controlling the size of the balls and making connections between the spatial appearance of 
sample space and the possible outcome of the game in the longer term (see, for example, 
Jane's and Mathew's cases in section 7.3.2.1). 
'Mixing upý events in the lottery machine was a construction for fairness which arose after 
the children had watched the continuous movement of the white ball and realised that it 
did 
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not follow a patterned movement. This strategy was expressed by half of the children. The 
mixed up balls involved either equal number or/and size of balls (see, for example, Lucy's 
case in section 7.3-2.2.1) or different number and/or size of balls (e. g. Toms case in 
section 7.3.2.2.2). The goal of both strategies was for the two events to have equal 
probability distributions and hence, the mixing up strategy can be seen as a situated 
abstraction of an equal probability distribution expressed of having events with different 
probability to occur. 
Symmetric fairness was built as a result of what the twenty-two out of twenty-three 
children already had in mind of what is fair - that there is a connection between symmetry 
with fairness, and thus they built a symmetrical environment to bring fairness into their 
game. From the historical discussion (cf. 1.3.2 and 1.3.4) it is clear that the idea of 
symmetry co-evolved with ideas of probability. It seems that the spatial metaphor allowed 
the children of the study to express ideas through symmetry for probabilistic constructions 
of fairness in line with historical evolution. The idea of asymmetric fairness seems to have 
developed as the children interacted with the game, checking by the outcome whether their 
strategy did or did not generate a fair result. So, there appears to be a distinction between 
knowing in advance what brings fairness in the game (i. e. symmetry), and developing an 
asymmetric arrangement by checking repeatedly if it brings a fair result. Pratt (1998) 
argues that a typical characteristic of the way people think about fairness is that they think 
about equiprobable outcomes and they relate probability to symmetry. Borovcnik and 
Bentz (1991) also describe that symmetry played a key role in the history of probability, 
and they conclude that the concept of sample space with equally probable events cannot be 
fully understood if it is not related to intuitions of symmetry. 
The findings of the current study showed that symmetry is, for the twenty-two out of the 
twenty-three children of the study, also a characteristic of fairness and randomness. The 
findings agree with what Pratt and Noss (1998) have also shown that existing intuitions 
about symmetry and fairness derived from interacting with their microworld. 
The 
framework of Jones et al (1997; 1999) implies that the children in this study should 
be 
categorised at the first level (they should not be able to predict 
fair and unfair probability 
situations), however the children were not only able to 
distinguish fair from unfair 
probability situations, but were also able to construct 
fairness in a random environment. 
Moreover, this study has shown that all the children intuitively wanted to construct a 
fair 
random environment, by seeing the game as consisting of 
two "teams", the blue and the 
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red. In the final iteration the children had the opportunity to express both symmetric and 
asymmetric fairness, as the specified task was simply to construct a fair spatial random 
environment. Piaget and Inhelder (1975) described symmetry to be an obstacle for children 
of this age to appreciate randomness. However, this study has shown that children's 
intuitions of symmetry can be used to construct the idea of fairness in a random 
environment and even that children could express fairness by using asymmetry to express 
distributional ideas. 
As the children built their symmetric and asymmetric representations of fairness, they had 
to engage with the ideas of equiprobable sample space and even distribution. It appears 
that, implicitly, the fifteen out of the twenty-three children were thinking about distribution 
in ways that are surprisingly related with asymmetrical constructions. Expressing the idea 
of fairness by the even distribution is an example of a situated abstraction of asymmetric 
placement, as if the children were thinking of placing balls asymmetrically in a way to 
'balance' the sample space. Thus, children constructed symmetric fairness to express a 
situated abstraction of equiprobable sample space. 
9.4.4 Unfairness: Inventing the idea of distribution 
The children expressed the situated abstraction that by unbalancing the sample space the 
distribution is skewed. 
Thus, it can be claimed that in the children's construction of unfairness there is a situated 
abstraction of the distributional idea, in that when they unbalanced the sample space their 
intention was to unbalance the outcome as well. The construction of fairness required 
children to deal with unfair situations as well, because their fair construction was not 
working. The children of the study also faced a problematic situation of unfairness in 
which they intentionally wanted one of the two planets and one of the teams to get more 
points than the other. The spatial environment of the game encouraged some children to 
base their construction of unfairness not only on changing the probability of an event by 
increasing the quantity of events, but also by increasing the likelihood of an event, by 
changing the distribution. The study showed that children of the study employed the 
following representational forms for constructing an unfair random environment: 
a. two events with different numbers of same size balls. In this category, 
twenty-one out of twenty-three children seemed to understand that having 
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more balls of one colour in their sample space makes the game unfair (see 
John's case in section 7.4.1) 
events with different sizes of balls but the same number. The different space 
that each ball occupied in the sample space was a criterion for thirteen out of 
twenty-three children to recognise an unfair environment (e. g. Anne's case in 
section 7.4.2) 
c. spatial arrangements for unfairness. Here, ten out of twenty-three children 
expressed the idea of having the same number and size of balls, but they 
arranged them in a way to make them feel like 'not cheating'. This category 
suggests an expression of distribution (e. g. Anne's case in section 7.4.3) 
The children of the study also constructed unfair environments when they wanted to 
construct impossible or certain events - when they wanted to make the space kid touch 
definitely one of the two planets. It was very obvious for them that by not having any balls 
of a particular colour in the sample space it would be impossible for this colour to have an 
outcome and it would be certain for the other colour to win (e. g. Karen's case in section 
7.4.4). Twenty-one of the twenty-three children of the study expressed a sign of 
uncertainty of an event to happen for sure when two events existed in their lottery machine 
(e. g. Demis' case in section 7.4.4). They realised that if an event exists in their distribution, 
it has a possibility to occur, and that extreme variability is also a possibility. The findings 
here suggest a way in which children's thinking about distribution developed. At first there 
was a connection between distribution and randomness. The children's interaction with the 
game seemed to help them to link the concept of distribution with the existence of two 
events, possibility of an event and the existence of only one event in their distribution. 
They also seemed to connect distribution with the size, the amount and the place of each 
event (the coloured balls) in their lottery machine. 
The findings of the study suggest that these young children had a clear idea of what are 
certain, possible and impossible events. The findings diverge from those of Fischbein, 
Nello and Marino's (199 1) (cf. section 2.4.1), that elementary students do not have in mind 
a clear definition of such events. They claim that elementary students 
had difficulty in 
understanding the term 'certain', when it is related to a compound event and some subjects 
confused rare with impossible. But, my argument in this thesis 
is that it is quite possible for 
children not to be able to define what is certain or 
impossible, but that it is possible for 
them to express these notions in an appropriately designed computational environment. 
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The children of this study implicitly used the idea of distribution in the sense of changing 
the likelihood of an event. The game encouraged seventeen of the twenty-three children to 
base their construction of unfairness, and changing the probability of an event, not only by 
changing the quantity of that event in the sample space, but also by changing the 
distribution. The study investigated a different perspective to that of Piaget and Inhelder 
(1975)'s study, who propose that at this age there is an absence of an appreciation for 
distribution of the whole. Piaget and Inhelder claim that the problem of random mixture 
brings up the problem of the forms of distributions and that the final positions of the 
elements in the mix necessarily take on certain distributive forms of the whole. In this 
study, the children articulated a need to express distribution in their constructions of the 
lottery machine and they had a tool to do so. This 'invention' of distribution also emerged 
in the children's use of asymmetric fairness, as described in the previous section. 
9.4.5 Qualitative judgements 
In order to make judgements about relative likelihood of an event the children coordinated 
local and global events. This enabled them to make more qualitative judgements instead of 
quantitative ones. The children's use of 'proportionality' to control outcomes was 
restricted to the ratio two to one. However, in a few cases children expressed a belief that 
this strategy could be generalised. 
The children's strategy for recognising what is equal in the game was expressed mainly by 
looking at the aggregate outcomes of their construction (how close the scorers were, or 
how near the yellow line the space kid was). The children made judgements about equally 
likely events based on the global outcomes, even when the 'raw' difference in the 
outcomes was not quite zero. Without the continuous movement in the computer game, 
linking sample space and distribution to the outcome, it would have been very difficult for 
children to do this, because otherwise the outcome would only exist in local terms and the 
children would not see any global effect directly. Because of the design of the game, the 
children were able to change focus between local and global events, between quantity and 
quality: and finally their judgement of their construction to be fair came to be a qualitative 
one. The findings of this study provide further evidence about the importance of having an 
experimental task to link local understandings with global ones - see for example the 
research of Konold and Pollatsek (2002). Having the opportunity to look at the global view 
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of their sample space, the children of this study seemed to be able better to judge their 
construction (e. g. Anne's case in section 6.4) and to make a step forward from judging 
their result by focusing on the individual outcome. It was significant that the children 
started by not distinguishing between the importance of short-term and long-term trials for 
making judgments, but eventually they could make use of the distinction to construct for 
equiprobable events. 
The children in this study expressed logical comparisons between events to predict whether 
an event will occur or not. In constructing their lottery machine, children expressed the 
idea of 'proportional' thinking in three different ways: 
a. equality of an event, where twenty-two of the children expressed their 
understanding that equal ratio would produce an equal outcome (e. g. Victoria's 
case in section 8.4.1) 
'duplicating' points. Ten out of the twenty-three children developed different 
mechanisms to achieve the goal of one event getting double the points of the other. 
They tried to manage with a proportion that evidences the concept of twice as much 
and used the aggregate view of the environment to judge whether it worked or not. 
However, they did not manage to work effectively with other proportional numbers 
like tens (e. g. Demis' case in section 8.4.2). This finding comes to agree with 
Hart's (1984) work in which is argued that doubling is not a ratio. 
c. probability of an event. Twenty-two of the children expressed the probability of an 
event by indicating which colour would get more points than the other. They did 
not pay attention to how many points the team would get, but they seem to be 
generally satisfied to find out which would be the winning team. The medium gave 
to three children an impetus to think that it might be a 'strategy' for guessing the 
score, but they did not achieve the use of proportional thinking for the probability 
of an event to occur (e. g. George's case in section 8.4.3). 
The findings of the study suggest that children preferred to make logical comparisons 
instead of arithmetical ones. This partly contradicts Piaget and Inhelder's (1975) work, 
which finds an absence of any ability to make quantitative comparisons between two sets, 
since (for them) the child at this level has neither 'elementary logical operations' nor 
'arithmetical operations formative of the series of the whole numbers'. 
The children of the study focused their attention on qualitative 
judgements as a way to deal 
with the relative likelihood of an event. 
The findings show that the children's 'proportional 
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strategies' were restricted only to doubling, although some children indicated that they 
could generalise this. For example, George, in section 8.4.2 indicates that because he had 
two reds and one blue, he might get ten points for the reds and five points of the blues, as 
two times five makes ten. According to Singer and Resnick's (1992) analysis (cf. section 
2.4.1), George's proportional thinking involves a part-part schema - describing the 
relationship of two parts to each other and not seeing the proportion as a part-whole (i. e. 
'two reds out of three and one blue out of three'). In general, the children expressed the 
part-part schema of proportional thinking than the part-whole schema (see section 2.4.1). 
They seemed to want to avoid proportional thinking and preferred to start the game and 
wait long enough in order to see what would happen to the outcomes. 
This finding brings us to the next section concerning children's strategies in order to deal 
with the law of large numbers. 
9.4.6 Inventing the law of large numbers 
The children employed four distinct strategies to express the idea that their construction 
could only be judged with respect to a large number of trials. 
Children employed the idea of increasing the likelihood of each trial, in order to judge 
better the success of their construction, by 
a. increasing the speed of the white ball, in order to hit the other balls more often (e. g. 
Anne and Paul, section 8.2.1)28 
b. increasing the number of events in the lottery machine, by adding more coloured 
balls (e. g. Simon, section 8.2.2)29 
c. adding more white balls, making more 'random generators' to produce events (e. g. 
Fiona, section 8.2.3)30 
d. making the size of the white ball bigger in order to hit the other balls more often 
(e. g. Matthew, section 8.2.4)31 
e. leaving the game running for longer. This was a common strategy; all the 
twenty-three children expressed it. Helen (section 8.2.4) described 
her 
successful construction by saying that it would 
keep going 'the whole night' 
28 This idea was expressed by 7/23 children, see section 
8.3. 
29 This idea was expressed by 16/23 children, see section 
8.3. 
30 This idea was expressed by 21/23 children, see section 
8.3. 
31 This idea was expressed by 5/23 children, see section 
8.3. 
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and Orestis (section 8.2.4) admitted that his construction did not get the 
desired result 'Yet'. 
It is apparent that the game provided children the opportunity to express the idea that 
stability can come from increasing outcomes in ways different from the 'leaving longer' 
strategy. The game provided ways in which twenty-one children could engage with the 
idea of getting 'bigger numbers' besides leaving the game work for longer. It can be said 
that the above children's expressions is evidence of several situated abstractions for the 
law of large numbers. 
In their constructions, children seemed to express a belief that the mathematical idea of 
fairness (equal likelihood for example) could only be tested in the long term. This 
observation contradicts findings in the literature that describe a child's everyday intuition 
that the more trials there are; the more unsureness there is about the result. For example, 
Metz (1998) reports that the 'law of small numbers' was the only interpretation underlying 
the students' acknowledgment of determinism and this interpretation consisted of the belief 
that the contents of an unknown sample space could be directly assessed through a small 
number of observations. In this study, children seemed to develop intuitions about the 
stability of long-term trials, something that the game had afforded by making visible the 
aggregate outcome of their construction. 'It can be concluded that the computational 
medium did support children's intuition of the law of large numbers, giving support to 
Biehler's (1991) argument that without computer support, it is difficult to work with large 
numbers, and that long-run frequencies remain mysterious and students will act as if a law 
of small numbers applies. 
9.5 Some Didactical Implications 
This study has suggested that a range of important probabilistic intuitions exist from an 
early age and that stochastic experiences can be fundamentally important for children's 
development of intuitions about chance and probability. Young students bring intuitions to 
the classroom environment, but most of these are neglected because of the absence of 
teaching instruction. The findings of the study suggest that teaching probability can be 
based on knowledge of students' intuitions, and an active learning environment can give 
students the opportunity to construct their own meanings 
by connecting new information to 
what they already know. In this study, 
I have described the evolutions in students' 
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meanings for mathematical knowledge, which occurred while they built computational 
models of sample space and distribution. This finding provides support to the general 
constructionist thesis that engagement in the building of some external, shareable and 
personally meaningful product is conducive to mathematics learning (Papert, 1991). 
In the constructionist prespective, the learner becomes involved in creating, as well as 
appropriating, artefacts that become part of the 'culture' of a learning system. Looking 
forward, I believe that a well-structured curriculum on probability could be introduced 
from the early levels of the elementary school. The Cypriot National Curriculum, as well 
as the National Curriculum of England and Wales, contains almost no work on chance and 
probability at this level. I suggest that probability should be introduced at this level for a 
variety of reasons: a. The findings of this study suggest that intuitions on probability exist 
from an early age and therefore should be exploited before being abused, b. Probability at 
this age can be connected with games and this can bring positive attitudes to pupils about 
mathematics and the connection to everyday life, c. It helps one to understand and evaluate 
information in the world, d. In later years it is a prerequisite to enter many fields of study, 
and weak foundations of understanding are highly damaging. For these reasons, I believe 
that the subject of probability should not be neglected but should have a significant place 
in the elementary curriculum. 
9.6 Limitations of this study 
f 
The limitations of this study are those of time, scale and sensitivity of findings to the 
specific features of the computer game. The time spent with each child was sometimes 
limited, depending on factors such as the maximum time that the child's teacher permitted. 
Typically each child engaged in the final computer game individually for between two to 
three hours for two or three sessions. Longer periods of time may have allowed other 
meanings to emerge and it is possible that some observations would have proved to 
be 
more or less significant than the interpretation given in this account. 
For this reason, the 
research can be generalised only with some care. Experience of working with a computer- 
designed game in this study emphasises the sensitive nature of the relationship 
between the 
children's activity and the construction of probabilistic meanings and 
the tools and 
structures made available within the microworld. 
The iterative design methodology helps 
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to gain a feeling for the nature of this relationship, but it is necessary to interpret the 
findings with some caution. 
9.7 Implications for future research 
The findings of this study support the view that there do exist many unstructured pieces of 
knowledge in young children's thinking about randomness and probabilistic ideas. These 
pieces of knowledge surfaced while using a medium specially designed for expressing 
randomness and chance, and I believe they can most easily be identified with difficulty if 
static, not dynamic, media were involved. If these findings are valid, then we might expect 
that similar findings would result from research using similarly specially designed tools. 
The children of the study were taken from a particular age range. One of the reasons for 
choosing this age range (as described in Chapter Four) was to see whether children's ideas 
of randomness could be predicted using standard misconceptions as Tversky and 
Kahneman (1983) describe, or stages of thinking as Piaget and Inhelder (1975), and Jones 
et al (1997; 1999) describe. The findings suggest that children of this age express 
themselves in a different way to what is expected from 'stages of thinking' analysis. 
Further research could be undertaken by using the same or similar tools with children of 
other ages. 
The lottery game offered children the opportunity to manipulate only two different colours 
of balls. This could be modified to give children the opportunity to express ideas of 
conditional probability, by having two lottery machines, or by having more than two 
events in their sample space. This might reveal other aspects of intuitive probabilistic 
knowledge. The study has also shown some of the probabilistic geometrical intuitions that 
children have; these appear to be quite novel in research in learning probability and 
provide an inspiration for further research. A further study could also be undertaken with 
children using the Pathways software actually to program games and find out how meaning 
of probabilistic ideas can be achieved through the expressiveness of programming. 
Further research based on the present findings could be also used to identify a broader 
range of applicability. It would be interesting to see the game performed 
by children of 
different cultures in order to see whether socio-cultural variables affect probabilistic 
intuitions. in this respect, the software could also be used in the sense of social 
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constructivism. The game used in this study could also be used in curriculum-oriented 
research on probability, leading to a methodology for teaching and learning conceptions of 
probability in a classroom environment. 
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APPENDICES 
Al Snapshot of tilt box experiment 
I R: What do you think will happen when I tilt this box to the other side? 
2 P: These balls will go to the other side. 
3 R: Where will the red balls go? 
4 P: The reds will move here, then the yellows, the greens here and the 
5 oranges here. 
6 R: Can you show me how the reds will move? 
7 P: The first red might go here... 
8 R: What about the yellow one? 
9 P: The first one? 
10 R: Yes. 
11 P: It will move here... Tilt it to have a look! 
12 (The box is tilted. ) 
13 P: Oops... They messed up. 
14 R: Why is that? 
15 P: Maybe because the yellow fell in front of the purple and they messed up. 
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A2 Children's experience with Pathways 
A2.1 Showing and Reacting to Colours 
m Activity 1: Off the computer 
Think of three different colours and draw them in the boxes below: 
Colour Colour 
What are you going to do when you see a colour? 
For example: 'When I see red I jump up and down. ' 
Action Action 
Colour 
Action 
Diagram Al. 1: The showing and reacting to colours diagram 
Now, I will show you a colour and act according to what you 
filled in the above diagram. 
s Activity 2: On the computer 
Play the coloured planets game. 
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Figure Al. l: The coloured planets game 
Try to read the rules of the planets and the scorer. 
Figure AI. 2: The rules of the planets and the scorer 
Can you now fill in the table? 
Blue planets: 
When do What colour Which thing What does 
they show a do they show? reacts? it do? 
colour? 
Table Al. 1: The blue planets 
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a Activity 3 
Play the game again. 
Can you change the rules of the game in order to stop when the result of the scorer is 50? 
Describe what you have done. 
A2.2 Help the duckling 
You are going to make a game where a duckling tries to meet the gold fish and collect 
magic wishes! 
iI 
 4i'i: 
r7 
 I. 
) 
4. ) 
Figure A. 1.3: The duckling game 
m Activity 1: Looking at the duckling! 
Find the duckling. 
Look at its rules. 
Try to read and understand them. 
Prediction question: 
Do you think that the duckling can meet all the fish? 
Now, play the game.... 
Did the duckling meet the fish? 
Why yes or why not? 
0 Activity 2: Can you help the duckling? 
Look again at the rules of the duckling! 
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4( 
ALIO 
Figure AIA: The rules of the duckling 
Which rule helps the duckling to move towards fish? 
See what happens when you change the arrows in the second rule. 
Try to add new rules to the duckling in order to reach all the fish. You can use the stones 
and the toolbox. 
What did you do? 
Prediction question: 
Do you think that the duckling now can reach all the fish? 
Play the game again. 
Did the duckling reach the fish? 
Why yes or why not? 
n Activity 4: Another change! 
Can you train one of the ducks to make another sound when it touches the duckling? 
Try it by using the stone that plays a sound: 
( 
4 ___ 
7: 7 
Figure AI. 5: The sound stone 
Describe what you have done. 
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A3 The protocol of the task-based interview of the learning investigation 
Step 1 
Tasks 
1. Switch on the game. 
2. Imagine: 
a. What are the rules of the space kid? 
b. What are the rules that make the space kid work? 
c. What makes the scorer go up and down? 
3. Switch off the game 
4. Find out: a. What are the rules of the space kid, the red ball, the blue ball, the 
bouncing ball? b. What do scorers count? 
5. Use the stones to make the space kid to play a sound when goes up and to play a 
different sound when it goes down. 
6. Switch on the game again. 
7. Describe what happens. 
8. Can you make changes in order the space kid will move easier up and down? 
9. Demo: 
a. Move the balls not to a position of symmetry. How do you think this effect 
the result of the game? 
b. Make another ball. See the rules that are the same. How does this affect the 
result of the game? 
Step 2 
Tasks 
1. Switch on the game 
2. Imagine the rules of the two mines. 
3. Switch off the game. 
4. See the rules of the mines. 
5. If you want the space kid not to touch the two mines what will you do? 
Why? 
6. Try it out ... What 
did happen? Why do you think this happened? 
7. If it doesn't work, as you want it, what else can you change? 
8. Suppose that you want the red score twice as much as the blue scorer / ten times as 
much. What can you do? 
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Step 3 
Tasks 
1. See the rules of the bouncing balls and the bricks. 
2. Switch on the game. 
3. What will you change in order to the space kid stays nearly the yellow line? Try it 
out! 
4. What did happen? Why do you think this happened? If it doesn't work, as you want 
it, what else can you change? 
5. What will you change now in order to make the space kid reach the blue planet/the 
red planet? Why? 
6. What did happen? Why? 
7. If it doesn't work, as you want it, what else can you change? 
Step 4 
Tasks 
1. Having in mind the lottery machine game, can you build a new game? 
2. What will you do? 
3. What is the role of the lottery machine in the game? 
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Line 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
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7 
8 
9 
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14 
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16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
A4 An example of a coded transcript 
Step 1 
J: There is a yellow triangle (the space kid) that 
moves up and down ... here (on the red scorer) we have four points. 
R: When does it (the scorer) get some points? 
J: Is it when it (the white ball) touches the balls? 
R: Maybe ... lets see ... How does the white ball move? J: By itself ... Ah, because the reds were less it 
touched the red and got a point. 
R: What about the space kid? 
J: It went down. 
R: When does it move down? 
J: When we have more blue points. 
R: Why did it go up now? 
J: Because it (the white ball) touched the red ball. 
R: Can you imagine the rules of the space kid (s. k. )? 
J: When the little white ball touches at the red ball, 
our s. k. moves up and when it touches the blue one 
it moves down. The red points are more. 
R: Can you find the rules and read them? 
J: When the s. k. receives a blue envelope it moves 
down and when it receives a red envelope it moves 
up! 
R: Ok! Who do you think is sending these envelopes? 
J: The scorers... 
She opens the rules. 
J: When you start the game you have zero points, 
when it gets a red envelope it gets one point. 
R: What about the blue scorer? 
J: When it gets a blue envelope it gets one point, as 
well. 
R: Where these envelopes are coming from? 
J: May be from these balls here. 
She opens the rules. 
J: When it touches something, it bounces it and gives 
a blue envelope. 
R: What about the red balls? 
J: it's the same rule; we just have a red envelope 
here. 
R: What else do we have in our game to look at its 
rules? 
J: This little white ball here... 
She opens its rules. 
J: There are no rules... 
R: Yes, it only has a speed that you can find it by 
using the star It only moves in the yellow square 
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Notes/Screenshots 
Showing the red 
balls on the screen 
Appendices 
Ok ... Let's start the game... 40 J: Because the white ball touched the red ball our s. k. A2 41 moved up and because it touched the blue it moved 
down. 
42 R: Can we make use of the stones so that the s. k. 43 makes a sound when it goes up and a different 
44 sound when it goes down? 
45 J: Yes... 
46 She puts the stones and switches on the game... 
47 J: When it touches the blue ball, [the s. k] goes down BI 
and makes the noise that I chose. 
48 R: What are the points now? 
49 J: Two-Three 
... Four-Four. They are the same. 50 R: What happens to our s. k. when we have the same 
51 score? 
52 J: It's on the yellow line, at the place that it was in A2 
53 the beginning. 
54 R: Ok ... now I will switch off the game and I will put 55 this blue ball here and that red ball... 
56 J: Put it here! 
57 R: Where? 
58 J: Here (opposite the other ball). D3.1.1 
59 R: What will it happen if I put it there? 
60 J: The same thing as before, but the balls will be in a D3.1.1 
61 different place. 
62 She switches the game on. 
63 R: What happens? 
64 J: It is in the middle, down, down... 
65 R: Which ball will it (the white ball) touch now? 
66 J: The red one ... We 
have 3-3. 
67 R: It's in the middle now ---- 
68 J: It went a little down and it has five for the blue and 
69 four for the red scorer. 
70 R: I will stop the game now and I will put the red ball 
71 here. What will happen? 
72 J: The same, but the balls will be in different places. D3.1.3 
73 R: Where do you think our s. k. will move? 
74 J: Up and down. 
75 R: Will it be near or far away from the yellow line 
76 after one minute? 
77 J: it will be in the middle, may be a little bit up or D. 3.1.3 
78 little bit down. Depends on this white ball. DI 
79 R: How does this come? 
80 J: it moves by itself. It goes in different places and 
if D1.1 
81 it goes down and there is a red ball there it touches 
82 it and our s. k. moves up. 
83 R: Do you know where the white ball will move? 
84 J: No ... 
I just know that when it is very near to the DLI 
85 red ball, it might touch the red ball. 
Li 
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86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
102 
103 
104 
105 
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107 
108 
109 
110 
ill 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
She gets the star and makes the blue ball bigger D2.3 
than the red one. D3.2.2 
J: It will move very down because the blue is bigger 
and it (the white ball) will touch most of the time 
on it, because the ball takes more space in the 
yellow square. 
R: More space? 
J: It's bigger and takes more space, and before it (the 
white ball) went there and didn't touch the ball, 
now it will go there and it will find and touch the 
ball. 
R: Can you show me how the white ball moves? 
J: I will first need to start the game. 
She switches the game on. 
J: The blue wins. 
R: If I want my s. k. to move faster up and down, what 
can I do with the balls? 
J: I can make the red bigger as well. 
R: And then? 
J: The scorers will be equal. 
She takes the star and she makes the red ball 
bigger. 
J: I think the red will win. 
R: Why is that? 
J: I think I made it a little bigger than the other... We 
can open the game and if the scorers are the same 
that means that they have the same size, otherwise 
the one is bigger than the other. 
R: What about the s. k.? 
J: if it is as now that means our balls have the same 
size... 
She starts the game. 
J: You see, now it means that they have the same 
size. Our space kid is near the yellow line. 
R: How long do we need to leave the game on? 
J: Four seconds ... may 
be ... I 
don't know. We need to 
see. But now it moves quickly. The white ball goes 
many times on the circles (the big balls), because 
they are big. Now the blue has more points, now 
the red .... the 
blue ... the red. 
R: For how long do we need to leave it going? 
J: We need more seconds ... The red now 
is 91 & 
80... 
R: If we change the position of the balls, will the 
result change? 
J: Yes ... I think so ... may 
be... 
R: Will it be the same? 
J: I don't know. May be. 
R: Can you make an arrangement in order to have the 
same result? 
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137 J: Ok ... let's see... 138 She changes the size of the balls. The blue is D3.1.2 
139 bigger than the red ball. 
140 J: We might get the same numbers with this D3.2.2 141 arrangement, but it's more possible for the blue to 
142 win because it's bigger. Let's see ... shall we start 143 the game? Let's start it! It might get more on the 
144 red. The white ball is near the red one, but at the 
145 end the blue will win. It's bigger ... I need to make 146 them to have the same size in order to get equal 
147 points. 
148 She makes the blue smaller than before. She starts 
149 the game. 
150 R: Ok! But, I think it moves too slowly. Can you tell 
151 me what it will happen if I copy more blue balls? 
152 1 copy some blue balls. 
153 
154 
155 
156 
157 
158 
159 
160 
161 
162 
163 
164 
165 
166 
167 
168 
169 
170 
171 
172 
173 
174 
175 
J: The blue will win. The blue has more balls, four D3.2.2 
more. 
J: We have 5 blue and I red balls. 
R: So, if the blue gets 5 points, how many points will 
the red have? 
J: It will have one point. 
R: And if the blue gets 10 points? 
J: 5? May be ... because the blue got 10 then the red 
will get 5. 
R: Where will the s. k. go? 
J: It will go down. The blue balls are more, so it (the 
white ball) will touch on the blues and it (the space 
kid) will move down. Let's see... 
R: Oh ... it moves 
down. How are you going to 
characterise the white ball? 
J: It moves quickly... 
R: Can you do again something with the balls in order 
for the space kid to move near the yellow line? 
J: Yes ... I'll copy another 
4 red balls. So, we're 
having 5-5. Let's see... 
R: How did you arrange the balls? 
J: I put three red balls near each other and two far 
away and two blues, two blues and one alone. 
Oh ... it goes 
down. 
She watches the space kid on the screen. 
R: Can you do something to stay near the yellow line? 
J: Yes! I'll put near all the red balls and then all the 
blue ones. Then, I will take these two teams and I 
will put them near to each other. 
R: That sounds a nice idea! 
D5 
D5 
D3.2 
D6 
D3.1 
D3.1.3 
D3.1 
.. "" 
" 
00 
0 00 
0 
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J: Ok! (She makes the arrangement). 
She starts the game. 
J: Oh! They are equal! 
R: Great! Which colour ball will the white ball touch 
now? 
J: The red one. The red has 32 points and the blue 27. 
R: But, we want them to be equal. 
J: It's going to get red... here it is... you see! 
R: Can you do something to make them equal (the 
scorers)? 
J: Oh ... it (the space kid) went up... 
She switches the game off. 
J: I will put them on a line, one red and one blue. I 
will put the red one on the left and the blue one on 
the right... 
R: Why is that? 
J: Because I will put them near to each other in the 
middle. So, when the [white] ball goes to touch 
one, it will touch also the other that's near it. So, it 
will touch both of them and we will have equal 
points. We do not know where it (the white ball) 
will go, but if it touches one ball it will touch the 
other as well. 
R: That sounds a nice idea ... can we try it? J: Because our ball is small I will put them very near 
to each other ... to have equal points. But, we have 
to have in mind where we will put the white ball. 
She starts the game. 
J: Ah! It's getting points very quickly. We have the 
blue ones with more points.... now the red ones.... 
Oh! The reds have more points! 
R: But you put them near to each other. 
J: Yes, the red is outside. So, it's touching the white 
ball more times. I will put them like this now. I 
will put the two lines in the middle. Now, I need 
another two balls. I'll get the magic wand to get 
more balls. It's the good fairy that gave it to us... 
She copies more balls. 
J: ... The 
little fairy likes us, because we are learning 
it to play games. Ok ... I copied the 
balls... 
R: Do You know how many balls do we have? 
J: Yes ... they are equal. 
I know they are equal, but I 
don't know how many balls I have. 
R: How do you know that they are equal? 
J: I copied one red and one blue each time. It doesn't 
matter actually how many they are. They are equal. 
She switches the game on. 
Al 
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D1.1 
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D6 
D3.1 
D3.1 
C 
D3.1 
D5.1 
loi_z 
00 
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9 
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223 R: Ah ... 10-10! 224 J: Yes 
... now we have more blue balls ... it should go D4.1 225 more times to the red balls now ... Ah! They are 226 equal! ... Now we have more reds ... they're going 227 to be equal again! Yes! 
228 
229 R: Let's stop the game now. I will leave one red and D5 
230 seven blues. Can you tell me after a while what 
231 number the red will get and what the blue one? 
232 J: How much time will we leave it go? 
233 R: As much as you think ... may be one minute. Explaining intervention 234 J: Ok! The blue might have 200 and more and the red D5 
235 100. 
236 R: What about if I put another red ball (7B 2R)? If our 
237 white ball touches 9 times on the balls, how many 
238 times do you think will it touch the reds and how 
239 many times the blues? 
240 J: May be 5 blues and 4 reds ... or .... may be 3 reds D5 241 and 6 blues ... or ... may be 7 blues and 2 reds ... 1 243 don't know. 
244 R: Can we also have 7 reds and 3 blues? 
245 J: May be ... let's say if you put the 
balls here, we 
246 might have it. 
247 R: Ah ... I will put the balls 
in the position that You 
248 used in order to have equal scores. If our white ball 
249 now touches 90 times on the balls, what will we 
250 get for the red scorer and what for the blue one? 
251 J: May be 60 blues and 30 reds. D5 
252 R: If I have 3 reds and 6 blues? 
253 J: May be 50 blues and 40 reds. 
254 R: If I have 4 reds and 5 blues? 
255 J: May be 20 reds or may be all blues ... I don't 
know. D5 
256 R: Ok ... Now, 
I want the blue scorer to have twice as 
257 much as the red scorer. How many balls should I 
have? 
258 J: I can have 3 reds and 6 blues ... So, 
lets take away D5.2.1 
259 one from the red and get another blue... 
260 J: ... 
let's take away 2 blues, but we may get more 
261 reds ... it's possible. 
262 R: If we want to make it more possible to get twice as 
263 many blue balls as red balls? What shall we do? 
264 J: We may have 7 blues and 3 reds. 
265 She copies some balls and switches on the game 
(8B 3R) *I 
266 J: We get more blue balls. if we had a bigger white 
D5 
267 ball it would touch both blue and red balls without 
268 passing though... 
269 R: We can make it bigger... 
270 J: I mean the white ball! 
D2 
271 R: Yes! We can use the star! 
and I will Yes! I remember that window will open 272 J: 
236 
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273 make it bigger. 
274 She uses the star to make the white ball bigger, D2.2 275 then, she takes away balls. 
276 R: How many balls do we have now? 277 J: We have 3 more blue balls than red ones. We have 278 6 blues and 3 reds. 
279 R: Why is that? 
280 J: We want the blue scorer to be twice as much as the D5.2 281 red one ... wait a minute. 282 She re-arranges the balls. 
283 J: I will switch on the game now! ... Ok! I'll do 284 something else. 
285 She makes 4 blues and 3 reds. 
286 R: What did you do? 
287 J: I'll have more blue balls. D3.2.2 
288 R: How many more? 
289 J: More than reds ... The blue will get more points, D3 290 that's for sure. 
Step 2 
291 R: Let's switch on the game and tell me what's 
happening. 
292 J: We have 5 reds and 4 blues (on the scorers). 
293 R: Why did the game shut down? 
294 J: It (the space kid) moved up and shut down. 
295 R: Did it touch something? 
296 J: It touched that red thing (the red planet). 
297 R: Start the game again. Can you imagine the rules of 
298 the red planet? 
299 J: When it has more points the red scorer, the s. k. D3.2 
300 touches the red planet, it explodes and the game 
301 shuts down. 
302 She opens the rules. 
303 J: When it touches the s. k., it explodes and the game C 
304 shuts down. 
305 R: What about the blue planet? 
306 J: When it touches the space kid, it explodes and the 
307 game shuts down. They are the same as the red C 
ones. 
308 R: Switch on the game again and lets see what 
happens. 
309 J: It (the space kid) touches the red planet. 
310 R: Why does it touch the red planet? 
311 J: The red balls are more... D3.2.2 
312 R: Can we do something in order for the space kid not 
313 to touch any planet? 
314 J: Yes! We can put the same amount of balls. D3.1.1 
315 R: The same amount of balls ... where will the s. 
k. be? 
316 J: In the middle. 
317 R: Can you make that? 
318 J: Yes ... or ... we can 
have only one or two more red D3.1 
£KJ 
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319 balls, but not too many more ... we can leave only 320 one red and one blue. 
321 She removes some balls. 
322 J: I know why it went to the red planet. The red balls 323 were more and it touched them more times ... you 324 see ... I destroyed so many red balls and there are 325 still more ... Ok! I will leave two blue balls and two 326 red ones. I will put one red, one blue, one red, one 
327 blue. 
328 R: Ok... 
329 She starts the game. 
330 R: How is the white ball moving around? 
331 J: It moves up and down, right and left and when it 
332 touches one ball and gets a point it then goes 
333 everywhere in the yellow square. 
334 R: Does it know where it goes? 
335 J: It knows. 
336 R: How does it know? 
337 J: It does know, we don't, but it knows. 
338 R: How does it move? 
339 J: For us it moves randomly, but it might know 
340 where to go. We don't know where it goes because 
341 we didn't make it to go somewhere ... Look 11-11! 342 
343 But, it stopped! Why? 
344 R: Do you want to leave it a little more time to see if 
345 we have equal numbers? 
346 J: Yes! 
347 R: Ok ... let's move these two planets. You are going 348 to move them as far as you want to. 
349 J: Ok! I'll put them here (further away from the space 
349 kid, but not at the edge of the screen). 
350 She starts the game. 
351 R: it moves too slowly. 
352 J: I will put some more balls. 
353 She copies some balls. 
354 R: How many balls do we have now? 
355 J: We have 4 blues and 4 reds. 
356 R: Let's see how you are going to arrange them. 
357 J: Ah! I know! 
358 She destroys some balls, leaving I red and I blue. 
359 ... 
360 J: I will put them like this ... Because the white 
ball is 
361 in the middle, it touches the red and blue ball. 
362 Have you imagined filling in our square with blue 
363 balls and having one red in the middle? 
364 Shelaughs... 
365 R: What will happen? 
366 J: It will kill itself all the time on the blue planet! 
367 R: Will the red get a point? 
368 J: It will, but the blue will take much more. 
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369 R: We can try that afterwards ... Look! It keeps 370 moving slowly. What shall we do? 371 J: Add some balls? 
372 R: If you think so ... 373 J: Look! 20-20! ... Ok! I'll put some balls ... Like 374 this ... a diagonal line. 375 R: Oh ... you copied another white ball (accidentally), 376 what do you think will happen? 
377 J: I don't know. We will get equal points. 
378 R: Will we get points more easily or more difficult 
than before? 
379 J: We will get easier points, because these two balls 
380 are moving together, collecting more points ... Can 381 we destroy these? (the two planets). 
382 R: Yes we can. Do you want to? 
383 J: Yes ... they shut down the game and it doesn't stay 384 for a long time. 
385 R: Can we make it stay longer without destroying 
386 them? 
387 J: Yes ... if you put more white balls, what will 388 happen? 
389 R: Can you tell me? 
390 J: I will put some more ... we will have many points, 391 changing all the time. 
392 R: What about our space kid? 
393 J: It will keep going up and down, up and down and 
394 it will get a headache! 
395 She copies some white balls. 
396 J: At the end it will kill itself ... it will have a 
397 headache all the time! 
398 R: Where will it go to kill itself? At the red or at the 
399 blue planet? 
400 J: At both of them! We won't know where to go! 
401 She keeps adding and destroYing balls. 
402 J: We do not want these two balls... 
403 She put one red, one blue etc, and they remained 
404 two blues... 
405 J: Wait a minute! 
406 R: What's up? 
407 J: I'm checking whether the balls are equal. 
408 R: Are they? 
409 J: Yes! 
410 She switches on the game. 
411 J: Oh! You cannot understand from the 
412 numbers ... they 
keep moving too quickly. We 
413 should look at the space kid ... 
Oh! It went up ... 92- 
414 110. We should move the planets again. 
415 She moves the two planets to the edge of 
the 
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screen. 
416 R: Let's start the game again. 
417 J: Oh! I think it will go on the red. Yes! It's on the D4.1 418 yellow line now! They passed the 100 ... Oh again on the blue ... oh 118-137. 419 R: That was a very good idea ... If we want now to get 420 quickly at the red planet without getting any blue 
421 points, what shall we do? 
422 J: I will put the reds here and the blue here ... It will D3.2 423 only get one point (the blue scorer). D7 
424 She starts the game. 
425 J: You see ... it got only one point. D7 426 R: If we don't want to get any blue points what shall 
427 we do? 
428 J: We should leave only red balls! D3.2.1 
429 R: Ok! But if we have to have some blue balls? 
430 J: We can have many reds and only one blue. Do you 
431 want me to do that? 
432 R: If you would like... 
433 She copies and destroys balls. 
434 J: Oh! It became a drawing. You see ... here is his C2 435 nose, his eyes, his hands ... it doesn't have any legs. 436 I'll do him his legs... 
437 R: So, how many points you think the blue will have? 
438 J: Too little ... may be the red 100 and the 
blue, D5 
439 maybe, 20. 
440 She switches the game on. 
441 J: The red got 20 and the blue one point. 
442 R: Can you make it in a way to have a blue ball, but 
443 not to have any blue points? 
444 J: Yes ... I will put the red 
balls near to each other and D3.2 
445 1 will put the blue one down on the side. I will D3.1.3 
446 copy some red balls to make the red to get more 
space. 
447 She starts the game. 
448 J: Oh! It took one point ... I don't 
know... 
449 R: Do you remember now your diagonal line. 
450 J: Yes! 
451 R: How many balls do we have here? 
452 J: One blue and nine reds. 
453 R: Ok. We have ten points now. How many blues you 
454 think we have and how many reds? 
455 J: 10 reds and may be no blue points ... or maybe 
9 D5 
456 reds and I blue point. 
457 R: if we get 20 points? 
458 J: May be 10 blues and 10 reds. 
459 She starts the game. 
460 J: We got 24 reds and 4 blues. We got more red 
balls. 
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461 R: Ok ... now we will have 3 blues and 7 reds. What 462 points will we get? 
463 J: We will have ... 7 red points and 3 blue points. 464 R: If we get 20 points? 
465 J: 20 points? We may have 15 reds and 5 blues. 466 R: If we need the red to be twice as much as the blue? 467 J: To put another two reds ... eh... 
468 She starts the game... 
469 J: 33-13.1 have 9 reds and 3 blue balls. 
470 R: If we want this (the red score) to be twice as 
471 much? 
472 J: Oh 
... I don't know ... I can't do it... Step 3 
473 R: What happens with the brick? 
474 J: It touches them and moves them away. It has the 
475 same rules with the balls, but now messages. 
476 R: Can you do something here in order for the space 
477 kid to be near the yellow line? 
478 J: I will take away some red balls. 
479 R: Ok! How many balls do you have now? 
480 J: 8 blues and 8 reds ... Shall I start the game? I think 481 it's ok! 
Discussion 
482 R: What did you do with these games? 
483 J: We played with a space kid and some balls, and we 
484 tried to put as many balls so that as the time passes 
485 our numbers become equal. Our space kid should 
486 remain in the middle, near to the yellow line. 
487 R: How did the white ball move? 
488 J: It moved ... the computer controlled it. We tried to 
489 think where might the ball go. 
490 R: What did we do in order to have a clue about 
491 which ball will touch? 
492 J: We put ... when we 
had more red balls, we knew 
493 that it would go to the red balls. 
494 R: If we wanted the space kid to remain on the yellow 
495 line? 
496 J: We put the balls on a diagonal line. 
497 R: What did you like from these games? 
498 J: Each thing had its rules and in order to control the 
499 white ball we should delete all the rules from the 
500 computer that control it, and put our rules on it! 
501 R: And if we couldn't change its rules? 
502 J: We put balls... 
503 R: OK, thanks a lot! 
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A5 A summary of a transcript 
Irene's first reaction to the game was sample space-oriented. She was very curious about 
how the white ball was moving and at the beginning she expressed many times the idea of 
controlling this ball, which as she said 'it moves everywhere'. After watching the white 
ball moving around and concluding that 'It is just moving around without doing anything', 
she decided to deal with the coloured balls inside the yellow square. The movement of the 
white ball seemed to be arbitrary and the absence of a rule beside it suggested a movement 
with no purpose. She realised that she cannot do anything about that, unless she creates a 
rule for the ball. The arbitrary movement here is an expression of randomness. Her 
recognition of this led her to begin thinking of controlling the placing the coloured balls, as 
a way to control this 'free' situation. 
Generally, in her constructions she used outcome-oriented description based on the global 
events on the screen, to value whether her idea was working ok. Because of the continuous 
movement of the white ball, the change on the scorers came without stopping. When the 
scorers changed more quickly, looking at the global events in the game was more helpful 
for her to make decisions, and to express the possibility of something to happen by 
describing the movement of the space kid, up or down. 
Fairness was Irene's first reaction for dealing with two colours. On my intervention about 
changing the place of the balls, she put the balls in symmetrical positions. 
R: .... Let me ask you something. 
If I move the blue ball a little 
bit and place the red ball here, what do you think will happen? 
1: It (the white ball) will move again. We just changed the place 
of the balls. 
R: What will happen to the counters? 
1: 1 will do something 
R: Can you please answer my question first? 
Never mind... I will put this here and that one I will put it 
here. 
R- Why did you put it like this? 
0 
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Because if this gets that one then it will go to the blue and 
then get the red and go like this and get that. 
R: Where will the space kid move? 
1: On the yellow line... 
She starts the game. 
You see! (She laughs). We have 0-0 points for the time! 2 
points, 3... 
Irene ignored my question about the 'unsymmetrical position' of the balls. The idea of 
fairness comes intuitively, since 'fair' is the thing that 'must' happen in a game. 
Furthermore, in Irene) s mind fairness is connected with symmetry. 
During this construction Irene was watching the scorers changing points very slowly. This 
event made her copy more balls into the sample space. She wanted the results to change 
quickly, so she copied another two balls of each colour. Perhaps this is also a sign of 
situated abstraction for the law of large numbers and probability. The placement of these 
extra balls was again symmetrical: the sample space should be fair, so the balls should be 
placed in symmetry. Her explanation of symmetrical placement of the balls was as follows: 
1: 1 will put them like this. The one near the other. 
R: Why? 
1: Because the white ball can get more easily the red and the 
blue balls and they will get more points. 
R: Will they get the same points? 
1: No! Because the blue has four points and I placed the ball 
here from the beginning, so it will get more points. 
R: Can you make something to get the same points? 
1: Yes ... 
in the middle. (She places the white ball in the middle). 
R: Will they get the same points now? 
1: 1 don't know. Yes! I think so, may be. Shall I start the game? 
R: Yes! 
She starts the game. 
18,19 ... 
hey move! Wow! They got the same points. Yes! 27! 
(She is screaming). 29-29 Wow! 33-33! It's so quick! 
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Apart from thinking about the symmetrical position it seems also that the starting point of 
the white ball has a role in Irene's mind, at least at the beginning. She tried to guess the 
first movement of the white ball to make a decision about how the ball would move and 
which balls it would touch more frequently. Her decision worked for the short-term 
movement of the ball but not in the long term. Thus, the continuous movement of the white 
ball gives two levels for movement: the short term, which might be expressed as 'local', 
and the long term movement, which might be expressed as 'global'. 
Irene's enthusiasm was evidenced by her continuous shouts while she was watching the 
scorers on the screen. At this point I asked her to place more balls in the sample space. 
This is when she thought of the idea of surrounding the white ball, 'I will surround this 
white ball'. She did this again by placing an equal number of blue and red balls, five of 
each colour. After some trial and error with spatial arrangement she concluded by 
constructing a semi-circle, placing the blue and red balls in an alternating pattern. The 
method of trial and error, in a spatial representation environment, allowed her to develop 
the idea of building a fair sample space; this requires not only the same number of balls of 
each colour, something that she knew from before, but also a particular spatial 
arrangement. 
1: 1 will get this blue ball, put it where the red was and I will 
place the red near to it, such as to have blue, red, blue... 
R: Why are you doing this? 
1: 1 am making it like pattern because with this way they could 
have equal points! Is it right? 
R: There is no right and wrong... I just need your ideas! 
1: Ok... I think now it's ok! 
She starts the game. 
Oh... you bad red balls! Oh ... 
look! 21-21! Something 
happens! Look we have equal numbers! (She laughs). They 
got 61 points! ... Oh ... 
it is ok! Wow ... 102! 
104! Oh it moved 
down... 112-122... Oh, the poor space kid! It moves up now! 
Oops! A... It seems to move up now... Ahhhhhhhhhhh 207- 
207! (Shelaughs! ) 
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The starting place of the white ball still played a role in Irene's thinking. She finally came 
to the idea of having the white ball in the middle and surrounded by the other balls. 
Although the starting place of the ball didn't play a significant role in this construction, she 
evidently felt it to be important for fairness. 
In the previous constructions and in this one, Irene faced some unfair situations. She 
started by making a circle of balls and because that was small she had to place some red 
balls outside the circle. This made her sample space not to work effectively, and the blues 
to get a bigger score. This is another point where she seemed to find significance in the 
spatial representation of the balls in sample space. So, although at the beginning she was 
very careful of having equal numbers of balls inside the sample space, which is how she 
understood fairness, she made the decision to take away one blue, leaving four blues and 
five reds and tried it out. The environment made her to question her idea that fairness only 
means equality between the numbers of the balls of the two colours; she came to 
coordinate both the spatial arrangement and numbers of the balls to achieve a desired fair 
result. After another trial of placing the balls in the space she thought of the semi-circle 
pattern. It seem that at this point she made the connection between the two pieces of 
knowledge - equal numbers and the placement of the balls inside the sample space. After 
this (in phase 2, where she tried to make the space kid not to touch the two planets) she 
constructed another two fair sample spaces as follows: 
00 
%0: 
An effective strategy devised by Irene for constructing a fair random environment came to 
be the 'surrounding" of the white ball and making a pattern with equal numbers of balls of 
different colour. This was her way to 'control' randomness and to make the white ball to 
'touch both blue and red balls the same times". 
The construction of a fair environment was not made 
by Irene because she was asked to, 
but because as she said is 'better for both colours to get the same points on the counters'. 
That statement was made when she had tried out different representations and 
had got an 
unfair sample space. The idea of 
fairness is something that Irene developed through her 
experience in the games. As 
Irene was getting bigger scores on the counters, she seemed to 
judge differently the equality of fairness. As the above snapshot shows, while 
the scorers 
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were changing very quickly, she expressed that 102 and 104 are equal, and then 112-122 
also declared equal. 
Irene easily constructed an 'impossible' sample space, where no blues would give any 
points for the blue counter. 
R: Can you do something in order our space kid to move quickly 
to the red planet? 
1: Yes... Now, it won't get any blues. 
*0 
O's, 40 
R: Are you sure about it? 
L Yes! 
She starts the game. 
1: It will explode on the red... They are alone ... so that's ok! 
R: If we need to have some blue balls as well? 
1: 1 will put them somewhere that the ball doesn't go. 
R: Is there such a place? 
1: No, but I can make one. We could also put only blue balls and 
move to the blue planet. Anyway, I will put only one blue 
ball. 
R: Why only one? 
1: To be easier for the ball to get the reds. 
She starts the game. 
1: It might get some points, but it will make an explosion. 
0* 
0,0,0 
Notice here that although Irene had the idea of making it difficult to get any blue points, 
she understood that it is still possible for the white ball to touch the blue ball. 
There is an 
implication here that perhaps Irene thinks that everything is possible to happen. Even 
extreme variability is a possibility. This is also a point where she sees this construction 
in 
the long term, and reveals thinking about the 'law of large numbers'. 
This was also found 
in the previous episode where she constructed a symmetrical fair sample space of three 
balls of each colour. When she was asked whether the two scorers will get the same points, 
she said 'I don't know. Yes! I think so, may 
be. Shall I start the garneT Although here she 
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seemed to be almost sure of the result, the reason that she could not control the movement 
of the white ball made her think about the possibility of things to happen (or not happen) 
which she did (not) want to happen. 
T Irene worked with patterns to place equal numbers of balls inside the sample space. She 
did not care about the number of balls, only to have the same number of each colour. She 
did not count the balls to see if they are equal, but she used patterns to produce the same 
number of balls. This may indicate that she had the knowledge of 'equality of an event', 
such that 1: 1 is equal to 5: 5. Most of the times she preferred adding balls in the sample 
space instead of taking balls away. The total number of the balls (the denominator for the 
probability) did not play a role in her construction of fairness, only the equality of the 
numerators. 
When she had to deal with big numbers and to express ratios requiring double figures, she 
tended to express the outcome by saying only which colour is going to get more or less 
points. 
R: Ok... So, they are 10 balls, 9 blues and I red. If the red gets 
10 how many will the blue get? 
1: 19... Because the red is one and the blues are 9 and they 
surround the white ball. 
R: If now the white ball touches 100 times on the balls, how 
many times will it touch on the red and how many on the 
blues? 
1: On the blue it might touch 88 times or 100 and on the red 
78... 
Irene here expressed large and small numbers, depending on which colour 
it was possible 
to win, without even thinking whether the total of these numbers 
is the total number of hits 
by the white ball. She used the words 'more' and 'less', and 
does not appear to think in a 
proportional way to express a possible number result. 
Irene made some effort to understand how the game was working. 
She used most of the 
time the third person to express the rules of objects. 
She did not express the rules as 'there 
is an object having this rule', 
but she did express about what an object was 
doing in the 
game. She was self-oriented when she was 
describing rules. For example, when she 
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described the rules of the counter she said, "See. The first rule is 'when I start the game it's 
zero and when it moves down and gets the red message it adds one. "' Although that she 
did not express the rules of the game using the third person she understood very quickly 
how the game worked and connected easily the local events that happened inside the 
yellow square with the outcome they had for the space kid. The use of the third person 
seemed to be only a problem of expression, that might have something to do with the age 
of the children, and not a problem of understanding the game. 
During the game, apart from changing the balls inside the yellow square Irene also had the 
idea of changing the size of the planets and moved them far away from the yellow line in 
order for the space kid not to touch them. This was done to give time for the space kid to 
make more movements and to remain near the yellow line. This suggests an intuition by 
the child that is connected with the law of large numbers. 
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A6 A sketch of a transcript 
A. Local and Global Thinkina - ---------- 
DESCRIPTION PAGE ON THE 
TRANSCRIPT (the line 
Al. I't description s. s. oriented+outcome oriented 
was highlighted on it) 
PgI 
(mix) 
- Connection between local andSlobal thinking Pg 1 
Al. 1 Global oriented Pg 2 
Al. lNeed the use of global thinking Pg 3 
A2 Global thinking of equalit Pg 4 
A2 Global thinking of proportional thinking 
_Pg 
5 
B. Expressing the rules 
3r" person Pg l 
ist person Pg 6 
C. Eni! ai! ement with the game 
I C. To have fun [ pg 9 
C. Expressions of random mixture 
DI. Unsystematic movement 
D I. *: Liberal movement Pg 2, Pg 6, Pg 8, 
Dl. *": The starting point of the white ball plays a 
role 
Pg 2, Pg 9 
D1*: Moving in a strange way Pg 10 
D2 Changing the mechanism 
D2.4 Have another colour of balls pg 
D2.4Make a rule to the scorers to get 50 points Pg 3 
D2.2.1 More white balls Pg 3 
D2.2.3 Changing the speed of the white balls Pg 4 
D2.3Giving speed to red and blue balls Pg 4 
D2.4Making new rules Pg 7 
D2*Having only the white ball Pg 7 
D3.1 Construction of fairness 
D3.1.1 Moving and changing the number of the 
elements of sample space 
Pg 2 
D3.1. *Same number and size of balls Pg 3 
D3.1-1.1 Symmetrical teams Pg 4. Pg 5 
53.1.2. * Mixture Pg 4, Pg7 
D3.1.2. * Same size Pg 8 
D3.1. *Spatial representation/distribution Pg 5 
32 *: A not pre-defined code on the coding system (see Chapter 4, section 4.3.5). 
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D3.2 Construction of unfairness 
D3.2. *The same size of all the balls/different 
number 
Pg 3 
D3.2. *Distribution: 'it's how I put them' Pg 5 
D3.2. *'No points=no red/no blue balls Pg 9 
D3.2. I Certain and Impossible events/no red balls Pg 9 
D4 Judgement of equality in fairness 
D4. *'Someone might get more, but they will be 
equal... ' 
Pg 2, Pg 3 
D4. *A small difference 40-43 Pg 3 
D4. *Almost the same Pg 5. Pg 7 
D4. *Trial and error Pg 2 
D5 Proportional thinking 
D5. *'The more will win... ' Pg 5 
D5.1.2 '7/1=70/10 only with one ball... ' Pg 5 
D5.2 'Twice as much, 2- 1' - only with small 
numbers 
Pg 5 
D5.1.2 1/4=10/40,1/5= 10/50 Pg 5 
5. *Taking away balls to make them equal E Pg 6 
D5 * 'To be sure for his decision' 
[ 
Pg 6 
D6 Infinity 
D6.1. *More balls 3 
D6.1. *Move planets at the edges Pg 6/ Pg 7 
D6.1. *Change the speed Pg 8 
D6.1. *Adding balls of both colours 
D7 Possibility 
D7.1. *1 red ball pg 9 
D7.1. *Only blue balls Pg 9 
w 
UNY. 
